Just in Case you Missed the Emergence of Regional Poles...

The recent signing by the Czechs of the Lisbon Treaty means that the EU will from 2010 become a more formidable force, with what it calls "The European External Action Service", or a super EU Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The UK's CHATHAM HOUSE has a paper on this *http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/research/europe/papers/view/-/id/621/*, which makes interesting reading about how and why the EU needs to use the Lisbon Treaty to better-manage its external affairs. Inevitably, this might include trade and development.

At a time that the AU is also talking about the AU Authority (http://knowledge.uneca.org/member-states/observatory-on-regional-integration/regional-economic-commissions-in-africa/african-union/transformation-of-african-union-from-a-commission-to-an-authority-1/transformation-of-african-union-from-a-commission-to-an-authority) in place of an AU Commission, which is more administrative, it is clear and inexorable the speed towards which we all must be hurtling towards a world where regional poles matter--big time.

Now we all have doubts about this much-touted AU of the people, but blocs like ASEAN are even taking cue from us. A recent article--http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/2769-asean-can-take-a-leaf-out-of-african-union-.html--argues that the AU has gotten serious on strengthening human rights, and perhaps ASEAN should do same.

For a bloc that continues to overlook the castigation of BURMA when it is crystal-clear that the junta is a as sore a thumb in ASEAN as Niger-Guinea axis of "trouble" is for our own ECOWAS, a new ASEAN human rights bloc looks a bit of a misnomer and embarrassment for the 10-member bloc.

Coming back to a practical level of what these blocs mean, my kindred spirit--Canadian Stuart Hastings--shares similar views about how these poles can advance a degree of peace. His website is towardsunity.org, and there you can read how he has embarked on a one-year trip to visit the major regional poles--AFRICAN UNION *Addis* / EUROPEAN UNION *Brussels*/ ASIAN *Jakarta* / UNION OF SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS *Quito, Ecudaor*. He hopes to turn his adventures into a video and a book. He is right now in Strasbourg.

If you have some time, do check out his blog on his adventures of how this young 27-yr-old is breaking grounds by practicalising the experience of visiting emerging regional poles, which we have touched on many a time> http://www.towardsunity.org/mission-log.phtml

ARTICLE--ASEAN: "ASEAN can take a leaf out of African Union"

ASEAN can take a leaf out of African Union
by Dominic J Nardi
Wednesday, 16 September 2009 11:59

from: http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/2769-asean-can-take-a-leaf-out-of-african-union-.html

Mizzima News - ASEAN still has much to learn about establishing an
effective human rights body from – of all places – Africa.

As the Association of Southeast Asian Nations prepares to appoint its
first set of human rights commissioners to the new ASEAN Human Rights
Body at the 15th ASEAN Summit this October, the commission itself
faces skepticism and uncertainty about its future. Human rights
activists allege that ASEAN stripped the commission of any teeth in
order to appease perennial human rights violators such as Burma.

Defenders counter that, given ASEAN's concerns over national
sovereignty (the infamous "ASEAN Way"), the result was a necessary
political compromise. Indeed, comparing the ASEAN Human Rights Body to
the European Court of Human Rights would seem unfair, given that
Europe consists exclusively of liberal democracies. However, even if
we look to the rest of the developing world, ASEAN still has much to
learn about much about establishing an effective human rights body
from – of all places – Africa.

Historically Africa has had more petty dictators, more xenophobic
governments, more genocides, and more overall human rights problems
than ASEAN. Despite these challenges, the African Union has developed
a fairly advanced human rights system.

During the 1980s, African leaders adopted the Banjul Charter on Human
and People's Rights. Since then, the region has also adopted treaties
protecting children's and women's rights, as well as a charter on
democratic governance. Africa's human rights system exists not only on
paper, but also has teeth: the African Commission on Human and
People's Rights.

African Union member countries elect 11 commissioners for a six-year
renewable term. These commissioners are independent from their
respective governments and must be human rights experts of the
"highest reputation." Impressively, the Commission has both the
mandate and political will to rule against African governments for
discrimination, free speech, arbitrary detention, torture, and a
variety of other rights violations. When a military junta still ruled
Nigeria in the late 1990s, the Commission ordered the government to
release a journalist who had been arrested without a warrant and
prosecuted in a military tribunal. Several years ago, it ruled that
the Republic of Guinea violated the Banjul Charter by inciting solders
to evict, rape, and torture Sierra Leonean refugees. The Commission
has interpreted African human rights broadly, finding that a state of
emergency does not justify violating human rights. It has even
ventured into political disputes, condemning the government of
Mauritania for dissolving the opposition party in 2000.

