Statement by BRICs at New Dehli Meet on 29 March, 2012

Five emerging economic powerhouses - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa - are meeting in Delhi for the BRICS summit to discuss a range of issues, including increased financial integration of the member countries, energy security and the ongoing crisis in Syria.

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(Photo: Reuters)
(From L-R) Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Chinese President Hu Jintao and South African President Jacob Zuma join their hands together during a group photo for the BRICS Summit in New Delhi March 29, 2012.

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Here is the document the BRICS members released to explain their agenda.

Source: India's Ministry of External Affairs

1. We, the leaders of the Federative Republic of Brazil, theRussian Federation, the Republic of India, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, met in New Delhi, India, on 29 March 2012 at the Fourth BRICS Summit. Our discussions, under the overarching theme,"BRICS Partnership for Global Stability, Security and Prosperity", were conducted in an atmosphere of cordiality and warmth and inspired by a shared desire to further strengthen our partnership for common development and take our cooperation forward on the basis of openness, solidarity, mutual understanding and trust.

2. We met against the backdrop of developments and changes of contemporary global and regional importance - a faltering global recovery made more complex by the situation in the euro zone; concerns of sustainable development and climate change which take on greater relevance as we approach the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) and the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity being hosted in Brazil and India respectively later this year; the upcoming G20 Summit in Mexico and the recent 8th WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva; and the developing political scenario in the Middle East and North Africa that we view with increasing concern. Our deliberations today reflected our consensus to remain engaged with the world community as we address these challenges to global well-being and stability in a responsible and constructive manner.

3. BRICS is a platform for dialogue and cooperation amongst countries that represent 43 percent of the world's population, for the promotion of peace, security and development in a multi-polar, inter-dependent and increasingly complex, globalizing world. Coming, as we do, from Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America, the transcontinental dimension of our interaction adds to its value and significance.

4. We envision a future marked by global peace, economic and social progress and enlightened scientific temper. We stand ready to work with others, developed and developing countries together, on the basis of universally recognized norms of international law and multilateral decision making, to deal with the challenges and the opportunities before the world today. Strengthened representation of emerging and developing countries in the institutions of global governance will enhance their effectiveness in achieving this objective.

5. We are concerned over the current global economic situation. While the BRICS recovered relatively quickly from the global crisis, growth prospects worldwide have again got dampened by market instability especially in the euro zone. The build-up of sovereign debt and concerns over medium to long-term fiscal adjustment in advanced countries are creating an uncertain environment for global growth. Further, excessive liquidity from the aggressive policy actions taken by central banks to stabilize their domestic economies have been spilling over into emerging market economies, fostering excessive volatility in capital flows and commodity prices. The immediate priority at hand is to restore market confidence and get global growth back on track. We will work with the international community to ensure international policy coordination to maintain macroeconomic stability conducive to the healthy recovery of the global economy.

6. We believe that it is critical for advanced economies to adopt responsible macroeconomic and financial policies, avoid creating excessive global liquidity and undertake structural reforms to lift growth that create jobs. We draw attention to the risks of large and volatile cross-border capital flows being faced by the emerging economies. We call for further international financial regulatory oversight and reform, strengthening policy coordination and financial regulation and supervision cooperation, and promoting the sound development of global financial markets and banking systems.

7. In this context, we believe that the primary role of the G20 as premier forum for international economic cooperation at this juncture is to facilitate enhanced macroeconomic policy coordination, to enable global economic recovery and secure financial stability, including through an improved international monetary and financial architecture. We approach the next G20 Summit in Mexico with a commitment to work with the Presidency, all members and the international community to achieve positive results, consistent with national policy frameworks, to ensure strong, sustainable and balanced growth.

8. We recognize the importance of the global financial architecture in maintaining the stability and integrity of the global monetary and financial system. We therefore call for a more representative international financial architecture, with an increase in the voice and representation of developing countries and the establishment and improvement of a just international monetary system that can serve the interests of all countries and support the development of emerging and developing economies. Moreover, these economies having experienced broad-based growth are now significant contributors to global recovery.

9. We are however concerned at the slow pace of quota and governance reforms in the IMF. We see an urgent need to implement, as agreed, the 2010 Governance and Quota Reform before the 2012 IMF/World Bank Annual Meeting, as well as the comprehensive review of the quota formula to better reflect economic weights and enhance the voice and representation of emerging market and developing countries by January 2013, followed by the completion of the next general quota review by January 2014. This dynamic process of reform is necessary to ensure the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Fund. We stress that the ongoing effort to increase the lending capacity of the IMF will only be successful if there is confidence that the entire membership of the institution is truly committed to implement the 2010 Reform faithfully. We will work with the international community to ensure that sufficient resources can be mobilized to the IMF in a timely manner as the Fund continues its transition to improve governance and legitimacy. We reiterate our support for measures to protect the voice and representation of the IMF's poorest members.

10. We call upon the IMF to make its surveillance framework more integrated and even-handed, noting that IMF proposals for a new integrated decision on surveillance would be considered before the IMF Spring Meeting.

11. In the current global economic environment, we recognize that there is a pressing need for enhancing the flow of development finance to emerging and developing countries. We therefore call upon the World Bank to give greater priority to mobilizing resources and meeting the needs of development finance while reducing lending costs and adopting innovative lending tools.

12. We welcome the candidatures from developing world for the position of the President of the World Bank. We reiterate that the Heads of IMF and World Bank be selected through an open and merit-based process. Furthermore, the new World Bank leadership must commit to transform the Bank into a multilateral institution that truly reflects the vision of all its members, including the governance structure that reflects current economic and political reality. Moreover, the nature of the Bank must shift from an institution that essentially mediates North-South cooperation to an institution that promotes equal partnership with all countries as a way to deal with development issues and to overcome an outdated donor- recipient dichotomy.

13. We have considered the possibility of setting up a new Development Bank for mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries, to supplement the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development. We direct our Finance Ministers to examine the feasibility and viability of such an initiative, set up a joint working group for further study, and report back to us by the next Summit.

14. Brazil, India, China and South Africa look forward to the Russian Presidency of G20 in 2013 and extend their cooperation.

15. Brazil, India, China and South Africa congratulate the Russian Federation on its accession to the WTO. This makes the WTO more representative and strengthens the rule-based multilateral trading system. We commit to working together to safeguard this system and urge other countries to resist all forms of trade protectionism and disguised restrictions on trade.

16. We will continue our efforts for the successful conclusion of the Doha Round, based on the progress made and in keeping with its mandate. Towards this end, we will explore outcomes in specific areas where progress is possible while preserving the centrality of development and within the overall framework of the single undertaking. We do not support plurilateral initiatives that go against the fundamental principles of transparency, inclusiveness and multilateralism. We believe that such initiatives not only distract members from striving for a collective outcome but also fail to address the development deficit inherited from previous negotiating rounds. Once the ratification process is completed, Russia intends to participate in an active and constructive manner for a balanced outcome of the Doha Round that will help strengthen and develop the multilateral trade system.

17. Considering UNCTAD to be the focal point in the UN system for the treatment of trade and development issues, we intend to invest in improving its traditional activities of consensus-building, technical cooperation and research on issues of economic development and trade. We reiterate our willingness to actively contribute to the achievement of a successful UNCTAD XIII, in April 2012.

18. We agree to build upon our synergies and to work together to intensify trade and investment flows among our countries to advance our respective industrial development and employment objectives. We welcome the outcomes of the second Meeting of BRICS Trade Ministers held in New Delhi on 28 March 2012. We support the regular consultations amongst our Trade Ministers and consider taking suitable measures to facilitate further consolidation of our trade and economic ties. We welcome the conclusion of the Master Agreement on Extending Credit Facility in Local Currency under BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism and the Multilateral Letter of Credit Confirmation Facility Agreement between our EXIM/Development Banks. We believe that these Agreements will serve as useful enabling instruments for enhancing intra-BRICS trade in coming years.

