ARTICLE:"Regional integration and elite power politics in East Asia"

An insightful read. The parts in bold and italics are my emphasis of what I read as important components of regional integration dynamics of East Asia. Enjoy!

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from: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/04/05/regional-integration-and-elite-power-politics-in-east-asia/

Regional integration and elite power politics in East Asia

April 5th, 2012

Author: Christian Wirth, Waseda University

Recent developments have revealed the deepening contradiction between economics and politics in East Asian international relations.

On the one hand, cooperative mechanisms, especially those related to economic regional governance, have been enhanced. This is apparent in the expansion of currency swap agreements within the Chiang Mai Initiative, which have constituted a key regional response to the European fiscal crisis. It can also be seen in the new dynamics of free-trade negotiations that developed after the Obama administration renewed its push for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a move which in turn invigorated talks about China-Japan-South Korea, ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 FTAs.

At the same time, a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute survey of international arms transfers published this March showed some surprising results. Amid an overall volume increase of 24 per cent, the world’s five largest importers of conventional weapons between 2007 and 2011 — India, South Korea, China, Pakistan and Singapore — are all in Asia. Given the presence of hotspots such as the Taiwan Strait and the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula, and in view of the securitisation of the maritime sphere, this trend should be taken seriously. Other recent events — such as the September 2010 clash between Beijing and Tokyo over the arrest of the captain of a Chinese fishing boat intercepted near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands — have revealed the inadequacy of isolating either economics or politics in regional analysis. The two cannot be separated if we are to gain a more complete understanding of regional dynamics in East Asia.

In view of such trends, prominent scholars have argued that the Asia Pacific’s post-war order is no longer tenable and have called for the establishment of a ‘Concert of Asia’ in order to divert the great powers from their current collision course. According to this school of thought, simple strategies of deterrence are inadequate and rising powers, especially China, need to be given more ‘space’ — that is, a legitimate role in the international relations of the Asia Pacific. This proposition also requires that Washington relinquish its primacy in the region.

But there is a major flaw in the conception of such a balance of power: the era of 19th-century European-style foreign politics is over. Foreign policies can no longer be made and decided upon among a small number of national elites. Trust among top leaders, even if they were to stay in power for sufficiently long periods of time — wishful thinking in itself — is insufficient for stable international relations. Instead, the formulation of foreign policy must account for domestic political constraints.

The contradiction between economics and politics and the tensions between policy elites and public opinion were evident when Beijing sought to diplomatically engage Japan in the East China Sea dispute in 2008. China’s attempt at formalising earlier tacit understandings between Chinese and Japanese elites — epitomised by Deng Xiaoping’s call for ‘shelving’ dispute politics — has ultimately failed. This was not only due to Japan’s uncompromising stand. It was also due to popular resistance — both among Chinese academics and the general public — to the Chinese leadership’s perceived weakness toward foreign demands.

Similar to calls for adjusted balances of power, the discourse of Asian regionalism also has a strong elite bias. While the former assumes that foreign policy can be conducted more or less autonomously from the domestic realm, the latter implicitly assumes that economic growth, spurred on by free trade and other related policies, has a trickle-down effect strong enough to maintain social cohesion and thereby legitimise incumbent political systems. Given the salient income disparities and other social and environmental problems in East Asia, however, it must be asked: what is actually being integrated, who should be cooperating and for what purpose?

To be sure, European regional cooperation and integration has been an elite project with the aim of economic competitiveness and prosperity at its core. But although economic development is a real priority for contemporary East Asian governments, prevailing circumstances during Europe’s 20th-century integration differ greatly from those of contemporary East Asia.

As a result of past and present development policies, Asia’s populations and economic and political power are now largely concentrated in a few urban centres. This leads to the horizontal fragmentation of societies between their cities and the countryside, and to a vertical fragmentation among the few rich and an increasing number of poor city dwellers. China’s 240 million ‘migrant workers’ is but the most extreme example of this.

The question for East Asia is how ruling elites will maintain the cohesion of their societies given these recent trends. The answer will have crucial implications for the conduct of foreign and security policies, and with it the future of order in the Asia Pacific. If incumbent elites, be it for material gains or fear of ‘disorder’, cling to the status quo, top-down and bottom-up nationalism will inevitably continue to rise. This does not bode well for the future of East Asia, even if economic growth continues as expected.

This is not to deny that East Asia is coming together socially and economically — but understanding the social processes underlying economic and security policies depends on a deeper analysis of the foundation of domestic political legitimation, especially in times when economic growth alone is insufficient to achieve this end.

Christian Wirth is Research Fellow at Waseda University and Adjunct Lecturer at Sophia University, Tokyo.

Understanding African Integration—Actors and Dates

If one were to look at the landscape of integration efforts worldwide, it would be safe to say that African integration is perhaps the only kind that involves a troika that is fast and furiously emerging as the key drivers of integration at the intergovernmental level. These are the African Union Commission (AUC, est 2002); the African Development Bank (AfDB, est 1963); and the UN’s Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 1958).

As we now know here on this blog, the African Union Commission is a successor to the Adis Ababa-based Secretariat of the OAU, which was established in May 1963.

The AfDB is a regional development bank established in 1964 with the intention of promoting economic and social development in Africa. The Group comprises the African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Development Fund (ADF), and the Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF). AfDB provides loans and grants to African governments and private companies investing in the regional member countries (RMC) in Africa.**

As regards the UNECA, which is the African counterpart to the UN’s five regional commissions, it was established in 1958 and by the United Nations Economic and Social Council to encourage economic cooperation among its member states (the nations of the African continent)[2] following a recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly.

Many times I have tried to work out in my mind whether the Asian Development Bank(ADB) for example and UNESCAP have played a role as central as the Tunisia-based AfDB. While it is true that ADB has been involved in the regional integration process in the ASEAN region (http://www.aric.adb.org/ ), it has been more of a duo of the ADB and ASEAN working together, with a limited role by the regional commission of UNESCAP. It is even rather telling to note that a google search of “unescap asean” as compared to “uneca African union” yields searches of 75,600 and 86,900, respectively.

Still, far from suggesting that Asian integration has a long way to go, I think a little bit of the comparative approach helps provide perspective on the progress of an African integration that is rarely given much credit. If you recall my beef with Daniel Bach three weeks ago, it was to do with how he had managed to side-step the importance of the capacity-building and research (through its inimitable Assessing Regional Integration in Africa(ARIA) ) that UNECA has provided over fifty years towards African integration processes, in tandem with the AfDB.

But on the specific issue of African integration, other “processes” that are noteworthy are the following:

1. Conference of African Ministers of Integration(COMAI), institutionalized in 2006
2. The AU-mandated RECs (AMU/ ECOWAS / CENSAD / EAC / IGAD / ECCAS / SADC / COMESA)& subregional RECs(six of them)
3. National member states

Bearing in mind that the AUC/AfDB/UNECA have been frontline intergovernmental actors facilitating regional integration, with COMAI playing a secondary but important ancillary role to African integration, we can already see that in understanding African integration, the devil is truly in the detail of these processes.

This is because the picture is far from complete when you look at these actors in isolation. COMAI, for example, has been operating at the intergovernmental level in a context of REC-rationalization since 2006, when it was institutionalized. One can speculate whether without the rationalization of the Regional Economic Communities, the regularity of the meetings would have been established.