Admittedly, the African human rights system is far from perfect. The
African Commission has no independent enforcement mechanisms. Some
countries do comply voluntarily, but, even when governments refuse to,
a favourable decision from the commission can constitute a powerful
moral victory. Also, the Commission's docket is backlogged since it
can only meet for two 15-day sessions each year. However, the
Commission has taken important steps toward not only supporting
individual human rights victims, but also promoting human rights
ideals throughout the continent. Despite Africa's sensitivity over
their national sovereignty after being colonized by Europe, many
African governments now consider it appropriate to intervene in order
to protect human rights. Last year, when Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe won
an election through violence and fraud, the Southern African
Development Community strongly criticized his actions and successfully
pressured him to form a coalition government with the opposition. In
2005, the African Union even suspended Togo in response to an
unconstitutional seizure of power, which convinced the government to
call new elections. Moreover, the African Union is currently
establishing a stronger African Court of Justice and Human Rights to
hear human rights cases. As a result, according to the U.S. think-tank
Freedom House, Africans on the whole currently enjoy more civil and
political freedom than Southeast Asians. While Africa still faces many
challenges, human rights violations are no longer accepted as the norm
thanks in part to efforts of the African Commission on Human and
People's Rights.

By contrast, ASEAN has yet to adopt a single human rights treaty and
struggles to condemn gross rights violations committed by its member.
Unlike African human rights treaties, neither the ASEAN Charter nor
the ASEAN Human Rights Body's Terms of Reference detail specific
rights, but rather list vague principles, such as non-discrimination
and the rule of law. Thus, it is not even clear whether Southeast
Asians possess the same human rights that Africans currently enjoy.
Moreover, the ASEAN Human Rights Body will not be nearly as strong as
its African counterpart. It cannot hear individual complaints from
ASEAN citizens whose rights have been violated. In addition, the
commission has no power to monitor or investigate abuses in ASEAN
countries. Rather, its main function appears to be merely promoting
human rights awareness. The ASEAN Terms of Reference also provides
little guidance on the qualifications for commissioners – a far cry
from the Africa Union's requirement that its commissioners be human
rights experts of the "highest reputation." ASEAN's commissioners will
have no independence, serving merely as "representatives" of their
respective governments. Should a commissioner become too vocal, the
government can remove him at its discretion at any time.

ASEAN and the Africa Union are two very different regions, but
nonetheless the comparison provides some useful lessons as ASEAN
prepares to appoint the first human rights commissioners. First of
all, a strong regional human body can coexist with political
diversity, conservative cultures, and national sovereignty. The
African Commission hears individual complaints from human rights
victims who live under authoritarian governments. This may embarrass
some politicians, but has certainly not threatened the regimes of
dictators such as Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe. It is likewise difficult
to see how a stronger ASEAN Human Rights Body would topple Burma's
Than Shwe. Indeed, part of the African Commission's success derives
from using nuanced legal interpretations to balance the concerns of
sovereign governments with the imperative of protecting human rights.
For example, it requires human rights victims to work within their
country's own justice system before appealing to the Commission. This
allows governments the first chance to redress any human rights
violations and save face.

Rather than trying to find a similar compromise, ASEAN seems to have
simply hid behind the mantra of the "ASEAN Way." Southeast Asian
leaders should take a closer look at other regional human rights
bodies, particularly Africa's, in order to learn how to balance
meaningful protection of human rights with national sovereignty. In
the longer run, doing so will help create a stronger ASEAN Community
and give both ASEAN and its member governments more legitimacy in the
eyes of their citizens. In fact, given Africa's relative experience
with human rights, perhaps we will soon see African Union legal
advisors sent to Southeast Asia in order to help the ASEAN Human
Rights Body comply with international human rights standards.