19. We recognize the vital importance that stability, peace and security of the Middle East and North Africa holds for all of us, for the international community, and above all for the countries and their citizens themselves whose lives have been affected by the turbulence that has erupted in the region. We wish to see these countries living in peace and regain stability and prosperity as respected members of the global community.

20. We agree that the period of transformation taking place in the Middle East and North Africa should not be used as a pretext to delay resolution of lasting conflicts but rather it should serve as an incentive to settle them, in particular the Arab-Israeli conflict. Resolution of this and other long-standing regional issues would generally improve the situation in the Middle East and North Africa. Thus we confirm our commitment to achieving comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of the universally recognized international legal framework including the relevant UN resolutions, the Madrid principles and the Arab Peace Initiative. We encourage the Quartet to intensify its efforts and call for greater involvement of the UN Security Council in search for a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We also underscore the importance of direct negotiations between the parties to reach final settlement. We call upon Palestinians and Israelis to take constructive measures, rebuild mutual trust and create the right conditions for restarting negotiations, while avoiding unilateral steps, in particular settlement activity in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

21. We express our deep concern at the current situation in Syria and call for an immediate end to all violence and violations of human rights in that country. Global interests would best be served by dealing with the crisis through peaceful means that encourage broad national dialogues that reflect the legitimate aspirations of all sections of Syrian society and respect Syrian independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Our objective is to facilitate a Syrian-led inclusive political process, and we welcome the joint efforts of the United Nations and the Arab League to this end. We encourage the Syrian government and all sections of Syrian society to demonstrate the political will to initiate such a process, which alone can create a new environment for peace. We welcome the appointment of Mr. Kofi Annan as the Joint Special Envoy on the Syrian crisis and the progress made so far, and support him in continuing to play a constructive role in bringing about the political resolution of the crisis.

22. The situation concerning Iran cannot be allowed to escalate into conflict, the disastrous consequences of which will be in no one's interest. Iran has a crucial role to play for the peaceful development and prosperity of a region of high political and economic relevance, and we look to it to play its part as a responsible member of the global community. We are concerned about the situation that is emerging around Iran's nuclear issue. We recognize Iran's right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with its international obligations, and support resolution of the issues involved through political and diplomatic means and dialogue between the parties concerned, including between the IAEA and Iran and in accordance with the provisions of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

23. Afghanistan needs time, development assistance and cooperation, preferential access to world markets, foreign investment and a clear end-state strategy to attain lasting peace and stability. We support the global community's commitment to Afghanistan, enunciated at the Bonn International Conference in December 2011, to remain engaged over the transformation decade from 2015-2024. We affirm our commitment to support Afghanistan's emergence as a peaceful, stable and democratic state, free of terrorism and extremism, and underscore the need for more effective regional and international cooperation for the stabilization of Afghanistan, including by combating terrorism.

24. We extend support to the efforts aimed at combating illicit traffic in opiates originating in Afghanistan within the framework of the Paris Pact.

25. We reiterate that there can be no justification, whatsoever, for any act of terrorism in any form or manifestation. We reaffirm our determination to strengthen cooperation in countering this menace and believe that the United Nations has a central role in coordinating international action against terrorism, within the framework of the UN Charter and in accordance with principles and norms of international law. We emphasize the need for an early finalization of the draft of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism in the UN General Assembly and its adoption by all Member States to provide a comprehensive legal framework to address this global scourge.

26. We express our strong commitment to multilateral diplomacy with the United Nations playing a central role in dealing with global challenges and threats. In this regard, we reaffirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, with a view to making it more effective, efficient and representative so that it can deal with today's global challenges more successfully. China and Russia reiterate the importance they attach to the status of Brazil, India and South Africa in international affairs and support their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN.

27. We recall our close coordination in the Security Council during the year 2011, and underscore our commitment to work together in the UN to continue our cooperation and strengthen multilateral approaches on issues pertaining to global peace and security in the years to come.

28. Accelerating growth and sustainable development, along with food, and energy security, are amongst the most important challenges facing the world today, and central to addressing economic development, eradicating poverty, combating hunger and malnutrition in many developing countries. Creating jobs needed to improve people's living standards worldwide is critical. Sustainable development is also a key element of our agenda for global recovery and investment for future growth. We owe this responsibility to our future generations.

29. We congratulate South Africa on the successful hosting of the 17th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 7th Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP17/CMP7) in December 2011. We welcome the significant outcomes of the Conference and are ready to work with the international community to implement its decisions in accordance with the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.

30. We are fully committed to playing our part in the global fight against climate change and will contribute to the global effort in dealing with climate change issues through sustainable and inclusive growth and not by capping development. We emphasize that developed country Parties to the UNFCCC shall provide enhanced financial, technology and capacity building support for the preparation and implementation of nationally appropriate mitigation actions of developing countries.

31. We believe that the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) is a unique opportunity for the international community to renew its high-level political commitment to supporting the overarching sustainable development framework encompassing inclusive economic growth and development, social progress and environment protection in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, including the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation.

32. We consider that sustainable development should be the main paradigm in environmental issues, as well as for economic and social strategies. We acknowledge the relevance and focus of the main themes for the Conference namely, Green Economy in the context of Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication (GESDPE) as well as Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development (IFSD).

33. China, Russia, India and South Africa look forward to working with Brazil as the host of this important Conference in June, for a successful and practical outcome. Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa also pledge their support to working with India as it hosts the 11th meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in October 2012 and look forward to a positive outcome. We will continue our efforts for the implementation of the Convention and its Protocols, with special attention to the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization, Biodiversity Strategic Plan 2011-2020 and the Resource Mobilization Strategy.

34. We affirm that the concept of a 'green economy', still to be defined at Rio+20, must be understood in the larger framework of sustainable development and poverty eradication and is a means to achieve these fundamental and overriding priorities, not an end in itself. National authorities must be given the flexibility and policy space to make their own choices out of a broad menu of options and define their paths towards sustainable development based on the country's stage of development, national strategies, circumstances and priorities. We resist the introduction of trade and investment barriers in any form on the grounds of developing green economy.

35. The Millennium Development Goals remain a fundamental milestone in the development agenda. To enable developing countries to obtain maximal results in attaining their Millennium Development Goals by the agreed time-line of 2015, we must ensure that growth in these countries is not affected. Any slowdown would have serious consequences for the world economy. Attainment of the MDGs is fundamental to ensuring inclusive, equitable and sustainable global growth and would require continued focus on these goals even beyond 2015, entailing enhanced financing support.

36. We attach the highest importance to economic growth that supports development and stability in Africa, as many of these countries have not yet realized their full economic potential. We will take our cooperation forward to support their efforts to accelerate the diversification and modernization of their economies. This will be through infrastructure development, knowledge exchange and support for increased access to technology, enhanced capacity building, and investment in human capital, including within the framework of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

37. We express our commitment to the alleviation of the humanitarian crisis that still affects millions of people in the Horn of Africa and support international efforts to this end.

38. Excessive volatility in commodity prices, particularly those for food and energy, poses additional risks for the recovery of the world economy. Improved regulation of the derivatives market for commodities is essential to avoid destabilizing impacts on food and energy supplies. We believe that increased energy production capacities and strengthened producer-consumer dialogue are important initiatives that would help in arresting such price volatility.

39. Energy based on fossil fuels will continue to dominate the energy mix for the foreseeable future. We will expand sourcing of clean and renewable energy, and use of energy efficient and alternative technologies, to meet the increasing demand of our economies and our people, and respond to climate concerns as well. In this context, we emphasize that international cooperation in the development of safe nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should proceed under conditions of strict observance of relevant safety standards and requirements concerning design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants. We stress IAEA's essential role in the joint efforts of the international community towards enhancing nuclear safety standards with a view to increasing public confidence in nuclear energy as a clean, affordable, safe and secure source of energy, vital to meeting global energy demands.

