The African Union's "Situation Room" Compared to the EU's newly-created "Situation Room"

If ever there was a temptation by Afro-pessimists to conclude that the AU is incapable of results, I would want to point to the AU's situation room as one element to totally de-bunk that myth.

Back in March this year, when I had the opportunity to also visit the AU's situation room, alongside then-colleagues of the Africa Peace and Security programme(APSP), I had to say I was impressed by this very screen here [this picture is from Derek Henry Flood of http://the-war-diaries.com/?tag=new-african-union], which I also remarked, but felt it was not possible to take a picture of! I would have thought that the AU Situation Room might want to keep it confidential you know!

Anyway, the point ought not to be lost on you that the AU Situation Room has been around for a while--in fact since 1998--and I want to cull what I found from an AU report:

"

59.       Ambassador Ki-Doulaye gave a brief overview of the Situation Room of the Conflict Management Center. He pointed out that after the establishment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Management and Resolution in 1993, with the Central Organ as its main decision-making body, there grew an increasing need to understand African conflicts better, in order to prevent them. It was commonsensical at that time that a thorough understanding of African conflicts required timely and reliable information and analysis, providing the decision-makers with actionable options.  These growing concerns provided the impetus for convening, in 1998, of the meeting of experts to identify the political, economic, social, and military indicators, which could be considered to qualify a conflict.

60.       The Acting Head of the CMC informed the experts that it was following the outcome of that meeting in 1998, that the Situation Room was established, to serve as an initial step to the establishment within the CMC of a full continental early warning unit, which would strengthen the capacity of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The Situation Room is now serving as the center for the collection, processing and dissemination of data and information on crisis situations around the continent.

 --from: http://www.google.com.gh/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=13&ved=0CCEQFjACOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.africa-union.org%2Froot%2Fua%2FConferences%2Fdecembre%2FPSC%2F17-19%2520dec%2FRpt%252030-31Oct%2520%252003%2520Background%2520n%25201.doc&rct=j&q=%22AU%20situation%20room%22&ei=M6UuTtq_LojIhAeb6_Uj&usg=AFQjCNF9Pg_NkCkfxXYpRHNsXTrjiqH3Gw&cad=rja

A bit too long, but I guess you get the point that to read that -- and then to read the latest news over the weekend that no less than the European Union was establishing an EU "Situation Room" under the new External European Action Service(EEAS) could only prompt questions as to whether the EU might have copied the AU--but never admit it! Let's see the dates: 1998 and 2011. Some 13 years down the line? I do not think anyone can convince me that the bilaterals that have taken place over the years between the AU and the EU Commissions might have touched on peace and security and, by extension, the situation rooms!

Check the objectives for the EU Situation room and you might get the picture:

----------------------------------
The EU Situation Room is part of the EEAS Crisis Response Department. It is operational since 15 July 2011.

The main tasks of the EU Situation Room are the following:

• To lead, manage and develop all EEAS permanence and situational awareness capabilities;
• To staff and support the EEAS Crisis Platform;
• To ensure that all EEAS services can continuously have access to accurate and updated situational awareness as regards the political situation worldwide, the particular situations affecting EU Delegations and EU CSDP Missions/Operations as well as events and situations potentially affecting EEAS staff from a duty-of-care perspective;
• To manage and develop relations with similar crisis mechanisms in certain International Organisations and a number of third countries.

 from: http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/es/article_11223_es.htm


The key words are "similar crisis mechanisms" -- and frankly, the EU was not original this time!!

Suffice-to-say, whether it is regional integration or regional cooperation, this blog here has always emphasized "the regional way". To see that "similar mechanisms" to manage and prevent conflict are being established is a glimmer of hope that for those of us who wish to see a global governance predicated on regional institutions, the reality might be closer than we could ever imagine.


Though I cannot ever foresee the EU situation room and the AU situation room exchanging ideas in a kind of "knowledge management" bubble, I can foresee the emergence of a progressive and critical look at regional integration!

ekbensah AT critiquing-regionalism.org

Abuja Bombings Must be a Clear Call for ECOWAS to Adopt the ECOWAS FBI!