(Dominic J Nardi, Jr. is a visiting research fellow with the
Governance Institute, a legal think-tank dedicated to promoting the
rule of law. He has worked with human rights organizations in
Southeast Asia and advised women's' rights NGOs in East Africa. In
addition, he has a J.D. from Georgetown Law and a Masters in Southeast
Asian Studies from Johns Hopkins SAIS. The views expressed are his
own.)

East Asian Community--Come Again, Japan!

I always get worried when new leaders debut their politics with what some might consider bombastic claims to practicalise regional integration. I use "bombastic" to explain away wild claims that might not be founded on reality. I cannot help but wonder whether every economic community has to be predicated on the model of the EU.

When, during the sidelines of the UN general assembly, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama floated the idea of an East Asian community inspired by the European Union in his first meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao, I believed it to be a great idea, but it is one that must be accompanied with caution.

Caution because just creating something that is modelled on the EU but divorces itself from the culture of East Asia might go to frustrate the conception thereof. Simply put, East Asia needs to continue doing a kind of cost-benefit analysis of what kind of imperative is best for its region--is it economic? is it fiscal? is it one based on security?

When I wrote about the East Asian Community in 2008, I made reference to the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) that is keen to support the conception of any EAC. My personal opinion remains that a hybrid of ASEAN and the EU and others might be a good idea. A simple cut-and-paste job of the EU into Asia might prove to be counter-productive and seriously frustrate any desire at a critical and progressive outlook on regional integration for South-East Asia.

Vice President Mahama Returns From AU Summit

Click to Play

recording from Metro TV

UNCTAD Revisits Calls to Strengthen Regional Integration

9 July, 2009

By E.K.Bensah II



The UNCTAD 2009 report on Economic Development was launched in Accra in June. It is the latest in a series of yearly UNCTAD reports that provide additional angles on issues affecting Africa and the developing world.

Entitled “Strengthening Regional Economic Integration for Africa’s Development”, it is the second report in the space of two years that focuses exclusively on how developing countries can maximize the benefits of regional economic integration for their policy space.

UNCTAD 2007 Trade & Development vs 2009 Economic Report on Africa

The most recent was the UNCTAD Trade and Development Report, which was published in 2007. Entitled “Regional cooperation for development”, the 240-page report used the report to outline how regional integration could offer national space for developing countries. Apart from defining what “new regionalism” was, the report stressed that trade liberalization is not the end-all and be-all insofar as regionalism is concerned. The tendency has been for economic integration to be perceived as a purely economic enterprise. UNCTAD averred it was more to do with a reconfiguration of policy space, expressed through many important elements, such as the provision of public goods; a tool for regional trade and industrial integration; and strengthened policies on energy and industry to complement already-existing national strategies.

As for the 2009 UNCTAD report, it comprises five chapters dealing with the issues of challenges and opportunities in the context of the experience of regional integration for Africa; expanding intra-african trade for Africa’s growth; intra-African investment; emerging issues in regional trade integration in Africa; and policy recommendations on strengthening regional integration.

The report dedicates Chapter 1 to the “Experience with regional integration in Africa: challenges and opportunities”, offering more than just a theoretical justification for economic integration. The report provides a graphical illustration of the eight AU-mandated sub-regional blocs (ECOWAS/ECCAS/SADC/COMESA/AMU/IGAD/EAC), along with the existing monetary zones (UEMOA; CFA franc zone). The Libya-sponsored CENSAD, which Cape Verde joined recently, is the only one that is missing in the graph. This omission notwithstanding, the report explains that the African Union has classified the multiplicity of regional groupings in Africa into two groups—the regional economic communities (RECs) and other integration blocs.

We are reminded that many African countries have multiple memberships—an issue that was equally broached in the UNCTAD 2007 TDR, and considered to be one of the reasons for such low level of intra-African trade. Of the 53 countries, 27 are members of two regional groupings, with 18 belonging to three, with one country being a member of no less than four groupings. This kind of spaghetti-bowl groupings can only go to accentuate the necessity of regional integration by developing countries as part of their development strategies.

Given that this is the latest report by UNCTAD on the importance of regional integration, it is fair to say that although developing countries have made quite some progress, it continues to be found wanting—and napping—on concrete strategies to make regional economic integration work for them.