40. We have taken note of the substantive efforts made in taking intra-BRICS cooperation forward in a number of sectors so far. We are convinced that there is a storehouse of knowledge, know-how, capacities and best practices available in our countries that we can share and on which we can build meaningful cooperation for the benefit of our peoples. We have endorsed an Action Plan for the coming year with this objective.

41. We appreciate the outcomes of the Second Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development at Chengdu, China in October 2011. We direct our Ministers to take this process forward with particular focus on the potential of cooperation amongst the BRICS to contribute effectively to global food security and nutrition through improved agriculture production and productivity, transparency in markets and reducing excessive volatility in commodity prices, thereby making a difference in the quality of lives of the people particularly in the developing world.

42. Most of BRICS countries face a number of similar public health challenges, including universal access to health services, access to health technologies, including medicines, increasing costs and the growing burden of both communicable and non-communicable diseases. We direct that the BRICS Health Ministers meetings, of which the first was held in Beijing in July 2011, should henceforth be institutionalized in order to address these common challenges in the most cost-effective, equitable and sustainable manner.

43. We have taken note of the meeting of S&T Senior Officials in Dalian, China in September 2011, and, in particular, the growing capacities for research and development and innovation in our countries. We encourage this process both in priority areas of food, pharma, health and energy as well as basic research in the emerging inter-disciplinary fields of nanotechnology, biotechnology, advanced materials science, etc. We encourage flow of knowledge amongst our research institutions through joint projects, workshops and exchanges of young scientists.

44. The challenges of rapid urbanization, faced by all developing societies including our own, are multi-dimensional in nature covering a diversity of inter-linked issues. We direct our respective authorities to coordinate efforts and learn from best practices and technologies available that can make a meaningful difference to our societies. We note with appreciation the first meeting of BRICS Friendship Cities held in Sanya in December 2011 and will take this process forward with an Urbanization and Urban Infrastructure Forum along with the Second BRICS Friendship Cities and Local Governments Cooperation Forum.

45. Given our growing needs for renewable energy resources as well as on energy efficient and environmentally friendly technologies, and our complementary strengths in these areas, we agree to exchange knowledge, know-how, technology and best practices in these areas.

46. It gives us pleasure to release the first ever BRICS Report, coordinated by India, with its special focus on the synergies and complementarities in our economies. We welcome the outcomes of the cooperation among the National Statistical Institutions of BRICS and take note that the updated edition of the BRICS Statistical Publication, released today, serves as a useful reference on BRICS countries.

47. We express our satisfaction at the convening of the III BRICS Business Forum and the II Financial Forum and acknowledge their role in stimulating trade relations among our countries. In this context, we welcome the setting up of BRICS Exchange Alliance, a joint initiative by related BRICS securities exchanges.

48. We encourage expanding the channels of communication, exchanges and people-to-people contact amongst the BRICS, including in the areas of youth, education, culture, tourism and sports.

49. Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa extend their warm appreciation and sincere gratitude to the Government and the people of India for hosting the Fourth BRICS Summit in New Delhi.

50. Brazil, Russia, India and China thank South Africa for its offer to host the Fifth BRICS Summit in 2013 and pledge their full support.

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ECOWAS Has Been There; done that; Gotten the T-shirt for the Coups. It's getting to work!

Barely had the dust settled on the elections in Guinea-Bissau when West Africans woke up not to world-wide celebration  of World Water Day, but a search for incumbent Malian president Amadou Toumani Toure who had escaped from the Presidential palace.

Although I believe, as I averred in my last piece, that ECOWAS has a “mission”--and indeed responsibility—to protect West African citizens from criminals, and attendant cross-border crime, there is no gainsaying ECOWAS' latest diplomatic headache includes finding and enforcing peace in coup-torn Mali; restoring (a semblance of) democracy in lusophone Guinea-Bissau—and all against a backdrop of more sanguine news that ECOWAS is deepening ties with China.

Even before Ghana's Business&Financial Times newspaper started reminding us about an ECOWAS-China dalliance that would be manifested through a forum, we knew this was not the first-ever meeting, and that there had already been one held in 2008 in China when Dr.Chambas—the incumbent secretary-general of the Brussels-based ACP Group—was ECOWAS Commission president. 

That meeting saw over 1000 participants  from the sub-region, including 200 private-sector operators and 150 government officials. We can already speculate from this that the interest by Africa for China to be more involved on the continent and sub-region had been percolating in the minds of policy-makers. As to whether this interest was accompanied by a plan is less clear, but what we do know with this ECOWAS-China Forum is that there will indisputably be a clear and present opportunity for China in the sub-region.

This will manifest itself through key projects of infrastructural development—examples include roads; railways; housing; construction and transportation. Others include health care; mining; agriculture; power; pharmaceuticals; and ICT.  Ghana's vice-president John Mahama explained that the forum will seek to maximise inflows of foreign direct investment from China to ECOWAS countries, and attract long-term concessionary funds for developing infrastructure.

Senegal says goodbye to Wade

As Senegal voters saw Wade out, making way for newly-elected President Macky Sall, social networking sites were understandably congratulating the Senegalese people, forgetting that ECOWAS—as the player in the sub-region—had more than 100 election observers, including an envoy in Obasanjo who all had contributed to the outcome. Macky Sall himself congratulated the international and national observers 'for their contribution to successful elections.' While it may be too soon to congratulate the ECOWAS and AU elements, it is arguable that the success of the elections is in no small part due to our sub-regional and continental actors.

Sahel fatigue? Mali coup!

I have no doubt that even with the crisis in the Sahel, there might regrettably be a “Sahel crisis” fatigue, and that the good news from Senegal might have been overshadowed by it. Having written two pieces for this column on Mali and the crisis already, I can fully understand why people might be apathetic to the whole apparent chaos in the sub-region.

Truth be told, the threat of hunger in the Sahel is real—as UN agencies would testify. No less than the UNDP administrator Helen Clarke was involved in a live twitter conversation some three weeks ago in which she engaged the twitter audience to inform them what the UNDP and other UN agencies plan to do to help the hungry in the Sahel. ECOWAS around the same time donated one million dollars towards resolution of the crisis.

While the Sahel crisis has gone fairly under-reported by the West African media, it has ramified into unpredictable outcomes, such as terrorism in Northern Mali, including the coup in Mali proper, which genesis is tied to the Sahel crisis. Or at least, so the mutinous soldier would let us believe, claiming their president ATT had done little to stem the crisis in Northern Mali, so they were taking over to stop the terrorism in that part of the country, which is, in fact, contributing to the Sahel crisis. In short, it is a quagmire, which ECOWAS needs to really sink its teeth into to ensure they have well and truly nipped in the bud.

Guinea-Bissau comes of age?

Observers of the elections in Guinea-Bissau may recall how the Western press—and indeed much of the African media—had been describing this West African country as a “narco-state” in the run-up to its elections. ECOWAS observers went in—as per the provisions of ECOWAS's protocols, and elections have gone smoothly over-all.  I believe one can tick this off as another election gone down well, after Senegal. ECOWAS deployed 80 observers, led by former President of Niger's Transitional Government Salou Djibo, for the elections, which followed the death in January of President Malam Bacai Sanha after a long illness

In conclusion, it might be too early to speculate that continental and sub-regional conflict management has come of age, given what happened last year in 2011 in Cote d'ivoire and Libya, but I believe the signs are very encouraging. ECOWAS and the AU cannot afford to be complacent in the wake of eventual coups, given how a relatively stable country like Mali has found itself in a state of flux and confusion. There's no gainsaying that vigilance by Ecowas community citizens are indispensable, but even more so, in my view, is vigilance of what ECOWAS and AU are doing to entrench democratic dispensations.

As I write, ECOWAS is having an emergency summit in Cote d'Ivoire to resolve the crisis—and I have no doubt they will eventually put paid to the Mali question. When Western observers last week started tweeting and facebooking that the AU had suspended Mali, my eyes glazed over. This is nothing new; as the AU did so to Niger when it was involved in a coup in 2008. It's so standard practice it should no longer be news to Africans. I joked last week that on Mali, ECOWAS has been there; and done that.