The eight AU-mandated RECs have been operating as legal personalities in their own right as well, creating action plans and attempting to implement REC-specific plans. As to whether they have cognizant of how their plans sit with the African Economic Community is less clear. In fact, we can speculate that it is virtually non-existent.

Now that we have a fair idea of who the actors are, allow me to remind you of the key 10 dates necessary to obtain an insight of African integration. These are:

1. 25 May, 1963. This is when the OAU was established.

2. December 1976 –In what is now the DRC, Ministers of the then-OAU decided to establish an African Common Market as a prelude to the African Economic Community

3. June 1991 – Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) is established

4. May 1994 – AEC starts operating as a continental framework for African integration

5. 9 September 1999 – Sirte Declaration (Libya) encourages the speeding up of continental unity

6. July 2001 – NEPAD is established in Lusaka

7. July 2002 – OAU is disbanded in Durban, South Africa to be replaced by the African Union(AU)

8. 2006:
a. March, OUGADOUGOU -- Institutionalization of Conference of African Ministers on Integration (COMAI)
b. July, The GAMBIA – AU Seventh Ordinary Session (Summit) decides to recognize 8 regional economic communities (RECS). Puts a moratorium on any other RECs [6-7-8]

9. July 2007 -- AU Grand Debate on Union Government, ACCRA

10. 2009 – first phase of Minimum Integration Programme commences under the ambit of the AU Strategic Action Plan (2009-2012)


**thanks, WIKIPEDIA!

ASEAN's Elusive Regional Identity Lives!

Remember the ASEAN Charter back in 2007? If we forget the integration snobbery of the EU (where the EU believes its regionalism is the model for world-wide regional initiatives) for a second, we will understand why ASEAN is still not in a hurry to become like the EU. After all, it has its famed ASEAN way.

So when one reads that at their upcoming 43rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting they are going to discuss the ASEAN Charter in Vietnam, Hanoi, "with a focus on the implementation of the newly-ratified 2008 charter", we can only wait and see with baited breath.

The reports indicate that the Charter is supposed to "provide a legal framework" and set goals for the political, economic and socio-cultural development of its member states.

It has been riddled with holes on account of the fact that some observers wonder why such a Charter when ASEAN remains adamant that they will not deal decisively with Myanmar (Burma).That country continues to be the black sheep of the ASEAN family, and without ASEAN wielding the stick, any implementation of the Charter will come to naught.

So distressing has been the situation that even a few scholars were pointing to no less than the African Union as a model for ASEAN! You can read that article here: http://regionswatch.blogspot.com/2009/10/article-asean-asean-can-take-leaf-out.html.

That article maintains:

In 2005, the African Union even suspended Togo in response to an
unconstitutional seizure of power, which convinced the government to
call new elections. Moreover, the African Union is currently
establishing a stronger African Court of Justice and Human Rights to
hear human rights cases. As a result, according to the U.S. think-tank
Freedom House, Africans on the whole currently enjoy more civil and
political freedom than Southeast Asians. While Africa still faces many
challenges, human rights violations are no longer accepted as the norm
thanks in part to efforts of the African Commission on Human and
People's Rights.

By contrast, ASEAN has yet to adopt a single human rights treaty and
struggles to condemn gross rights violations committed by its member.
Unlike African human rights treaties, neither the ASEAN Charter nor
the ASEAN Human Rights Body's Terms of Reference detail specific
rights, but rather list vague principles, such as non-discrimination
and the rule of law. Thus, it is not even clear whether Southeast
Asians possess the same human rights that Africans currently enjoy.

As much as the ASEAN Charter is important, and needs decisive implementation, I think the 14-member grouping must actually also be credited for trying to promote ASEAN in an innovative way.

Given that this is not the first time ASEAN has made efforts at show-casing the organisation, we can only sit bemused by what next they have to offer.

Vietnam currently has a National Committee for ASEAN in collaboration with the Voice of Vietnam radio station.

This idea is basically:

in line with the regional body's attempts to raise public awareness of ASEAN and its role in member states, the radio contest centered around the "ASEAN Community of Solidarity and Prosperity", as part of the socio-cultural agenda of ASEAN under the recently ratified 2008 Charter. The radio contest is just one initiative aimed at communicating the concept and role of ASEAN to people in the region.

Although there remain challenges around the promoting of ASEAN, I think it's safe to say that it is a concept that can be replicated in different regional groupings--all with the aim of offering a constructive and progressive outlook to regional integration!

Monday Analysis: Of Regional Designs (ASEAN / SCO / East Asian Community / ECOWAS / SADC / IGAD )

The reason I have not been writing much here has been because I have been having an internal dialogue with myself what I'm really doing with all this reading and analysis on regional integration.

One day last year, my boss caught me printing some stuff about the social dimension of some regional integration initiative, prompting him to ask whether it was just for my "edification" (Not for the first time, I was likened to Kafka who is reputed to have written a novel when working in an apparently-dull job!). Truth be told, in many ways it is, but all this cannot just be for the blog--I aspire to get bigger things out of this enterprise than mere writings left in cyber-space.

My belief in regional integration in so many ways is about a world predicated on arrangements that are conducive to a more peaceful world. No doubt, man is a social animal whose genius finds expression in thinking, thought, and possibilities for a better world. I sincerely believe that "better world" can be found in regional designs.

I am heartened by the fact that 2010 is the Year of Peace and Security for the African Union, as well as the year that the Pan-African organisation will seek to operationalise the African Standby Force. I still cannot get over the fact that challenges notwithstanding, the AU has emerged since 2002 as a formidable actor in the set-up of the "regional designs". I hate to say it, but if you even have observers looking at the AU model on human rights as one that could be replicated for East Asia, I believe something must be going right for the AU!

That said, there remain challenges. One of imperatives is one of them.

Over the weekend, I was grappling with what imperative could be ascribed to SADC. I have yet to determine what comes to mind when one thinks of SADC--except power-sharing. From Zimbabwe to Madagascar, I think there has got to be more about the 14-member grouping than that, surely? If any of you know, I would be happy to report and update accordingly. I make a lot of noise about ECOWAS here, so it might be odd if you did not know. For ECOWAS, it's on conflict management, prevention and resolution, and I suspect IGAD might be going the same way, though to a lesser degree. Though I did read somewhere that the Early Warning System was pioneered by the six-member grouping established in 1986.

In South East Asia, Indonesia has been unhappy about talk of the East Asian Community on account of the fact that it believes it cannot happen without Asean. I hope to convey these frustrations over the next couple of weeks. In so many ways, I can empathise with the de jure hegemon that hosts the secretariat of Asean. Asean has been around since 1967--long without Japan. For that country to suddenly swan about talking about an economic community is almost to thumb the nose of ASEAN that has some commendable experience. As they say, though, the devil is in the detail, and I do hope to be reading a bot about the detail.

On the Shanghai Corporation Organisation, there are some interesting developments. I read a paper the other day that explored the possibility of the SCO being a force for good in the region. For the regional grouping that has Russia and China as key countries, this is certainly a grouping to watch out for. It has well-established structures and organisms that are not to be sneezed at. Interestingly, it has been around since 2001. The paper argued that in Afghanistan, the SCO might have a constructive role to play, so one should look out for it there. Also contrary to Western fears, it is not positioning itself to counter Western influences, at least explicitly in the region.