Back in March 2009, I wrote a piece on my ghana blog entitled The Unbearable Lightness of Being...ECOWAS-ian & Fighting Crime in ECOWAS/AU Member States ("http://ekbensahinghana.blogspot.com/2009/03/unbearable-lightness-of-being-ecowas.html) in which I opined:

"I was very happy to read at the beginning of this week that the UN and the AU have launched a joint initiative to support an AU plan to fight drug trafficking and related crimes over the next five years.. I am also deeply encouraged that the AU has a "Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2007-2012)".

In the long run, these protocols are great, and it's nice to know that ECOWAS is strong on peacekeeping and peace enforcement, but I would rather hope to see not just ECOWAS disposing of a Criminal Intelligence Bureau , but ALL regional economic communities—starting with the more formidable AU! "

Truth be told, the AU has an agency dealing with terrorism that is based in Algiers. Established in October 2004, it's called the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism (http://www.caert.org.dz/an/apropos.php). According to its website, its main functions are:

• Complementing international efforts by strengthening cooperation between African countries to prevent and combat terrorism;
• Assisting in the full implementation of international conventions relating to terrorism;
• Playing the role of a monitoring and alerting tool by incorporating in its approach the concept of preventive management of situations.

Now, all this would be well and good if public education on it were strong enough. Fact is, it is not. As such, we as citizens are all left feeling powerless to put sufficient pressure on our governments to provide us with information on their role at this AU-agency.

But it's more serious than that.

Yesterday's bombing in Abuja, in my view, has brought into sharp relief not so much the state of Nigeria's security as the state of REGIONAL SECURITY in West Africa and, by extension, security in other regional economic communities.

Today, I read from the UK's  Daily Telegraph newspaper that "Al-Qaeda-linked suicide bomber targets Nigeria police station" (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/8580438/Al-Qaeda-linked-suicide-bomber-targets-Nigeria-police-station.html). We have all already heard much talk about the Al-Quaida in the Maghreb over here in West Africa and felt that it was so isolated for us to care.

In May 2010, I was in Bamako for a meeting, and noticed at the airport that there were US soldiers lurking around. I later learnt that it was in connection with assisting Mali security services to fight Al Quaida in (Arab) Maghreb.

So, not so far away, huh?

So it prompts the question of why ECOWAS is being so lackadaisical about establishing its Criminal Investigative Intelligence Bureau. In the same March 2009 blog post, I wrote:


"The Europeans established EUROPOL the very moment the Treaty of Maastricht was established. Why did AU member states not equally view law enforcement as an important element in the facilitation of regional integration? "

My question still holds, but I want to go further: why did the AU not include the establishment of a Pan-African police organisation (with regional devolution at the very worst) to deal with impending issues associated with drug-trafficking and abuse of free movement protocols? Okay, so the AU, alongside the RECs, were caught off-guard, but it is never too late.

If you're interested, you might want to read the "Political Declaration on the Prevention Of Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crimes in West Africa" here: http://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/ecowaspoliticaldeclaration.html.
It is clear that West Africa has gotten fairly serious on countering crime, and I have to say that judging by some of the publications by the eponymous Dakar-based Intergovernmental Action Group against Money-Laundering(GIABA) that was established in 2000 as an ECOWAS agency, ECOWAS has moved significantly. But it must clearly do more -- as illustrated by my comment on Facebook on the BBC worldservice for Africa page:

Personally, I believe it is high-time ECOWAS got serious about adopting the Protocol of 2005 establishing the Criminal Investigative Intelligence Bureau. The AU should also use this opportunity to use the Algiers-based African Centre for St...udies and Research in Terrorism to start compiling a list of terrorist groups and the deploym...ent of strategies to deal with them. ECOWAS has done well to establish West African Police CHiefs Committee Organisation, and Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering(GIABA), but these are not enough.