I look forward to the day when it gets the T-shirt – stating it's a problem-solver on coups in the ECOWAS sub-region!

In 2009, in his capacity as a “Do More Talk Less Ambassador” of the 42nd Generation—an NGO that promotes and discusses Pan-Africanism--Emmanuel gave a series of lectures on the role of ECOWAS and the AU in facilitating a Pan-African identity. Emmanuel owns "Critiquing Regionalism" (http://critiquing-regionalism.org ). Established in 2004 as an initiative to respond to the dearth of knowledge on global regional integration initiatives worldwide, this non-profit blog features regional integration initiatives on MERCOSUR/EU/Africa/Asia and many others. You can reach him on ekbensah@ekbensah.net  / Mobile: +233-268.687.653.

Watch out for CEN-SAD and the Arab Maghreb Union's revival in 2012

Here's a turn-up for the books:

"Strengthening the UMA is seen as a counter to the dominance of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – an organization encompassing six oil-rich Gulf Arab states – which has tried to exert its influence over north Africa in recent years." -- from: http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/tunisia-seeks-revive-maghreb-union

Whatever you may make of that claim, this is going to prove to be an interesting time post-Qaddafi, especially since Morocco will be hosting the Executive Council of Foreign Ministers of CEN-SAD in June in that country. (check: http://www.afriquejet.com/maroc-cen-sad-reunion-du-conseil-executif-en-juin-2012013032457.html).

It's good to know that the CEN-SAD HQ will remain in Tripoli -- as will the Sahelo-Saharian bank. I feel that big things are coming for dynamising North Africa.

Watch this space!

On AL BA and Mobile blogging regionalism

I am quite excited by the prospect of mobile blogging issues on regional integration.

Off-late, been tricky, what with an excess of meetings, but this is to emphatically state that regularity shall return. Posts will be sharper and more-to-the-point.

Am excited by developments in Latin America and regional development banks. More soon!
Sent from my BlackBerry® smartphone from Vodafone

Time to Project AU Power in the AU's 10th Year!

“The Accidental Ecowas & AU Citizen”:

Africa's rise and how it’s Time to Project AU Power!

By E.K.Bensah Jr

If there were ever a greatest exponent of serendipity, it must have been when I found myself in the home of the African Union in March 2011. Unbeknownst to many, I met my kindred spirit—Mr. Stuart Hastings of towardsunity.org—in person for the first time. I had met him two years earlier online when I was searching through tomes of material on comparative regional integration and trying to find out also whether there were other souls concerned more with the comparative approach on regionalism than simply the single-minded one where, say, the AU, EU or ECOWAS is the main focus.

I would come across Stuart’s site and immediately spark a conversation with him about how the tectonic plates were shifting towards regional unions, and how we both needed to play a part in that change.

His website, then as now, was clear: to travel the world from his home town of Canada and return to produce a book on how far regional unions, such as the EU, MERCOSUR; African Union; and ASEAN can promote promote peace and humanity through democratic dispensations they offer in their institutional structures, and how it was important to re-think some of the current narratives driving hegemons in those respective unions.

So it would be that Stuart and I would meet on 19 March, 2011 at Lime Tree cafe, situated in the rather plush Boston Day Spa on the lush and swanky Bole Road in Addis. I will never forget that day for the people who were there—Stuart Hastings; and a young official of the UN Economic Commission for Africa who might never confess in public he is a Pan-Africanist—and for the fact that after I got back to my hotel, I would catch the news on BBC and Al-Jazeera that a multi-state coalition had began a military intervention in Libya to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973.

I had had a stress-free visit to the AU building days earlier, and so it seemed a bit surreal to see diplomats fluttering in and out after 19 March all over television. It was even harder to believe that the-then almost-completed AU building would play host to an apparent impotence of AU officials and policy-makers it would soon host almost a year later.

It is easy to speculate that it is probably these apparently-impotent AU policy-makers who have just witnessed the inauguration of the new, 28-floor AU building at the just-ended 18^th session of the AU in the Ethiopian capital. After the cacophony over the past few days of this Chinese gift to the Africans and the numerous speculations that have abounded over possible quid-pro-quos that might be associated with this expensive gift, it's time to get serious.

There's no gainsaying that China will expect some favours from Africa for having built this building that supposedly towers over the whole of Addis. To harp on it, in my view, is as relevant as claiming that the Europeans and Western donors who pay some sixty percent of many African countries’ budget would expect these-same countries to be indebted to them. The argument is even a non-starter. What I would hope we would talk about are two major things.

First – how it symbolises a renaissance of South-South cooperation and second, how it is a projection of the increasing power of the African Union.

Symbolism of the AU building

Both experts and amateurs on African integration, and Western journalists alike have been speculating over what China is likely to expect from the building they have donated to the African Union. What, for me, took the biscuit was no less than the venerable BBC World Service’s very respected “News Hour” programme on Sunday 29^th January interviewing the East African correspondent Will Ross, with an angle that was Sino-African centred in a way that suggested that China wants our natural resources, knows Africa is rising and so wants to capitalize on that rise. In my view, this is not analysis; it is common-sense. There really is no such thing as a free lunch. It is just that with the Chinese, they deliver that lunch faster and with few conditions. That may be the beauty of the relationship, and I believe what African integration watchers all over must be doing right now is to use this as an opportunity to explore and enhance the Sino-African relationship.

In 2010, UNCTAD launched the Economic Development in Africa report. Entitled “South-South Cooperation: Africa and the New Forms of Development Partnerships” it examined recent trends in the economic relationships of Africa with other developing countries and the new forms of partnership that are animating those relationships.

The increasing role of large developing countries in global trade, finance, investment and governance, coupled with their rapid economic growth, has stimulated debate on the implications for Africa´s development.

The report urges African nations to intensify efforts at developing better productive capacities to maximize their gains from the emerging partnerships and the gradual global shift of economic power to the East from the West. African countries, the report states “have to produce goods with high income elasticities of demand and that present greater opportunities for export market expansion”.

The report comprises five chapters dealing with the challenges and opportunities in South-South cooperation, Africa’s trade with developing countries, southern official flows to Africa, southern Foreign Direct Investment to Africa and making South-South Cooperation work for Africa.

The report concludes that Africa-South Cooperation—whether it is Sino— or Indio—not only has the potential to enhance Africa´s capacity to address its development challenges but the full realization of the benefits requires gearing cooperation towards the development of productive capacities across the region.

Bottom line is that Africa as a continent does not yet have a unified strategy relating to Africa-South cooperation and this is evidenced in part, for example, by the way in which the 2010 report was produced by UNCTAD, and not the African Union. Going forward, the AU can use the donation of the building to consolidate the Sino-African relationship—perhaps around infrastructure? — and create an effective strategy round it in a way that will slowly and surely put paid to the West’s.

Projection of power in the AU’s 10^th anniversary year!

Who has not seen pictures of the Brussels-based European Commission on TV and thought “wow, that’s a huge building!” And for those who have seen it in person, there’s no gainsaying it’s a rather imposing building. This contrasts sharply with what Stuart Hasting related to in one of our numerous discussions of his globe-trotting in Asia to see the secretariat of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Nepal. 

First and most importantly, after having been established in 1985, one would have thought that they might have upgraded their building a little. Pictures online of the Secretariat are consistent with the descriptions associated with Hasting’s sojourn anecdotes. This has prompted much speculation among those of us committed to propagating the development of regional unions and groupings – especially in the developing world— as good – and the greatest exemplification of the very-necessary projection of power the AU so needs to do. Given that this is coming in the tenth anniversary of the African Union, this could not but be a better and fitting presage of Africa’s putative rise!