I guess all we can do is wait and see! In the meantime, might I recommend that you visit Stuart Hastings "towardsunity.org" website (http://www.towardsunity.org to obtain insights into where the intrepid regional integrationist has been travelling to. Last time I read him, he was just going to Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, that is also the host of the ASEAN secretariat.

In all this, I derive some hope that the regional designs I talk of will find great expression in the following theories below I have propounded elsewhere many times:

First, there needs to be identification of imperatives of each region. Simply put, what is unique about a particular region that that region can capitalise on to bring to bear in the conception of an AU government? So, we can say, for example, that ECOWAS's sub-regional imperative is that of conflict prevention/resolution /management, given its experience with Liberia/Sierra Leone/and the instrumentality of ECOMOG. SADC's might be a different one; the EAC's might be on, say, regional infrastructure. For example, § A paper from UNU-CRIS cites that: “the AU has been the first regional organization to establish a clear relationship with the UN as it is consciously aspiring to closely coordinate, if not integrate, its mission planning and execution of peace and security action with the prevailing structures/plans of the UN”.


Secondly, there needs to be comparative approaches. By this I mean what best practices are there from each of these regional communities that can best be put to good use in any conception of an AU government? This means that ECOWAS's peacekeeping/peace enforcement wing ECOMOG could be analysed for use in a regional organisation like SAARC that has experienced problems over Kashmir/India and Pakistan. What is it that ECOMOG has been able to do in enforcing peace that SAARC can learn from?

Thirdly, there needs to be collaboration, as exemplified by the donation of $1m by the Arab League to the African Union's peacekeeping forces.
from: http://ekbensahinghana.blogspot.com/2009/01/unbearable-lightness-of-being-west.html

Just in Case you Missed the Emergence of Regional Poles...

The recent signing by the Czechs of the Lisbon Treaty means that the EU will from 2010 become a more formidable force, with what it calls "The European External Action Service", or a super EU Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The UK's CHATHAM HOUSE has a paper on this *http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/research/europe/papers/view/-/id/621/*, which makes interesting reading about how and why the EU needs to use the Lisbon Treaty to better-manage its external affairs. Inevitably, this might include trade and development.

At a time that the AU is also talking about the AU Authority (http://knowledge.uneca.org/member-states/observatory-on-regional-integration/regional-economic-commissions-in-africa/african-union/transformation-of-african-union-from-a-commission-to-an-authority-1/transformation-of-african-union-from-a-commission-to-an-authority) in place of an AU Commission, which is more administrative, it is clear and inexorable the speed towards which we all must be hurtling towards a world where regional poles matter--big time.

Now we all have doubts about this much-touted AU of the people, but blocs like ASEAN are even taking cue from us. A recent article--http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/2769-asean-can-take-a-leaf-out-of-african-union-.html--argues that the AU has gotten serious on strengthening human rights, and perhaps ASEAN should do same.

For a bloc that continues to overlook the castigation of BURMA when it is crystal-clear that the junta is a as sore a thumb in ASEAN as Niger-Guinea axis of "trouble" is for our own ECOWAS, a new ASEAN human rights bloc looks a bit of a misnomer and embarrassment for the 10-member bloc.

Coming back to a practical level of what these blocs mean, my kindred spirit--Canadian Stuart Hastings--shares similar views about how these poles can advance a degree of peace. His website is towardsunity.org, and there you can read how he has embarked on a one-year trip to visit the major regional poles--AFRICAN UNION *Addis* / EUROPEAN UNION *Brussels*/ ASIAN *Jakarta* / UNION OF SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS *Quito, Ecudaor*. He hopes to turn his adventures into a video and a book. He is right now in Strasbourg.

If you have some time, do check out his blog on his adventures of how this young 27-yr-old is breaking grounds by practicalising the experience of visiting emerging regional poles, which we have touched on many a time> http://www.towardsunity.org/mission-log.phtml

ARTICLE--ASEAN: "ASEAN can take a leaf out of African Union"

ASEAN can take a leaf out of African Union
by Dominic J Nardi
Wednesday, 16 September 2009 11:59

from: http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/2769-asean-can-take-a-leaf-out-of-african-union-.html

Mizzima News - ASEAN still has much to learn about establishing an
effective human rights body from – of all places – Africa.

As the Association of Southeast Asian Nations prepares to appoint its
first set of human rights commissioners to the new ASEAN Human Rights
Body at the 15th ASEAN Summit this October, the commission itself
faces skepticism and uncertainty about its future. Human rights
activists allege that ASEAN stripped the commission of any teeth in
order to appease perennial human rights violators such as Burma.

Defenders counter that, given ASEAN's concerns over national
sovereignty (the infamous "ASEAN Way"), the result was a necessary
political compromise. Indeed, comparing the ASEAN Human Rights Body to
the European Court of Human Rights would seem unfair, given that
Europe consists exclusively of liberal democracies. However, even if
we look to the rest of the developing world, ASEAN still has much to
learn about much about establishing an effective human rights body
from – of all places – Africa.

Historically Africa has had more petty dictators, more xenophobic
governments, more genocides, and more overall human rights problems
than ASEAN. Despite these challenges, the African Union has developed
a fairly advanced human rights system.

During the 1980s, African leaders adopted the Banjul Charter on Human
and People's Rights. Since then, the region has also adopted treaties
protecting children's and women's rights, as well as a charter on
democratic governance. Africa's human rights system exists not only on
paper, but also has teeth: the African Commission on Human and
People's Rights.

African Union member countries elect 11 commissioners for a six-year
renewable term. These commissioners are independent from their
respective governments and must be human rights experts of the
"highest reputation." Impressively, the Commission has both the
mandate and political will to rule against African governments for
discrimination, free speech, arbitrary detention, torture, and a
variety of other rights violations. When a military junta still ruled
Nigeria in the late 1990s, the Commission ordered the government to
release a journalist who had been arrested without a warrant and
prosecuted in a military tribunal. Several years ago, it ruled that
the Republic of Guinea violated the Banjul Charter by inciting solders
to evict, rape, and torture Sierra Leonean refugees. The Commission
has interpreted African human rights broadly, finding that a state of
emergency does not justify violating human rights. It has even
ventured into political disputes, condemning the government of
Mauritania for dissolving the opposition party in 2000.

Admittedly, the African human rights system is far from perfect. The
African Commission has no independent enforcement mechanisms. Some
countries do comply voluntarily, but, even when governments refuse to,
a favourable decision from the commission can constitute a powerful
moral victory. Also, the Commission's docket is backlogged since it
can only meet for two 15-day sessions each year. However, the
Commission has taken important steps toward not only supporting
individual human rights victims, but also promoting human rights
ideals throughout the continent. Despite Africa's sensitivity over
their national sovereignty after being colonized by Europe, many
African governments now consider it appropriate to intervene in order
to protect human rights. Last year, when Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe won
an election through violence and fraud, the Southern African
Development Community strongly criticized his actions and successfully
pressured him to form a coalition government with the opposition. In
2005, the African Union even suspended Togo in response to an
unconstitutional seizure of power, which convinced the government to
call new elections. Moreover, the African Union is currently
establishing a stronger African Court of Justice and Human Rights to
hear human rights cases. As a result, according to the U.S. think-tank
Freedom House, Africans on the whole currently enjoy more civil and
political freedom than Southeast Asians. While Africa still faces many
challenges, human rights violations are no longer accepted as the norm
thanks in part to efforts of the African Commission on Human and
People's Rights.