With ECOWAS citizens enjoying free movement, ECOWAS can no longer say this is a Nigeria-specific problem. Passports can be faked. As such, any of these fundamentalists are likely to exploit the free movement AND the absence of a criminal intelligence bureau in the region to cause more havoc in Nigeria and beyond. ECOWAS must kindly wake up -- fast!! (from: http://www.facebook.com/bbcworldserviceafrica#!/bbcworldserviceafrica)

Monday Analysis: Morocco for the Arab World?; Cuba Hails Community of Latin American and Caribbean States

Here's a turn-up for the books: Morocco wanting to cross-over from the African Union and join the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (as this article testifies). Now, Morocco left what was then the Organisation of African Unity in 1984--and has never rejoined what is the successor to the OAU--the African Union.

Interestingly and ironically, Morocco--a non-AU country--plays host to the headquarters of an AU-recognised regional economic community we know as the Arab Maghreb Union. Can the legal brains explain to us how that works?

If Morocco does go ahead and join the Gulf Cooperation Council, as a non-AU-member, what will happen to its relations with the African Union? The article suggests though the GCC sent Morocco an invite, it would be the odd-one-out in the whole group of GCC states whose GDP out-shadows Morocco's in leaps and bounds.

The invite suggests to me that the recent murmurings about the effectiveness--or lack thereof--of the AU might have raised eyebrows in that part of the world to such an extent that they decided to do some digging of the Arab Maghreb Union--only to find that Morocco, perhaps the least disruptive member, is "available" for business.

Whatever inspired the invite, it can only cement the position and the speculation that the so-called international community wherein regional players make a difference is slowly and surely coming into shape in weird and unexpected ways!

Finally, on the Cuba, it was never going to be any surprise that Cuba would support a gargantuan community/comity of states that excludes Canada and the US. As for the extent to which it would be able to effectively marginalise the fairly invisible Organisation of American States(OAS) is anyone's guess.

With big players like Venezuela; Brazil; and Cuba in the fold, you're likely to get bombastic claims about a regional integration that subsumes UNASUR; MERCOSUR; Andean Community.

Truth be told: it's likely to happen sooner than later. The Latin Americans share a language and are in my view perhaps more radicalised in creating a common future than my counterparts over here in Africa could probably ever be!

Happy African Economic Community Day! Kindly Sign a Petition...

Out today! UNDP's flagship report has come at a time when the Fourth UN Conference on LDCs is taking place in Istanbul, Turkey. Looks very worthy reading!!

from: http://www.prweb.com/releases/2011/5/prweb8405366.htm

UNDP Report: Africa: Stronger Cross-Border Ties Key to Social and Economic Progress

Region-wide linkages could positively impact national-level income growth and poverty reduction by improving access to public services and promoting sound environmentally sustainable policies

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Ambitious and well-designed integration agendas can advance both inclusive growth and human development —enabling African LDCs to accelerate progress towards the Millennium Development Goals.

Istanbul, Turkey (PRWEB) May 10, 2011

Integrated regional investments in roads and power, coupled with pro-poor policy, could lead to an accumulated 10 percent increase in the continent's standard of living between 2012 and 2020, says a new report released by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) today at the Fourth UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in Istanbul, Turkey.

Region-wide linkages could positively impact national-level income growth and poverty reduction by improving access to public services and promoting sound environmentally sustainable policies, according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, Regional Integration and Human Development: a pathway for Africa.

"The potential of regional integration to deliver higher economic growth is now widely appreciated," said UNDP Administrator Helen Clark. "Ambitious and well-designed integration agendas can advance both inclusive growth and human development —enabling African LDCs to accelerate progress towards the Millennium Development Goals."

However, the achievement of greater integration can only become reality if supported by strong political will and committed leadership in African countries, according to the report.

While half of Africa's population, amounting to half a billion, live in the continent's 33 LDCs, the countries share less than one quarter of Africa's total gross domestic product (GDP). In addition, 12 of Africa's LDCs lack direct domestic access to a seaport, making international trade difficult.

Investing in infrastructure and lowering transportation costs is particularly critical in Africa given the large distances that may be involved in delivering produce to markets.