Infrastructure for intra-African trade

The most highlighted case is that of infrastructure. The report posits that there is a distinction when it comes to infrastructure—there is what it calls “hard” and “soft” infrastructure. Hard infrastructure is described as “physical infrastructure that is often missing or is of poor quality in many African countries.” These include road and air transport. The report avers that “the quality of the road network on the continent is so poor that many countries even within the same RTA remain effectively isolated from each other.”

Conversely, “soft infrastructure” includes “the policy and regulatory environment, the transparency and predictability of trade and business administration, and the quality of the business environment more generally.” Simply put, policies that impact on development, such as transport policies are some of the examples of “soft” infrastructural issues that affect transport costs. Not to speak of the high transport costs throughout the sub-regions and continent that inhibits the facilitation of intra-African trade.

Truth be told, it is difficult to speak about infrastructure without broaching the issue of intra-African trade. UNCTAD in this report views it as a critical element in facilitating regional economic integration. It admits that although intra-African trade is low in comparison to other regions, “Intra-African trade is important for many African countries taken individually.” This is buttressed by the point that “over three-quarters of intra-African trade take place within regional trading blocs, highlighting their importance.” The third critical point is that this kind of trade occurs around what the report considers “influential” countries. That is to say “trade poles” that could become development poles.

The report summarizes the section on intra-African trade by recommending AU and sub-regional policy-makers to pay greater attention to the landlocked countries on the continent that are “constrained by their own poor infrastructure as well as their neighbours’.” The report expresses hope, however, in multilateral processes, such as the EPA negotiations between countries of regional economic communities and the EU; AGOA processes and the WTO Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations that are bound to re-configure the future of intra-African trade.

Intra-African investment

UNCTAD identifies in its report the importance of financially integrating the economies of the AU. Citing examples for each region of Africa, it refers to ECOBANK as a trailblazer, describing it as a “prominent West African investor in Africa’s banking sector.” Created by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and established in Lome, Togo, in 1985, the company was not licensed to operate as a bank until 1988. Today, through manifold investments, it has followed what the report considers to be “a proactive policy of African expansion." It is represented in 25 countries, including China, and has over 500 branches. ECOBANK’s strategy for geographic expansion is consistent with what UNCTAD calls “a sound financial sector”, which it maintains to be a “pre-requisite for increasing the flows of investment within Africa.”

In addition to ECOBANK, Nigerian banks have also been cited as key to the development of the financial sector in the ECOWAS region. UNCTAD indicates that the banking sector has “become a major player in African finance following a radical consolidation undertaken in 2005.” The centrality of these Nigerian banks in Africa’s financial system (with the biggest banks in Africa comprising 9 out of 20 that were Nigerian in 2008) can only go to complement the increasing financial integration of the economies—not just of West Africa but the continent, brought about by the fact that Nigeria’s banks go beyond the shores of the ECOWAS sub-region.

UNCTAD highlights a three-fold reason why both ECOBANK and Nigerian banks will affect intra-African investment. First, the merging and acquisition of these banks with domestic banks means that they inject capital in the economy. Secondly, new competition made possible by the coming of the new banks, triggers a reduction in the cost of banking. Finally, these banks have created financial networks across Africa, making payment mechanisms between countries easier.

In this respect, the proposal made by President of Cote d’ivoire Laurent Gbagbo along the sidelines of a June ECOWAS summit in Abuja for ECOWAS to establish a Regional Investment Fund that would purposefully be used for infrastructure is not just timely, but goes a long way to help cement the financial integration advocated in this report.

Migration and free movement

The May report by the African Union entitled “Status of Integration in Africa” disclosed that free movement had generally been achieved throughout the eight regional economic communities, but some were more advanced than others. ECOWAS perhaps has the oldest arrangement, which dates back to 1979, with a revised treaty in 2003. It has experienced many challenges throughout the three decades. Despite the presence of ECOWAS passports in only three of the fifteen ECOWAS countries, citizens of the sub-region are able to move freely throughout the region with only their ID cards or passports, and enjoy right of residence for 90 days.

Citizens of the East African Community enjoy a similar arrangement, where all the five members have a passport that is specific to the region, and which enables them single immigration entry/departure card under harmonized procedures of entry/work permits.

As for COMESA, it adopted a protocol on free movement of persons, labour, services, rights of establishment and right of residence in 2001. However, progress has been slow.