By contrast, ASEAN has yet to adopt a single human rights treaty and
struggles to condemn gross rights violations committed by its member.
Unlike African human rights treaties, neither the ASEAN Charter nor
the ASEAN Human Rights Body's Terms of Reference detail specific
rights, but rather list vague principles, such as non-discrimination
and the rule of law. Thus, it is not even clear whether Southeast
Asians possess the same human rights that Africans currently enjoy.
Moreover, the ASEAN Human Rights Body will not be nearly as strong as
its African counterpart. It cannot hear individual complaints from
ASEAN citizens whose rights have been violated. In addition, the
commission has no power to monitor or investigate abuses in ASEAN
countries. Rather, its main function appears to be merely promoting
human rights awareness. The ASEAN Terms of Reference also provides
little guidance on the qualifications for commissioners – a far cry
from the Africa Union's requirement that its commissioners be human
rights experts of the "highest reputation." ASEAN's commissioners will
have no independence, serving merely as "representatives" of their
respective governments. Should a commissioner become too vocal, the
government can remove him at its discretion at any time.

ASEAN and the Africa Union are two very different regions, but
nonetheless the comparison provides some useful lessons as ASEAN
prepares to appoint the first human rights commissioners. First of
all, a strong regional human body can coexist with political
diversity, conservative cultures, and national sovereignty. The
African Commission hears individual complaints from human rights
victims who live under authoritarian governments. This may embarrass
some politicians, but has certainly not threatened the regimes of
dictators such as Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe. It is likewise difficult
to see how a stronger ASEAN Human Rights Body would topple Burma's
Than Shwe. Indeed, part of the African Commission's success derives
from using nuanced legal interpretations to balance the concerns of
sovereign governments with the imperative of protecting human rights.
For example, it requires human rights victims to work within their
country's own justice system before appealing to the Commission. This
allows governments the first chance to redress any human rights
violations and save face.

Rather than trying to find a similar compromise, ASEAN seems to have
simply hid behind the mantra of the "ASEAN Way." Southeast Asian
leaders should take a closer look at other regional human rights
bodies, particularly Africa's, in order to learn how to balance
meaningful protection of human rights with national sovereignty. In
the longer run, doing so will help create a stronger ASEAN Community
and give both ASEAN and its member governments more legitimacy in the
eyes of their citizens. In fact, given Africa's relative experience
with human rights, perhaps we will soon see African Union legal
advisors sent to Southeast Asia in order to help the ASEAN Human
Rights Body comply with international human rights standards.

(Dominic J Nardi, Jr. is a visiting research fellow with the
Governance Institute, a legal think-tank dedicated to promoting the
rule of law. He has worked with human rights organizations in
Southeast Asia and advised women's' rights NGOs in East Africa. In
addition, he has a J.D. from Georgetown Law and a Masters in Southeast
Asian Studies from Johns Hopkins SAIS. The views expressed are his
own.)

ASEAN/African Union--Still Some Way to Go for the ASEAN Community

I am both excited and disappointed by the latest developments in the ASEAN region. I am excited to hear that ASEAN wants to "accelerate" the formation of a single market; but profoundly disappointed it has to be like that of the European Union.

ASEAN is not--and should not be expected to be -- like the EU, which culture is different; furthermore, the history surrounding the establishment of ASEAN is dissimilar to the EU. Like many of the African RECs, there was no Economic Coal and Steel Community before the Treaty of Maastricht created the EU in 1992.

That the organisation agreed to move on consensus-building rather than sanctions--even with the new Charter--is a reflection already of its idiosynchratic nature.

What is not so different is the fact that there are regional leaders driving the group. In this case, it is Singapore; Thailand; Malaysia; and Indonesia. According to bloomberg, they account for almost 90 percent of all foreign investment into ASEAN.

With regard to the bloc's response to the global recession, Bloomberg reports:

Asean’s new charter, which came into force three months ago, has no mechanism to stop member countries from implementing protectionist policies. Earlier this month Indonesia ordered civil servants to use local products, and Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi said it was “normal” for countries to resort to protectionist measures in a slowdown, according to local media reports.

ASEAN has always talked about free trade, and I don't believe that will change soon. What might have to be changed is the degree of political will to move forward on integration. That they have decided on a new human rights body, which has hitherto no name, is a great idea. Still critical steps to make it an important body in the ASEAN construct ought to take prominence. The naysayers and cold observers might huff and puff at the ideas for the region's processes. However, I believe that it needs to start with its charter--and the strengthening thereof--as an important step towards the critical development of its own regional integration.

What's eating the African Union?
Meanwhile, elsewhere in the African Union, the Pan-African body is getting some migraine from Guinea;Mauritania; Madagascar; and Guinea-Bissau. Need I mention Sudan? Let's watch the space for a frenetic period for the continental body. Before we do, let me leave you with a commentary by one Tom Nuttal about lessons that the AU can learn from the EU:

Tom Nuttall writing in the "Independent" newspaper of Uganda advances five lessons that AU member states can take cognizance of while conceiving of a United States of Africa.

First of all, it doesn’t take a charismatic man to drive the idea of any Union of African states. He refers to the "founding father" of the EU—a gradualist—Jean Monnet who espoused the idea of a Europe based on federal lines. Secondly, countries ought to "focus on the bottom line". In other words, they ought to believe that they will benefit mutually from being associated with each other, that leaving becomes the last thing on their mind. The third lesson is in finding "a method of integrating states while allowing them space for legitimate disagreements—and ensuring that those disagreements do not hinder the fundamental project of union." The fourth point is predicated on finding an external force, like the US in the EU after the Second World War ended in 1945, who can preside over any attempt or project to unite. Finally, adversity and challenges are necessary to advance any unification project. 

The Africa Unity Day that Wasn’t

By E.K.Bensah II

The last holiday that Ghanaians enjoyed might have gone unnoticed to many in its symbolism purely because they did not understand the significance of it. It is interesting to note on the news wires that even the US government congratulated the African Union(AU) for the celebration of forty-five years of its existence on 25 May. So when in scanning the Ghanaian media, one heard and read almost nothing symbolic about that celebration, it struck me as a worrying trend in our psyche of “Africanness”.

Granted, we do not need a holiday alone to remind ourselves that we are Ghanaian in particular, and Africans in general, but I do wonder whether it animates us sufficiently. For a country that played host to an African Union (AU) summit in June 2007 in the fiftieth anniversary of the country’s history, it is downright unacceptable, in my opinion, that Africa Unity day came and went with a non-existent fanfare.

We can speculate as much as we can—that it is an election year, or that it fell on a Sunday, therefore the media’s antennae were not awakened to the significance of it, and then some. In my view, we have no excuse about the silence, especially at a time when the regional is taking centre stage.

Take the case of Burma and the cyclone that it experienced a few weeks ago. Two weeks ago, British foreign minister and former senior UN official Lord Mark Malloch-Brown toured the region to try to establish whether there could be greater collective Asian/ASEAN response to the disaster. This was important, because the reluctance of the regime suggested that a regional response—translated through the ten-member grouping of the Association of South East Asian countries (ASEAN) – that includes Burma would elicit a more effective response. His efforts proved useful, because ultimately, a Franco-British deal would eventually facilitate ASEAN’s greater role in the disbursement of aid to the victims of the cyclone. All this has come against the backdrop of criticism in some quarters suggesting ASEAN should be disbanded.