In 2009, in his capacity as a “Do More Talk Less Ambassador” of the 42^nd Generation—an NGO that promotes and discusses Pan-Africanism--Emmanuel gave a series of lectures on the role of ECOWAS and the AU in facilitating a Pan-African identity. Emmanuel owns "Critiquing Regionalism" (http://critiquing-regionalism.org). Established in 2004 as an initiative to respond to the dearth of knowledge on global regional integration initiatives worldwide, this non-profit blog features regional integration initiatives on MERCOSUR/EU/Africa/Asia and many others. You can reach him on ekbensah@ekbensah.net / Mobile: +233-268.687.653.

The East African Community Learns Lessons of the EURO for its Monetary Zone...but why not consult ECOWAS, too?

Never mind the fact that Britain left 2011 causing a stir with its emphatic stance on the Euro. Never mind the fact that in the 20th anniversary of the Euro, the Europeans, especially Germany and France, are at loggerheads with other European countries over the future of the Euro, it beggars belief that the five-member East African Community are still keen to learn "lessons", which they can adopt for themselves as they anticipate a common currency for the East African sub-region.

Still, if we can get past this minutae,we can probably use it to underscore the fact that the ever-increasingly-regionalized world some of us talked about is developing right before our very eyes. Great will be the day when EAC will ask the West African Monetary Zone(WAMZ) -- comprising Ghana; Guinea; Gambia; Liberia; Nigeria and Sierra Leone -- on lessons over a common currency. Given how convoluted and long the process has been for West Africa, I would have thought the EAC might want to also visit ECOWAS for thoughts on overcoming some of the challenges.

In my view, the fact that the EAC went straight to the beleaguered EU can speak of, at best, a degree of tunnel vision and, at worst, myopia on East Africa managing its own regional integration in Africa when it has formidable African integration actors in the African Development Bank and the UN Economic Commission for Africa??

Enjoy the article below!:

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from: http://thecitizen.co.tz/magazines/-/19235-eac-team-learns-workings-of-eurozones-monetary-union

EAC team learns workings of eurozone's monetary union

Send to a friend

Thursday, 26 January 2012 10:19

digg By Felix Lazaro, BusinessWeek Reporter Dar es Salaam. Negotiations for the creation of the Monetary Union in the East African Community are at an advanced stage and the region is determined to learn from lessons from other regions to make the envisaged arrangement a success. But as an EAC mission, dispatched on a study tour to the embattled Eurozone two weeks ago, is about to come back, the region must do its homework before it plunges into a monetary union arrangement, analysts who spoke to BusinessWeek said. The EAC must check the speed with which it moves towards the creation of a single currency, Hussein Kamote from the Confederation of Tanzania Industries said. This is because economic challenges and issues to be worked upon, both by each member states and collectively as a region to make the union sustainable, need more time and resources, according to Mr Kamote the director of Policy and Advocacy at CTI.  "It is not about stopping the negotiations. Rather we should make sure the deadline is realizable. Negotiations to create the Eurozone took quite a long time, and is still faced with challenges. We must be more careful," said Mr Kamote who is also an Economist. The EAC member states currently face a myriad of economic problems characterized by high inflation rates and production costs partly as a result of power problems. While inflation, for instance, peaked in November with 29 per cent for Uganda, followed by Kenya 19.72, Tanzania 19.2, Burundi 16.4 per cent and Rwanda 7.39 per cent, the different basis for calculating these figures implies they may not be comparable. Going by a study commissioned earlier by the European Central Bank to guide the region, each of the five countries has a raft of housekeeping tasks to perform before the monetary union springs to life. Each has to maintain an annual GDP growth of at least seven per cent, keep inflation below five per cent, and peg national budgetary deficit to five per cent of the GDP before the union is launched. In addition, to the fact that member states budgets are heavily donor-dependent, the ongoing economic realities should prompt authorities to re-think about the EAC MU deadline. The heads of state of EAC countries had put this year as the deadline for the creation of the MU but analysts say the deadline is unrealizable. The EAC-MU at an advanced stage and a team of top government officials from the five countries, who have been negotiating the monetary union protocol since last year, are expected to finalise their report by end of March, just in time for the April's extra-ordinary summit of heads of state. The next round of negotiations is scheduled for Arusha. A lecturer from Mzumbe University Dr Elisante Ole Gabriel said the EAC members should work on the issue of consistency to avoid divisions and lack of commitments to the negotiations by member states. Already some member states are giving signals that show that they are now entirely comfortable with the entire EAC MU project. Mr Kamote also urged the EAC to create an autonomous organ like the EU Commission to deal specifically with issues of strengthening the monetary union to relieve the EAC Secretariat whose mandate is not strong enough. The 20 member delegation from EAC toured Europe for 12 days to learn on issues pertaining to the Eurozone. They visited the Commission and European Development Fund in Brussels; European Central Bank and the German Federal Bank in Frankfurt; Federal Ministry of Finance and Federal Ministry of Economic and Technology in Berlin, and European Investment Bank in Luxembourg. The delegation comprised chief negotiators of a high level task force negotiating the EAC MU protocol from each country member, five officials from EAC Secretariat led by deputy the Secretary General in charge of Planning and Infrastructure.

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Critiquing-regionalism is back!

After a few weeks off-air, you can easily-access http://regionswatch.blogspot.com by going to http://critiquing-regionalism.org. There are exciting developments coming up for it, including the development of ECOBANK WATCH (http://www.twitter.com/ecobank_watch).

See you there!

MERRY CHRISTMAS and a PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR

To paraphrase the legendary Mark Twain, reports of my blog's death have been greatly exaggerated!

This blog--whether it is Trials & Tribulations of a Freshly-Arrived Denizen...of Ghana; Accra Pictures by Day & Night; or Critiquing Regionalism; et al--are very much alive. The silence is attributed to the usual end-of-year pandemonium and cacophony.

No doubt, they shall all be back in full swing in 2012!

Suffice-to-say, as the sun sets on 2011, I sincerely hope however and whichever way you arrived at this blog entry, you'll be touched by the spirit of Christmas and goodness in the air and make sure you and your family HAVE YOURSELVES a great and scintillating Christmas break.

May it sound, peaceful and stress-free!

Have a supremely enjoyable and wonderful Christmas -- till we meet again in January 2012!;-D

AFRICA must Stop SOUTH AFRICA from enlisting EU help to get top AU position in 2012

Dear friend,

I am only a proud AU-frican citizen, but I am profoundly disturbed to read that the EU's top boss Baroness Ashton is ready to support South Africa to replace Gabon's Jean Ping in 2012. After the SOUTH AFRICA-NIGERIA duplicity and confusion at the Security Council in 2011 over Cote d'Ivoire, why must Africa sit back and watch the Africa's biggest economy to curry favour with the EU, which is going through its own internal crisis with the EUROZONE, just so that it can pave the way for further support for a permanent position at the UN Security Council?

Read the story below, and make your own judgement as to whether Jean Ping should be offered a UN position...or if it is to be SOUTH AFRICA, should it not be someone like Mbeki?

"Ashton should rather send Zuma to the top UN job, or challenge SA to put Mbeki up at the AU post!!"

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from: http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=160546

EU heavyweight backs Dlamini-Zuma for AU post

The endorsement will boost SA's campaign to have Home Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma replace Jean Ping as the next African Union Commissioner but it is likely to infuriate France

LOYISO LANGENI

Published: 2011/12/07 06:44:31 AM

EUROPEAN Union (EU) foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton is campaigning in Africa to have Home Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma appointed as the next African Union (AU) Commissioner, according to a senior government official.

This endorsement will boost SA's campaign to have her replace Jean Ping. But it is likely to infuriate France, which favours Mr Ping for a second five-year term.

Lady Ashton agreed to assist SA to convince the AU's heads of state, especially in west Africa, to have Mr Ping withdraw his candidature, paving the way for Ms Dlamini-Zuma to be elected uncontested, said the official, who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue.