All these developments notwithstanding, UNCTAD continues to believe that migration and free movement remain important cornerstones of facilitating regional economic integration. It points to West Africa, where it relates the so-called “Ivorian miracle” of the 1980s, which it describes as attributable to “the inflow of Sahelian labour on cocoa and coffee plantations in the South of Cote D’Ivoire.”

The report points to already-existing initiatives, such as the 2006 African Common Position on Migration and Development, which highlighted, among others, the need “to ensure coordination in the development of common regional policies for the management of migration within the RECs.” In this report, UNCTAD avers that policy-makers have to build on the existing initiatives on facilitating labour mobility and migration management “already laid out in various RECs and other consultative forums in the region.” Those above are certainly ones that the report would like to see consolidated and help inform national development strategies so necessary for developing countries.

Commitment

In the final analysis, it is arguable that UNCTAD’s return to regional integration is not a coincidence. By re-visiting the issue of regional integration, it is reminding both policy-makers and interested constituents that its concern for strategic development policies that will help integrate developing countries into the global economy against the backdrop of a global economic recession is sound.

As it indicates in the report, there is nothing wrong with trade policy, but it should “be part of an overall long-term development strategy which defines a country’s development objectives and the way they should be reached.” Cooperation and collaboration are important elements insofar as regional economic integration is concerned, but it should be done on a holistic basis, which includes regional policies on energy; industry; migration; and infrastructure. Regional integration done without attention to these will only go so far, and end up hindering the progress that the regional economic communities have made.

As the report so aptly concludes: “regional integration is not an end in itself; it should be seen as a stepping stone towards Africa’s attractiveness to investment and export competitiveness.”


ENDs


This article can also be found on the twn-africa site on http://twnafrica.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=203:unctad-revisits-calls-to-strengthen-regional-integration-&catid=72:unctad-&Itemid=55

Rejoinder to "Alan"--On Why Nato's "Raison d'Etre" is Elusive

Just because it's been a while since I wrote an entry does not mean I have not been blogging. I have four other active blogs, which I contribute to; this has merely gone on the back-burner--till now.

I want to get back to the blog entries here by re-posting a comment I wrote in reply to one "Alan" who queried my article on the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Nato. You can find it below. If, Alan, you do see this finally, I would be happy for us to exchange more for the purpose of learning from each other. Thanks!

Alan--many thanks for the education. Perhaps suggesting in this post that I only read a wikipedia article and formed an opinion would be doing a disservice to what I actually have been doing, which is reading around other academic articles and sites about the SCO.

I understand theimpression it might give, but I appreciate the value of research, and would do more than wikipedia. I hope the fact that I have set up this blog itself suggests a lot of reading goes on beyond wikipedia!:-)

That said, I believe in the light of what you have said, it is too early to make such categorical statements--as like life, comparative regional integration is about humans establishing mechanisms and whatnot that make policies work or not; in that respect, it's about shades of gray.

I don't pretend to be an expert on either Nato or SCO, but what I do know about the discipline of comparative regional integration is this: there are complementarities in each regional grouping that must be highlighted and popularised, as there are imperatives.

To date, I have failed to see the imperative of Nato--helping AU peacekeepers in Sudan? Helping in Afghanistan? AT least the piracy issue has given it some raison d'etre! All that said, there is no gainsaying that SCO is a force to reckon with, and will continue to serve as a counterweight to Nato in many respects...

An Ineffectual REC: Arab Maghreb Union

With Libyan leader al-Qaddafi focussing his interests in the African Union and CEN-SAD, you kind of wonder how much effort he would want to put into the Arab Maghreb Union.

Here's a five-member regional organisation that is twenty this year, yet has made scant effort to re-formulate its vision.

I took the liberty of reading the African Union's Status of Integration
, and was profoundly shocked by the fact that of the 8 major RECs on the African continent that had write-ups of them (ECOWAS/CENSAD/East African Community/IGAD/AMU/SADC/COMESA/ECCAS/AMU), AMU had nothing about it. The report suggests that it did not participate.

Elsewhere on the AU website, another report--the Minimum Integration Programme--indicates that in the matrices that have been set up to monitor progress of RECs, this-same REC had failed to deliver on them.

Surely, it's time to disband the Arab Maghreb Union from the AU's established RECs?