One particular article in the *Jakarta Post” entitled “Myanmar disaster challenges ASEAN’s utility” went so far as saying that ASEAN has been lethargic in the manner in which it has been implementing its programmes, including a 2005 Agreement on Disaster Management and Disaster Response that was never signed.

The case is not that much different in this part of the world, where ECOWAS, established since 1975, has, many times, come under some flak for not living up to its agreements. To date, the “real” meaning of ECOWAS integration is debatable, considering the hassles citizens of West Africa—comprising some 230 million—experience traveling through the sub-region.

Food crisis
The challenges notwithstanding, what we can say ECOWAS has done off late is respond regionally to the food crisis that has afflicted much of the developing world.

Last week, the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) agreed to provide $1billion annually to support agricultural productivity in the West Africa sub-region as part of its contribution towards resolving the food crisis. This was part of the outcome of an extraordinary meeting of the regional grouping and their ministers of agriculture, trade and finance. This development has spawned a number of discussions around ECOWAS and the implementation of a common agricultural policy.

Truth be told, it would be as far back as 2005 that the grouping would adopt the ECOWAS Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP). Three years later, its implementation remains moot. According to TRADENET website, in Senegal’s attempt to implement ECOWAP, the country begun putting in place a National Programme of Agricultural Investment. The question now is getting the mqjority of ECOWAS countries adopting the policy.

Imperatives
Any regional grouping learns from demands—or imperatives—that are placed on it. This means that when the Liberian conflict broke out in 1990, ECOWAS was compelled to send troops through its peacekeeping/-enforcement wing of ECOMOG. Today the Labadi-based Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre(KAIPTCE) is a testament to the ECOWAS imperative of conflict resolution and prevention. I daresay considering earthquake-struck China’s proximity to the ASEAN region, the grouping’s new imperative could be that of disaster management!

Regional Integration Perspectives: Closer Towards an East Asian Community?; AU-GCC FTA in the Offing?

There is some ground-breaking stuff going on in the area of regional integration: no less than the fifty-three member African Union has instituted an audit of its institutions.

It goes without saying that policy without direction is policy in a vaccum. An audit as a self-evaluating and self-monitoring tool can help the AU look deep into itself, and attempt at a resolution of some of the existential angst that it is suffering from. Arguably, one of the biggest of these is the proposed union government that was the subject of debate at the AU summit here in Accra last June.

An article in IPPmedia.com maintains that according to a report by Regional Economic Development and Integration, debate has been mounting on the appropriate form of a proposed union government. The report went on to say that conclusion on the debate of a formation of a continental government was subject to the finalization of the report.

AU-GCC Pact?
Meawhile, a very short article from gulf-times.com points to a desire by the de facto SADC hegemon South Africa to complete an FTA between the AU and the Gulf Cooperation Council. On reading the news, my visceral question was to ascertain since when South Africa had become the spokesperson for the AU; and secondly, was this not a masked desire by the country to itself establish an FTA with the GCC.

Interestingly enough, Pretoria maintains that it is impossible for one to be set up between itself and the country that will host the next session(XIII) of UNCTAD in 2012—Qatar, but one can be arranged between the GCC and the AU.

The reason being that South Africa is a member of a customs union, comprising the so-called BLNS countries (Botswana; Lesotho; Namibia and Swaziland).

Aren’t we going in circles here I wonder? Point is: the AU can set up one with the GCC. Fine, but why does SA have to speak on the 53-member body’s behalf as it did, when the South African Trade minister Mandisi Mpahlwa, speaking on the sidelines of a business forum organized by the Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry, told reporters when prompted by reporters. That in itself raises questions as to why reporters were asking about such an FTA to the country itself? What made them think South Africa would have the answer? Last time I looked, the AU had a Commission, which would take care of such questions!


EAC’s all the rage!
Though it’s been a while since I talked about the five-member regional organization that saw Rwanda and Burundi join its ranks in July last year, this is an EAC of a different kind. We’re talking about the East Asian Community, which has been promoted and promulgated so many times in the ASEAN world it’s no longer funny. ASEAN’s issues with Myanmar notwithstanding, it seems clear that an East Asian Community—probably modeled on the EU and NAFTA—would be a model that could work for the region. I suspect that one that worked like ECOWAS (in whichever form or content it exists) with a commission and commissioners is what might work best. The EU at 27 members seems a tad unwieldy these days, what with its aspirations to have an EU president and all that. Furthermore, with little movement on a referendum, and with ASEAN having adopted a charter where the EU failed, it seems, IMHO, that a hybrid of regional forms is what might best work for the proposed EAC.

But who am I to propose that? After all, the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), described as "a key initiative to support the formation of the East Asian Community has received full support from senior government officials in Brunei". This means, in short, that a considerable amount of resources are going to be put its way to chart the course of a putative Asian Community. Note what the article says:

The think tank, which will formally be established this year in Jakarta, will receive Y1 billion from the Japanese government for 10 years, said Hidetoshi.
The think tank will also be publishing 55 volumes of research on all 16 countries in the region soon, said Hidetoshi. Brunei's Centre of Strategic and Policy Studies (CSPS), one of the ERIA member research institutes, is involved with over 300 researches in 16 countries, including the 10 Asean countries and its dialogue partners, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.

ASEAN/SAARC Integration Gospel, according to The Economist

You have got to give it to the Economist. Once it propounds theories on regional integration, people are bound to listen. It hasn't been in this business of writing and influencing for almost two centuries for nothing. But that has got to change.

On issues of regional integration, people are getting smart, and being more discerning. Old attitudes that seek to see the EU as the precursor of regional integration everywhere, or those that seek to perpetuate the idea that it is because of countries against each other that cause the fragmentation of regional block are not quite fading into insignificance, but fading...somewhere!

Whilst there is some truth to these ideas, it's always important to look beneath the surface.

The Economist sadly, in its latest article looking at ASEAN, fails to do so. In my view, any generalist on regional integration could have come up with the view.

It starts off by saying all that we know: "The European Union has plenty of critics".

By gum, surely a secondary school leaver could have come up with that!

Then it goes on:

"For Asian leaders who seek greater regional integration across the continent, however, the EU surely provides at least a distant goal, if not a model. But time spent in Brussels talking to officials at the European Commission about the EU’s relations with Asia highlights the gap between the EU and its nearest Asian equivalents"

Let me not begin to presume that I am cognisant of the discussions that transpired between EU officials, but I can say authoritatively that this post goes to fly in the face of the Economist magazine's claim. In that article, EU officials from the 28th session of the Inter-Parliamentary ASEAN Assembly were claiming that ASEAN's model was a commendable one. They went on:

"We have good relations and strong economic links. The EU is a large investor and we create a lot of trade in Asean and vice-versa."

2. "Apart from having a common economic interest, our regional cooperation is the most advanced and successful in the world,"

3. "Until last year AIPA was still called the Parliamentary Organisation. It stresses parliamentary influence in Asean just like the European parliament"

Clearly, saying that there is work to be done does not discount the commendable nature of the organisation that is ASEAN, but in my view, the Economist should not go away making readers feel that ASEAN is clamoring to be like the EU--otherwise the ASEAN Charter would not have been passed!

Still, it is interesting to note that the article talks about war having been fought among the current 27-member-strong EU several decades ago, so why does it feel that if there are issues between India and Pakistan in SAARC over Kashmir, the two countries cannot sort it out? It writes:

In comparison, the two big Asian integrative ventures—the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC)—are puny striplings.