In return for Mr Ping's withdrawal, the EU would ensure he was "rewarded with a suitable and senior position" at the United Nations. "We met with Catherine Ashton in Perth on the sidelines (of the Commonwealth meeting in October) where she endorsed our plan for our candidate," the official said. "She supports SA's position to strengthen the AU, which is weak, ineffective and has poor administration and governance controls.

"Our strategy will neutralise France which is actively funding the re-election of Mr Ping, even though it is publicly denying it."

EU spokesman Frank Oberholzer said yesterday he was not aware of the Perth meeting. "The EU salutes democratic processes wherever it happens and would support whatever outcome the AU concludes," he said.

The French embassy would only refer to comments by Foreign Minister Alain Juppe during his visit to SA last month — that France had no interest in recolonising Africa.

Department of International Relations and Co-operation spokesman Clayson Monyela said yesterday he was not aware of any deal.

Mr Ping arrived in SA on Monday to attend the United Nations climate-change conference in Durban. His countryman, Gabonese President Ali Bongo Ondimba, attended the conference yesterday.

A senior Gabonese official refused to shed light on Mr Ping's campaign. "We are in competition with SA on the AU position, but we are here in Durban to support SA to conclude a climate agreement."

langenil@bdfm.co.za

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GHANA CANNOT RIDE TWO HORSES - PETITION TO THE MINISTER OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY ON THE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

GHANA CANNOT RIDE TWO HORSES - PETITION TO THE MINISTER OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY ON THE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (EU) WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON 28TH NOVEMBER 2011
1.0 Preamble

As Ghana hosts the ECOWAS Ministerial Monitoring Committee Meeting (MMC) from the 28 -30th November 2011, the preservation of the coherence of our Economic Community and the future of West Africa's Regional Integration hangs in the balance. The so-called Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) West Africa is currently negotiating with the European Union (EU) has already caused costly divisions in ECOWAS.

The EPA has created at least 3 contradictory trade regimes in a region that is supposed to have a single unified trade regime. LDCs in West Africa currently trade with the EU under the non-reciprocal Everything But Arms regime; as a non-LDC, Nigeria trades under what is known under the EU GSP; and Cote d'Ivoire has a bilateral EPA with the EU under which it is exempt on a small range of taxes imposed on Nigerian exports to the EU, BUT in exchange for exempting 81% of all imports from EU into Cote d'Ivoire from any tariff whatsoever.

The EU is our biggest trading partner and impacts our economies for better or for worse. Goods coming into West Africa from the EU will come in at 3 different tariff regimes and costs. What then will happen to the flow of these goods from each of these three sets of countries into each other as well as all other goods trade that exists between them? It is not difficult to imagine the trade bans, blockades and wars that will escalate within the region. This is the state of affairs that exists in West Africa as the MMC convenes in Accra today. The implications for ECOWAS are simply staggering.

But in can get much worse. In addition to these three trade regimes Ghana is on the brink of finalising and making PERMANENT its own INTERIM EPA which it undertook as a temporary measure three years ago. The Ghana IEPA has only slightly better terms in the scope of free entry it allows imports from Europe. Thus, Ghana will join Cote d'Ivoire in offering EU imports the most liberal, widest and therefore potentially most damaging market access. Meanwhile Ghana's terms are not identical to that offered by Cote d'Ivoire. In effect, the Government of Ghana would have created a FOURTH trade regime in West Africa. How can anyone seriously claim that this is and will remain in the national interest of Ghana? If taken any further, Ghana's unilateral stance will be a disaster for herself and for the region she is permanently tied to!

However this need not happen if Ghana and sister West African governments show vision and leadership and put the defence of ECOWAS' integrity today and its progressive development tomorrow as the central common priority and shared destiny.

The current MMC which gets underway in Accra this morning and the outcomes it produces will accelerate ECOWAS fracture or consolidate and enhance its future.

2.0 Issues in the EPA and Our Position:

The threats by Ghana Government to sign and ratify the interim EPA initialed in 2007 will destroy efforts over the years to integrate as one region. Ghana's Interim EPAs eliminates tariffs on above 80% of EU trade goods but the collective ECOWAS EPA is currently offering much less than that. ECOWAS is now considering 70% offer, we think this is already too high and too dangerous for our economies! But the EU still rejects the (excessive) 70% offer. The EU is intransigent to the ECOWAS position because once it has the 80%-plus benchmark from Ghana (and Cote d'Ivoire) it knows West Africa's common stance has been greatly weakened.

The EU's ruthlessness, divisive and bullying stance in the EPAs has been officially acknowledged and condemned by African governments, including Ghana. But the example and fact of Ghana's IEPA gives the EU clear evidence and encourages its confidence that if it remains just as ruthless for long enough other West African governments will crack. Today, it is Ghana's position that is in the balance. The Ghana IEPA is a Trojan horse. We demand the Ghana IEPA be suspended immediately and Government commits fully and unconditionally to the collective ECOWAS EPA process, including the immediate issue of the collective position on the scope of Market Access.

ECOWAS must take a collective stance which, among others, compensates non-LDC members like Ghana for the costs in extra tariffs that their exports to the EU market will attract if they abandon the IEPA. Credible estimates indicate that the three non-LDCs in West Africa will incur additional tariffs on their exports into EU of about €132million if they trade without an EPA. Ghana's direct share of these losses will be about €37 million euro. The economy, total global trade and the livelihoods of the overwhelming majority of 25 million Ghanaians cannot be sacrificed for a paltry tax bill of 37 million euro. West Africa's development and its future cannot be sold for 132 million euro. ECOWAS must immediately create a REGIONAL SOLIDARITY FUND to absorb these losses. Ghana must signal her complete commitment to promoting this Regional Solidarity Fund rather than its 'national interest' in the IEPA. It must also reject the attacks the EU is making on the ECOWAS levy in the EPA negotiations, as this is the kind of mechanism needed to create the solidarity fund.

Beyond the immediate threat of extra tariffs on exports to Europe from Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria (the non-LDC countries in ECOWAS), it must be made clear that ALL West African countries will incur massive fiscal losses from the EPAs. It is worth reminder that the 13 West African LDCs currently export everything but arms duty-free, quota-free to the EU market. But they are currently entitled to impose tariffs on all EU imports. Revenue from trade tariffs are the lifeblood for these and other least developed as well as vulnerable lower income developing countries. Ghana alone stands to lose $194 million (UNECA, 2005). Under the EPA even the LDCs have to grant EU imports free entry and lose the associated revenues from tariffs. This will be 'in exchange' for something they ALREADY HAVE (and have for free), i.e. duty-free quota-free access to EU markets for all exports apart from arms.

Further, the EU's position on various aspects of the EPAs, e.g. standstill on introduction of new tariffs and taxes or increase in existing ones; restrictions on the use of export taxes and quantitative restrictions; the MFN, non-execution clause and others, collectively termed 'contentious issues' in the negotiations, will divert trade within West Africa as well as West African trade with other, non-EU countries and regions to their gain but to our loss. They will also undermine the Region's efforts to industrialize and its ability to move up the industrial value chain. As a result, the region will remain a perpetual supplier of raw materials, with all the adverse implications that this entails. Any regional EPA must remove these EU impositions and narrow the scope of threat or damage to ECOWAS. Suspending Ghana's IEPA and the provisions it contains on these issues will enhance ECOWAS ability to review and strengthen its collective positions.

The EU's demands and pressure in areas that go beyond tariffs and World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments – such as Financial Services, Public Procurement, Investment, Health, Raw Materials, Natural Resources and Intellectual Property - pose even greater threats and are of more strategic importance to Ghana's (as well as West Africa's) economic transformation, industrialization and overall development. In the case of Services, internal trade within West Africa is even bigger and more dynamic than trade in goods within the region. But West Africa is hardly in a position to export services to the EU. Officials claim that negotiating and including services (as well as the other WTO-plus, Trade-Related Issues like Procurement. Investment and Intellectual Property) will create a predictable environment for EU trade and investment in West Africa. We have already had increasingly free trade in goods with the EU and others for more than 30 years. There is one predictable outcome we already know – EU companies will dominate in these areas, our already low existing capacity will be weakened even further, including our foothold in the growth areas of trade in services and in manufactures within West Africa. Any EPA must be a goods-only agreement and must exclude Services and the so-called Trade related Issues.