ASEAN has at least achieved the first aim. Formed in 1967, just after a period of “confrontation”, just short of war, between Indonesia and Malaysia, it has made armed conflict between its members (now ten of them) seem very unlikely.

SAARC is not even there yet. It is riven by bloody internal conflicts in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, and a dormant but unresolved dispute over Kashmir between India and Pakistan that has sparked three wars in the past. A regional conflagration, sadly, cannot be ruled out.

In Brussels, SAARC hardly gets a mention. This is not just because its contribution to regional integration is so inchoate. It is also because, within South Asia, India physically, politically and economically dwarfs its neighbours.

This reference to India/Pakistan is a development that needs must be talked about in discussions over any SAARC integration, but I would have assumed the esteemed magazine to have elaborated a bit more than the sentiment that things can turn into a "regional conflagration."

It is fair to say that integration in SAARC is slow and, well, very slow, but it is important to put things into perspective. SAARC and the EU are far from comparable. EU and ASEAN, yes, but SAARC and EU, no!

I like the fact that the Economist has woven a news story of the EU wanting an FTA with India and ASEAN around this piece, but it has done some selective interpretation of the story, in my view, to underscore how formidably efficient the EU is--and, frankly, that's not on.

Sure, the EU had problems with Burma, but let's face it, ASEAN has not kicked that country out. The ASEAN Charter is a reality and Burma does not look to be going anywhere!

It is true that the Charter might have issues on voting; and the beefing up of the Secretariat, inter alia (note that ECOWAS without a charter transformed into a Commission so as to become more "efficient"), but it is not as if ASEAN will do it today is it?

Even the much-maligned African Union has moved away from the doctrine of non-interference, albeit slowly. ASEAN will go that way some day.

In my view, it's all about shades of gray.

It is important to talk about SAARC and how it can be helped, but the EU, I suspect, knows that it because it has preferential relations with the India (a rather dominant figure within SAARC), the organisation can probably go fish.

I suspect further that any greater proactiveness by India within SAARC might go to ruffle the EU's growing feathers.

Communicating the ASEAN Message

"I think many journalists are not aware of the impacts of ASEAN's many achievement on us. It seems that if it is not a corruption case then they will not publish it. We realize that we have to change this" -- Dian, Foreign Ministry's director general for ASEAN affairs

Haven't we been here before?

Communicating the ASEAN message graced this blog, when I first started writing it in this way back in April 2007. Then, it was the Malaysian ASEAN Youth/Sports Minister who was encouraging the youth to face up to both global and regional challenges by learning about ASEAN.

Now, like a boon to the minister, we read that most youngsters are actually in tune with what ASEAN is doing:

It found students from Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam were most likely to identify themselves with the ASEAN, with 96 percent, 93 percent and 92 percent respectively.

Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam are the newest members of ASEAN, having joined the 10-nation grouping in the 1990s.

They are often referred to as the newest four, or CMLV, and their development lacks behind the other six member countries.

Students in Singapore had the weakest affinity toward the grouping, with some 49 percent saying they were citizens of the grouping.

Even if these are the latecomers expressing this opinion, it cannot hurt for ASEAN to know that they might be getting something right.

Furthermore, it was not that they were only in tune with what the regional grouping was doing but that they also identified themselves as citizens of ASEAN.

In my view, this is a great start, and very welcome news to the South East Asia grouping, especially in the light of the establishment of its Charter last year.

Work to be done
In the meantime, much needs to be done by the media--the purveyors of information, and often the putative gatekeepers to society--to showcase the works of ASEAN. This, at least, was what Indonesia was saying.

Superficially speaking, blame can be apportioned to the media for failing to write about ASEAN. Truth be told, if there is little interest in the first place, how can you expect editors to consider writing about it. Therein lies the paradox of reconciling a responsibility to encourage citizens to feel more in tune to the regional grouping, and highlighting what it means for them, with reporting actual news about the organisation--even if it is considered bad.

On communicating regional integration to citizens, there are hardly any black-and-white areas: these agreements are realities--whether we like it or not, and so it becomes incumbent on all and sundry in the media to do its level best to understand the issues inherent in them, and if it is not happening, use the media itself to question why it is not happening.

Surely, that can only be a small step to obtaining that critical and progressive view of regional integration?

ASEAN Apathy Bites the Dust with ASEAN Charter?

"ASEAN, as an inter-governmental organization, is hereby conferred legal personality," says the Charter.

According to the Blueprint, the AEC builds on four pillars: a single market and production base, a highly competitive economic region, a region of equitable economic development, and a region fully integrated into the global economy

"When it (the Charter) comes into force, it has the potential to transform ASEAN from a loose grouping of countries into a more cohesive, more effective and a more rules-based organization,"

Even at a time when the South East asian regionalisms attitude towards erring members (viz: Pakistan in SAARC, and Myanmar in ASEAN) could be described as this side short of soporific, I have to confess that I am rather excited by the prospect of an ASEAN Charter. Excited, because it signals the beginning of what can be in the critical and progressive discussion on regional integration. What can be as in what is possible, where others might have failed.

I've intoned time and again how the Europeans rejected the constitution back in 2004, yet ASEAN leaders have managed to chalk, and pass it. As to whether it will translate to the citizens is a moot point.

Whatever the case will be, I believe history will look favourably on the 10-member regional organisation that has a population of 500 million [ECOWAS has 250-300 million, and is fifteen members] for having bitten the bullet to pass the Charter.

Highlights of the Charter include a compulsion by members:

to democracy and protection of human rights, the charter also mandates the establishment of a human rights body in the region and aims to turn the region into an European Union-style market.
http://in.news.yahoo.com/071120/43/6nguj.html

Though I am wont to criticise the EU-one-size-fits-all that many regionalisms touch on at least once in their life, I am avoiding that here, because I think it's time to accentuate the positive step ASEAN has taken.

Let's remember that 4the organisation turned forty only in August this year. It didn't wait for its Jubilee before doing something constructive for its region!


Above all, and in all seriousness, ASEAN wants to use the Charter to facilitate an Asian Economic Community by 2015. Well, deadlines are great. (Isn't the world supposed to eradicate poverty by half by 2015?) What matters is that there is a framework, a structure that can be carried forward by posterity. ASEAN now has legal personality--and that certainly, four decades after it was established, can only be congratulated.

In many respects, however, I can understand why the celebrations over the charter eclipsed the UN envoy to Burma Ibrahim Gambari's visit in a way that made the meeting abortive. Put simply, the meeting didn't happen.

I surmise that not that ASEAN was denying that Myanmar is a nettlesome issue, but that to have brought the UN envoy would have been undermining the cohesion ASEAN tried so hard to fight for in taking more than two years to draft this lofty charter.

I have always been in favour of UN envoys--and it's not going to change anytime soon--but, again, I've seen a similar thing in West Africa with Cote d'ivoire when it launched its coup in September 2002.

ECOWAS also decided not to expel it, but brought pressure to bear through the collective voice of ECOWAS to bring normality to the country through...talk.

For all the necessary noise that the US is making by saying (through Susan Schwab, US trade representative) that ASEAN's relationship with Myanmar cannot be "business as usual", it makes sense that ASEAN is not going to break its party anytime soon! Let it cry when it wants to--but certainly not now that there has been a significant, critical and progressive development in ASEAN's regional integration.


quotations taken from the following links:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-11/20/content_7115277.htm
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-11/20/content_7114354.htm
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-11/20/content_7115085.htm

African Union Peacekeepers Were Only Doing Their Job, but ASEAN must act in Myanmar

Recent events in Burma and Sudan have conspired to remind me about the need to have regional responses to these regional crises. Regional, because Myanmar is a member of ASEAN, and Sudan, a member of not just IGAD, but the more formidable African Union.

When I heard the news of the 10 AU peacekeepers having been killed over the weekend, I found myself almost on the verge of tears.

What happened to "never again" in Rwanda? More importantly, I couldn't help but remember, in uncanny parallels, how 10 Belgian peacekeepers were killed in Rwanda, prompting a hasty retreat. Whether Belgium was justified or not in the withdrawal, let's just say that in 1994, at the height of the genocide, no-one could have blamed them.

In my view, a quick reminder of the quasi-parallels are worth reminding ourselves about:

In January 1994, three months before the killings, Major General Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian commander of the U.N. peacekeepers in Rwanda, informed the Belgian government that the Hutus were preparing for a large-scale slaughter of Tutsis. Despite repeated warnings, the Belgians refused to provide or request further assistance.

In February, Belgian Foreign Minister Claes sent the Belgian Senate a telex that reported the possibility of genocide. No additional precautions were authorized.

The massacres ultimately were provoked April 6, 1994, by the death of Rwandan President Habyarimana, a Hutu, blown up in his jet as it approached Kigali airport on his way back from Arusha, Tanzania. Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira, also a Hutu, was killed on the same plane. The two presidents had just agreed to let Tutsi refugees in Burundi return to Rwanda.

Reacting to Habyarimana’s death, Hutu leaders proceeded with their plan to exterminate Rwanda’s Tutsi minority.

General Dallaire, the UNAMIR commander, saw the developing danger. He asked Uwilingiyimana, Rwanda’s Hutu prime minister, to speak on Rwandan radio to help calm the nation. He sent 10 Belgian soldiers in U.N. blue berets to pick up Uwilingiyimana at her house.

The Belgians took gunfire at the house, and when Uwilingiyimana tried to slip out the back, the militant Hutus caught her and killed her on the spot.

Then the 10 Belgians, with U.N. advice, agreed to disarm, and the Hutus took them in trucks to Camp Kigali, a military compound. Here, a mob of Hutu soldiers attacked the Belgians.

The Hutus beat several of the Belgians to death with iron bars. A few peacekeepers ran to a cinder block hut and tried to fight off the attackers. Hours later, the last of the 10 was killed with a grenade.

Shocked by the death of the 10 Belgians, Foreign Minister Claes asked U.N. secretary-general Boutros-Ghali for permission to withdraw all Belgian troops from the peacekeeping force. Claes also told Boutros-Ghali that the U.N. should suspend its entire operation in Rwanda.

In a letter to the U.N. Security Council, Boutros-Ghali said a Belgian withdrawal would cripple the UNAMIR mission
from: http://frankwarner.typepad.com/free_frank_warner/2004/04/belgiums_war_cr.html

In the same vein, a Nigerian withdrawal would cripple the AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan) that is about to become part of a UN-AU hybrid 26 000-strong force. This, despite the fact that Nigerian AU peacekeepers were also killed--and Nigeria has been emphatic about this, too:

"The Federal government of Nigeria condemns this attack and is concerned that this incident may undermine the credibility of the international mission," presidential spokesman Olusegun Adeniyi said in a statement.

But he ruled out any withdrawal from the peacekeeping mission.

"Nigeria will still continue to participate because we are committed to our commitment in Darfur under the UN/AU hybrid force," Adeniyi added.
from:http://www.africasia.com/services/news/newsitem.php?area=africa&item=071002210557.3t71v59e.php

Meanwhile, it was interesting that in all the responses of conflict management offered by listeners to BBC World Service news last Friday in News Hour, it had to take Mark Malloch-Brown, former UN Deputy Secretary-general now-turned junior foreign minister in the Gordon Brown administration in the UK, to talk about an ASEAN response to the crisis in Myanmar/Burma.

In a manner which I personally felt was slightly self-serving on Australia's part, it was interesting to read that Australia did not wholly condem an ASEAN response; in fact, it praised ASEAN:

perhaps most significantly, the ASEAN leaders meeting in New York last week released an uncharacteristically strong statement condemning the violence, calling for the release of all political detainees, including Suu Kyi, and imploring all parties to find a political solution.
from:http://www.theage.com.au/news/opinion/regional-pressure-can-change-burma/2007/10/02/1191091111557.html?page=2

Perhaps I spoke too soon?:

It is ASEAN's new robust position that offers an opportunity for Australia.

Having successfully assumed a leadership role at APEC and enjoying strong relationships with a number of ASEAN countries — including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and ASEAN's chair, Singapore — Australia is well positioned to work with them in co-ordinating a regional response, including multiparty talks.

However it turns out in Burma, what with China, Japan and India playing key roles in the resolution of the crisis, what is crystal-clear to me is that the world ought to be moving slowly and surely towards a time when crises -- as exemplified by that of the ambush of the AU peacekeepers (ending in a meeting of the AU's Peace and Security Council), and that of Burma -- prompt a visceral direction towards a regional response.

About this, there must be no question.

Six Years after 9/11, US-ASEAN Relations Strong

Forget the dodo-esque Free Trade Area of the Americas, have you heard of the Free Trade Area of the Pacific?

Singapore PM Lee Hsien Loong, speaking to US-ASEAN constituency at the recently-concluded APEC summit in Sydney, Australia, has hinted at one, as well as an APEC-wide FTA. There has even also been talks of a necessary US leadership on the Doha trade talks, especially after it floundered in Hong Kong last year:

the US commitment to free trade sets the tone for the rest of the world, he noted, which is why a successful conclusion of the Doha Round on free trade would not be possible without American leadership.
from:http://thestar.com.my/services/printerfriendly.asp?file=/2007/9/9/asia/18829860.asp&sec=asia

You can imagine how the rest of the tale goes: Singapore pretty much kowtowing to the US on its sterling leadership on trade talks; the US having confidence reposed in it by the country of Singapore on the Middle East , Israel-Palestine; and the necessity of quid-pro-quo policies:

As for Washington’s concerns in the Middle East, Lee said that if the US is able to stabilise the situation in Iraq and make progress on the Israel-Palestine issue, it will change the balance and psychology of the region. That, in turn, will “benefit not just South-east Asia, but also countries around the world.”

The US administration must be laughing all the way to the ASEAN region.

Oops, I forgot it's already there--and has been for a good thirty years.

At a time when Singapore--assuming the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN this year--is doing a Pavlov to the US, especially at a critical time for the US when 9/11 is as close as it is, the region--and most likely Singapore--can count on some heavy US support for the future!

Will the ASEAN-OPEC Collaboration Pave Way for Regional Governance?

Given the recent collaborations between regional organisations--ranging from the recent ECOWAS-EAC collaboration to the MERCOSUR-ASEAN one, to the recent ASEAN-OPEC collaboration, you could be forgiven for thinking that the world is slowly and surely moving towards some form of regional governance. I suppose that pre-supposes there to be some form of global governance already. Maybe the two do not have to be mutually exclusive.