5. While ECOWAS has bent over backwards to accommodate EU demands, her 'partner' remains inflexible, unyielding or worse. In fact the EU has consistently flouted and retracted on commitments it has previously made. A most telling example is in the area of EU responsibility to finance fiscal losses West African countries will incur as a result of entering into EPAs. Another is the subterfuge the EU has shown in respect of providing ADDITIONAL funding for the EPA Development Programme (or 'PAPED'). The EU has watered down and reversed commitments and has engaged in patent falsehoods, recycling existing European Development Fund commitments as 'new and additional funding'. By foul and other means the EU continues to show beyond all reasonable doubt that its interests in the EPAs have little or nothing to do with ECOWAS development or regional integration aspirations, but everything to do with securing preferential advantages in West African economies and markets against all comers – including our own domestic and regional producers and our development needs. ECOWAS must insist and secure binding and unequivocal EU compensation, adjustment and development commitments as a pre-condition for any EPA.

6. But Ghana and West Africa must also prioritize the diversification of their trade away from the EU, as well as our own developmental regionally integrated production capacities, investments and markets. The EU's current economic crisis is partly due to the same unbridled liberalisation policies it is trying to impose on us through the EPAs. In Europe today, the corporate monopolies in the financial services sector in particular are holding all working people in Europe and whole economies to ransom. Meanwhile as current trends show, many more prospects exits for production partnerships, trade, investment and economic development with emerging regions in the global South. Locking in our entire trade, investment and development finance policies by giving EU privileges no one else has, not even our own companies and citizens, is not a forward looking policy. Today we are unable to share in windfall profits of mining companies because we locked ourselves into agreements that predictably provided all the guarantees and benefits for our 'partners'. We are left with dwindling shares, missed opportunities, the destruction of livelihoods and of the very environment we live in! Our national and regional development plans and their integration must come first and determine the scope and content of any EPAs. The world is very different at the end of 2011 than it was at the beginning of 2002 when EPA negotiations began. The speed of change, including negative change is the key feature of economic fortunes. The entire ECOWAS leadership and the Government of Ghana must begin to lay down concrete alternatives to the EPA as they meet in Accra this week.

3.0 Conclusion

As Ghanaian organisations and citizens we call on the Government of Ghana to live up to the nation's role and responsibility to ECOWAS and Africa's unity and to our self-determination in charting and realising our developmental transformation. Thirty or so years of trade liberalisation has not brought us any closer to this. Rather it has brought collapse of industries, paralysis of agriculture and unprecedented mass unemployment and youth discontent in our societies.

Ghana must pull back from the brink of a unilateralism that will put another nail in the coffin of development in our country and in our region. It must suspend its bilateral EPA and fully and unconditionally return to the fold of the collective regional EPA process. Ghana cannot ride two horses at once. Two horses going in different and opposite direction will tear the rider apart and trample her underfoot.

Sister ECOWAS Trade Ministers and Governments must also play their part that we ride together towards the same destination and destiny for our collective mutual protection and benefit. The ECOWAS MMC must define a collective solution that addresses any losses that Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and other countries will face in the absence of their interim EPAs. This is the most immediate means to consolidate ECOWAS in the EPA process and in our deep common interests that go way beyond extra taxes that we will have to pay on a very small proportion of our exports to Europe.

Accra, 28th November 2011. Signed by the ff Organizations:
GHANA TRADE UNION CONGRESS, GHANA TRADE AND LIVELIHOODS COALITION, ISODEC, THIRD WORLD NETWORK-AFRICA, ABIBIMAN FOUNDATION, ACTION AID GHANA, GAWU, SEND FOUNDATION, FOODSPAN – all members of the ECONOMIC JUSTICE NETWORK OF GHANA (EJN)

from: http://www.twnafrica.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=47&Itemid=72

Of Libya, CENSAD and...Which REC for South Sudan?

 

Whither the future of CEN-SAD?

The Community of Sahel-Saharan States was established in 1998 by the late Colonel Qaddafi. After the rationalization of the regional economic communities in 2006, it became an AU-REC – that is one of the eight RECs mandated and recognized by the African Union. It has twenty-eight members, and Ghana is a member. 

Despite many meetings that had taken place and a fully-functioning website on http://www.censad.org, the uprising that started in Libya in March threw a huge spanner in the works of the organisation, effectively throwing the regional grouping out of sync with the other RECs at its base in Tripoli. Regrettably, the conspicuous absence of the African Union itself on the future of CENSAD has not helped dispel the notion that the AU is nothing more than a “toothless” bulldog. 

The passing of Qaddafi will effectively take the wind out of the sails of CENSAD, probably throwing all the good work – including the Great Green Wall being built along the sub-region to protect the region from climate change; as well as the establishment of a free-trade area of ECOWAS-UEMOA-CENSAD/ECOWAS-CENSAD/ECCAS along the likes of the SADC-COMESA-EAC tripartite free trade area, which was mooted in 2008.

Going forward, I would expect to see the AU taking serious the need to engage the National Transitional Council in Libya on their commitments to the African Union. This would include discussions on Libya and where it stands on the establishment of the AU-mandated and Tripoli-hosted African Investment Bank, as well as the state of play of CEN-SAD, and how it can be factored into discussions of Africa’s ongoing discussions over Africa’s integration.

South Sudan – which REC to belong to?

South Sudan might have slipped off the radar of news—not because it is not important, but other hot issues might naturally have tipped it off. Still, what has not been making the rounds too much has been the regional economic community to which South Sudan should belong. Given the location of that country, one cannot take it for granted that they would necessarily want to go with their Northern counterpart—and to the RECs is no exception.

There is no mechanism that can predict that South Sudan will want to become member of the East Africa Community or the IGAD. And what of COMESA? This is an important debate that African media practitioners – aware of the utility and increasing assertiveness of the RECs – might be ruminating over on the continent.

Although there have been major developments around South Sudan and its membership of some of these RECs, the point I am making here is about the absence of a debate in much of the African media. Going forward, African media practitioners, including here in Ghana, should move beyond the stage of talking about other AU member states only when they’re, at best, embroiled in conflict and/or at worst, are headline news over at the BBC!

You might be happy to know that South Sudan was made a member of COMESA at the 15th Comesa Heads of State and Government summit on 14^th October in Malawi. Furthermore, on 17 October, South Sudan President General Salva Kiir confirmed that his country has started on the application process to become a member of the East African Community (EAC).

**this piece was culled from my Wednesday column for Ghana's "Business and Financial Times" newspaper, which is called "The Accidental ECOWAS and AU Citizen"--from: http://www.thebftonline.com/bft_subcat_linkdetails.cfm?prodcatID=6&tblNewsCatID=63&tblNewsID=9788 . More also on http://african-union-citizen.blogspot.com/2011/10/hot-issues-on-au-needing-popular.html

In 2009, in his capacity as a “Do More Talk Less Ambassador” of the 42^nd Generation—an NGO that promotes and discusses Pan-Africanism--Emmanuel gave a series of lectures on the role of ECOWAS and the AU in facilitating a Pan-African identity. Emmanuel owns "Critiquing Regionalism" (http://www.critiquing-regionalism.org). Established in 2004 as an initiative to respond to the dearth of knowledge on global regional integration initiatives worldwide, this non-profit blog features regional integration initiatives on MERCOSUR/EU/Africa/Asia and many others. You can reach him on ekbensah@ekbensah.net / Mobile: 0268.687.653.

Thanks to its Youth Citizens, Arab Maghreb Union--an AU-REC--Might be Saved!

In 2009, the Arab Maghreb Union turned 20 years. And Critiquing Regionalism blog was there to castigate it (http://regionswatch.blogspot.com/2009/06/ineffectual-rec-arab-maghreb-union.html)!

That's quite a long time fore any regional integration initiative to reflect on where it's going and to whom it must account. Before the so-called Arab Spring, there must have been many outside the Arab Maghreb Union region thinking that the AMU bears little relevance to the citizens and that it's time for it to go. I was certainly one of them. When I was interviewed by the BBC in March this year on a "Africa Have Your Say" programme on the role of regional economic communities in Africa, I stated clearly that "the biggest elephant in  the room" on Libya was not the African Union, but the Arab Maghreb Union. This was because there has been a paucity of analysis in the news about what that 5-member grouping was doing on Libya. Instead, the Arab League had effectively stolen its thunder and was carrying the can on what to do in Libya.

I still wonder how things could have been different had the AU-REC [African Union-recognised REC] AMU -- instead of the Arab League -- started issuing resolutions over Libya. Historians might speculate that this is one of the reasons why it's good to be a member of only one REC, if even and only to save oneself from prosecution! Had Libya not been a member of the Arab League, where would the no-fly zone had come from?

But back to the present: the news that the Arab Maghreb youth are taking charge of things is encouraging, because it seems that increasingly the youth are realising the future is in their hands.

To read that:

"The Arab Maghreb Union is obsolete and moribund," El Ouafoudi [group's Moroccan rep] said in explaining why the youth movement was founded. He said civil society took the initiative to push for a Maghreb Union after "official failure" serves as a reminder that the youth are one of the likely constituencies to kick-start any regional integration push, if ever it was needed.

The group could not have said it better when they said:

""Economic integration can only be achieved with the desire of the rulers, as well as open borders and abolition of the visa," Vall added. "There thus must be pressure on governments to respond to such demands."

Read the full article here: http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2011/09/15/feature-04

PAPER: "Assessing Regional Diffusion from Brussels to Addis Ababa: The Limits of Modelling and Mentoring"

Read this surprisingly-refreshing piece entitled "Assessing Regional Diffusion from Brussels to Addis Ababa: The Limits of Modelling and Mentoring", which explores the "integration snobbery" theme of other regionalisms seeing the EU by hook or by crook as a model, but refracted through the prism of the African Union.

from: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/green/papers/workingpapers/haastrup_assessing_regional_diffusion.pdf

"Another challenge is the EU‟s „over-ambition‟ to promote regional integration (Börzel & Risse, 2009b). While the normative ideals being promoted by the EU might themselves be unproblematic, diffusion through the EU faces the potential criticism of being neo-colonial and arrogant. This is then problematic if the essence of EU-Africa relations, and indeed the cultivation of African integration is to give Africa a better seat at the table to represent its citizens. Further, the EU faces challenges to its own integration. A recent report in the Economist suggested that the difficulty the EU had in reaching a conclusion on the Greek bailout and the Eurozone crises endangers the integration project. Perhaps exaggerated, reports like these engender the negative perception of third parties, especially budding regional institutions like the AU, to the „EU as a Model‟ paradigm."

ENDs

"Regional Co-operation" v "Regional Integration"

About two weeks ago, I created a Google alert for "regional cooperation" alongside the "regional integration" that I have. I noticed I obtained far more search results than the latter. Then it struck me: it looked like "regional cooperation" seems to be far more popular and meaningful to observers and practitioners of the discipline that this "integration" thing I like to bandy about here, for example.

Now I can understand this, because if you really look at it, regional cooperation offers a wider "remit" if you will of how regionalism works. When states are cooperating in a regional sphere, people kind of get it you know; they understand what it entails to cooperate. The ideas of pooling resources; public goods; electricity, etc all kind of fall into place.

Conversely talk of integration, and the eyes kind of glaze over. Integration--far from being unsexy -- is also a bit of a mouthful: how and what are you integrating towards? And if it's a region, how are you integrating the region? All the images that the former explanation conjures kind of stops short when we talk of "regional integration."

Now inasmuch as both terms are valid and can be used interchangeably, there clearly is a difference that cannot be sneezed at. In my humble opinion, I foresee regional integration to be something more deep, more structural. The integration is kind of the engine that helps create a region that is well-integrated and harmonized, and where many member states are speaking with one voice.

On the other hand, "regional cooperation" seems superficial to me: it's like member states only cooperate, without doing it at the structural level. A quick search reveals no real definition of "regional cooperation". In fact, Google lists no less than 9,500,000 results, whereas on regional integration, we obtain 9,000,000 results.

Those results probably speak more of how more popular regional cooperation is than "integration".

On another level, there is the case of regional institutions and how regional groupings cooperate within them.

Let's just end with a definition from WIKIPEDIA on regional integration (interestingly, there is no such WIKIPEDIA piece on "regional cooperation"!):

Regional integration is a process in which states enter into a regional agreement in order to enhance regional cooperation through regional institutions and rules. The objectives of the agreement could range from economic to political, although it has generally become a political economy initiative where commercial purposes are the means to achieve broader socio-political and security objectives. It could be organized either on a supranational or an intergovernmental decision-making institutional order, or a combination of both.

If one remembers nothing at all (given that there are reputedly no less than eight requirements for regional integration systems), remember the first line:

Regional integration is a process in which states enter into a regional agreement in order to enhance regional cooperation through regional institutions and rules.

While CARICOM is on my Mind, Meet the S-G La Rocque!

For the past couple of weeks, I've been getting "Google ALerts" on CARICOM, and almost always, it is something negative about CARICOM.

Apart from the fact that CARICOM made a statement supporting the rebels of the TNC in Libya, I continue to question the real relevance of CARICOM in the Caribbean region. Not because it does not count--far from it--but what exactly it is doing to assert itself these days.

I read that they have a new secretary-general--by name La Rocque. He has vowed, as per this article here, to do quite a number of things to dynamise CARICOM, including cutting down on international travel and using video-conferencing instead! Secondly, "overtime" is out of the window.

You would think that for an organisation that has been around since 1973, they would have a lot more going for them than free movement and a Caribbean Single Market Economy scheme. CARICOM turned 38 on 1st August, but I sense that it is difficult to really speculate on what concretely it might be remembered for. Even on free movement, I read that it is only a few days ago that a press release issued stated that Jamaicans can now travel hassle-free. This has come as a result of "incidences" involving Jamaicans -- apparently! How miscreants from a member state might affect the region's free movement is beyond me -- but that is just me.

I do not for any second want to castigate CARICOM or even compare it with ECOWAS or SADC (comparable only by member countries, where ECOWAS has 15 and SADC 14). But I am still itching to compare the free movement system currently in CARICOM and ECOWAS.

ECOWAS has had free movement of its citizens since 1979. Regrettably that has meant that during the inter-necine wars of Liberia(affecting the Mano River Union countries of Liberia/Sierra Leone/Cote d'ivoire/Guinea) of the early nineties, it meant that (child) soldiers and mercenaries could move freely through the sub-region's porous borders, as well reside in ECOWAS member states for minimum ninety-days without hindrance. That ECOWAS member states have yet to fully ratify supplementary protocols associated with free movement, including setting up committees to monitor free movement (no country has done that yet!) speaks to the considerable work on free movement ECOWAS still needs to do.

CARICOM, conversely, seems to be working hard, albeit slowly.

I cannot foresee, in the 21st century, any regional integration project that underplays free movement; it just does not work. So I want to implore that given Caribbean countries are small, and that they have the CSME working better for  them than what might be here in the ECOWAS sub-region, they get serious on the regional integration project of helping them manage globalisation and its many adverse impacts.

Statements supporting Libyan rebels are curious--at a time when even the African Union has been very slow to recognise them--and interesting: they will not make CARICOM grow to be the community it can become, so CARICOM, more grease to your elbows after your 38th anniversary on 1st August this year. But, surely, you can do better?

As to whether La Rocque can be the saviour to CARICOM observers want, we live in vain expectation!