Either way, what they do have to do is to make sense for the rest of us. Questions, such as what type of regional governance will we be seeing should probably be the most viscerally-enquiring ones that we should be asking ourselves.

More in context of ASEAN, let me just say that ASEAN is going places. Not just because it is celebrating its fortieth anniversary, but in that celebration, it is seeking to bring to bear on the anniversary constructive outcomes that can benefit the 10-member organisation. For all the controversies over the ASEAN Charter, and whether Myanmar will be the thorn in the flesh in the conception of a rights-based constitution, what is most clear to the average observer is that things are happening, and the ASEAN region is talking to each other candidly about what it needs to do to ensure its citizens are catered for for the future. It is fair to say that ASEAN sees itself as a key player in the region that needs to have a little bit of clout.

It would therefore probably comes as little surprise that some months after the ECOWAS sub-region (allegedly) started its West African Gas Pipeline, and Latin America began talking about a Bank of the South that ASEAN would start talking about pooling its regional energy together--and it's certainly no lean feat!

ASEAN is thinking these big plans:

The 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations has agreed to form a regional ASEAN power grid. This will serve as a platform for members to trade electricity under a set of harmonised technical rules and regulations.

ASEAN leaders are also scheduled to sign a plan of action in the next two months in Singapore to put a $7-billion Trans ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP) project back on track, Indonesia's energy minister said. ASEAN will also work closely with the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to keep prices in check.

If you think those are big plans, let's try this for good measure: the very fact that they are seeking to collaborate with OPEC to "bring prices in check". For me, this type of collaboration may not just be unprecedented, but an interesting development to underscore how the collaboration underpinning the proverbial "unity is strength" has been chewed,transformed, and spat out into a need to strengthen institutional collaborations world-wide.

It also begs the question of why ECOWAS, in its discussions with the World Bank over the West Africa Gas Pipeline never came up with the idea of linking up with OPEC, considering how critical a country ECOWAS hegemon Nigeria is in the sub-region and the organisation. That CHEVRON has a stake in the WAGP reflects the serious and significant private sector interests that the US has and will continue to have in the region.

Then again, you didn't need me to tell you that; it might have been rather obvious to many casual observers.

What I'm, in fact, further interested in is not just the reporting that ASEAN is working on a regional grid, and it serves as a precedent to a region like the ECOWAS one that has a West Africa Power Pool and the WAGP, but how, it is the sure sign of developments in the regional organisations to come.

You might find this a little whimsical, but consider this: the very fact that a mere google search of "West Africa Power Pool" pulls not articles from ECOWAS, but many other private sector organisations not directly related to ECOWAS underscores the very twist and pernicious development that we will begin to see over this apparent new trend of regionalising power and energy projects--especially in Africa.

Here be Some Revelations: The European Union's View on Regional Integration (in ASEAN)

All's well that ends well--even in ASEAN, which has a very different kind of regional cooperation to that of the EU. You know you're doing something right, I suppose, when the EU tells you that your regional cooperation is the best and most successful in the world. Check these soundbites out by EU Parliamentarian, Hartmut Nassauer, invited to the 28th session of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly:

1. "We have good relations and strong economic links. The EU is a large investor and we create a lot of trade in Asean and vice-versa."

2. "Apart from having a common economic interest, our regional cooperation is the most advanced and successful in the world,"

3. "Until last year AIPA was still called the Parliamentary Organisation. It stresses parliamentary influence in Asean just like the European parliament"

A very superficial analysis would reveal, from these quotes at least, that the EU is no less than pleased with how ASEAN does business. It is evidently looking forward to ASEAN becoming a bigger bloc--as evidenced by this statement here:

Nassauer said the EU would support Asean the best it could in its efforts to speed up integration of the Asean community particularly on the single common market

I guess there can be nothing wrong with parties seeking to maximise cooperation, while contemporraneously lending credence to the maxim that there are "no permanent friends, only permanent allies", as so wittily enunciated by Palmerston with regard to British foreign policy in the nineteenth century.

So, you've got no bother, really, wondering why the EU would be making such proclamations at this time.

Either way, I'm bored. Bored because these pronouncements are nothing mere than reflections of a less-than-altruistic motive by the EU to woo the ASEAN region like never before. And here's the bombshell: the EU betrays itself by giving us mere mortals a sneak preview into how it conceives of regional integration. Read carefully:

the basic element for the EU approach of regional cooperation was

how to strike a balance between the super powers like China, India and the United States

.

"The only chance for the weaker and smaller states is for them to act together. For a balanced development, South-east Asian states had decided to act as a regional cooperation,"

he added.

If that be the case, why the hell will the European Union not leave Africa alone to manage its own regional integration? Why does it seek to force one for us--as evidenced by the aggressive pursuit of the Economic Partnership Agreement, slated for December this year?

Does it mean, therefore, that it's one rule for ASEAN, and another altogether for African Union's regional organisations?

ASEAN is 40, So What?

Don't celebrations commence during the Jubilee year? So why, honestly, would there be any reason for the Association of South Eastern Asian Nations to start at a time when it is 40 years old?

The reason for the celebration has everything to do with ASEAN's Charter!

In my previous post, I talked about how ASEAN would have succeeded where a more-developed bloc, like the EU, would have failed. It goes deeper, though. This ASEAN Charter, predicated very much on a rules-based and human rights-based set of principles would help strengthen the 10-member grouping, and probably make it more relevant for its contemporaries. As one might expect, Myanmar is not very keen.

It might probably be very happy that, as Channelnewsasia reports:

there is no consensus on the commission's scope, how it will operate or even when it will start

Evidently, the ts have to be crossed, anad the I's dotted -- particularly because ASEAN hopes tha, with this charter, it can transform itself into "a community with economic security and socio-cultural pillars by 2015".

I am very happy to read that ASEAN is not seeking all-out to emulate the European experience, and remaining mindful that other continents, like the AU and Latin American countries also have it, albeit in limited forms:

ASEAN should understand the European experience without idolising or aping it. After all, other regional human rights mechanisms exist in the Americas and Africa but work in more limited ways. In many cases, rather than emphasising court-like procedures, the systems give ample room for political negotiation and compromise.

But, let this not sound like I am being too pig-headed about the comparative approaches I have advocated before. I simply feel that in order for any serious analysis to take place on the state of regional integration in 2007, such approaches are more than critical.

I hope that the perfect does not become the enemy of the good. Judging by comments like below, one begins to wonder:

ASEAN may, similarly, begin its human rights initiative more modestly, while holding out the possibility of stronger mechanisms in the future. Where can ASEAN best begin?

The best place to begin is in the beginning! At least a charter is being chalked; the rest of the tweaking will needs take place.

Whilst all that tweaking takes place, other articles on the web, such as those by one Bunn Nagara, of the Malaysian Star newspaper are looking at the existentialist nature of ASEAN: where has it come from, and where is it heading.

He attempts at a description of ASEAN in the light of the new development of the proposed charter here:

Encouraged by economic policy harmonisation in a globalised world, some policy harmonisation in governance seemed desirable for regional cohesiveness.

The proposed Asean charter was supposed to cover human rights, as current chair Philippines had hoped, but collective assent through consensus found only nominal approval for a proposed regional rights watchdog.

I like that: regional cohesiveness.

It's something that some of the other Southern regionalisms in the AU, for example, could begin to reflect over!

Kudos to ASEAN!