Facilitating the movement of people and managing this in a way that protects migrants and respects human rights can also contribute to increased incomes and remittances, and empowerment.

While there are important integration initiatives already underway, the report states that countries could also gain by harmonizing regulations and standards, devising common approaches to macroeconomic policy and managing shared natural resources.

The report notes that closer regional ties could bring LDCs new forms of industrial and trade policy and could pave the way for a greater mix in trading sectors where the majority of LDCs currently rely on agricultural commodities, such as cotton, coffee, and on minerals.

UNDP works with LDCs to achieve sustainable human development focused on inclusive growth, reducing poverty and creating jobs.

In Africa, UNDP has been working with regional economic communities to identify gaps and strengths as a first step towards building institutions and human resources to effectively support regional integration.

In countries such as Central African Republic, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda and Tanzania, UNDP has provided technical assistance for the integration of domestic and regional trade priorities into national development plans and poverty reduction strategies.

The report is available at: http://www.undp.org/poverty/library.shtml

Editor's note:
The 33 LDCs in Africa are: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia.

UNDP is the UN's global network to help people meet their development needs and build a better life. We are on the ground in 166 countries, working as a trusted partner with governments, civil society and the private sector to help them build their own solutions to global and national development challenges. Further information can be found at http://www.undp.org. Follow us on twitter and facebook

Ghana's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Launches May as "Regional Integration Month"

At a time when I mooted the idea of virtually launching May as the "African Unity" month (http://www.facebook.com/home.php?sk=group_70453161507#!/event.php?eid=154734547925672) in March 2011, I am terribly encouraged to read that no less than Ghana's own Ministry of Foreign Affairs has launched May as "Regional Integration" month. The full story can be found here: http://www.ghananewsagency.org/s_politics/r_28439/politics/regional-integration-month-is-launched. In the interests of time, however, allow me to flesh out what some of the activities will be:

1. Between 18 and 27 May: LaPalm Royal Beach Hotel: gala awards night and African achievement awards


2. 19 May: Accra International Conference Centre(AICC): seminar on the theme: "Free Movement in Security"

3. 20 May: Flagstaff House conference room: launch of "ECOWAS Front" -- quarterly newsletter


4. 24 May:sponsored walk;

5. 25 May: African Unity day; flag-raising ceremony at forecourt of the State House; mounting of three-day exhibition (25-28 May) at AICC; fun-fair to showcase African dishes; fashion show

6. 28 May: joint Ghana-African-American Chamber of Commerce investment forum: LaPalm Royal Beach Hotel ; football match: El-Wak Stadium

These details are not from the site, but come from today's edition of THE GHANAIAN TIMES(p.33)

Fwd: New blog posts - New challenges for ASEAN

Though it has been a while since I posted a proper blog entry, I thought it was important to remind visitors that this blog is far from dead. Secondly, ASEAN is a pet topic, which I have regrettably neglected for some time now.

Given all that is going on in the world with regard to the UN, the AU and its sub-regional economic communities and their capacity--or lack thereof--to intervene in Ivory Coast and Libya, why would ASEAN not get shelved to the back-burner?                  

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: HD Centre <pr@hdcentre.org>
Date: 2011/4/7
Subject: New blog posts - New challenges for ASEAN
To: ekbensah AT gmail.com

You are receiving this email because you are subscribed to our email list. Find out more about:  Mediation Projects   |   Mediation Support Related Blog post: Indonesia and the West Opinion: Time for ASEAN to resolve spat Meeting report - Asian Mediation Retreat 2010 You may have missed: Blog posts: Women's representation in peace processes in Afghanistan and the Philippines New publication - Mediation Practice Series - Negotiating ceasefires Forward to a friend Know someone who might be interested? Why not forward this email to a friend? Follow the HD Centre RSS   twitter   facebook New blog posts 7 April 2011   New challenges for ASEAN   In February 2011, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) took a historic decision to intervene in a dispute along the Thai/Cambodian border. While this decision could potentially boost the regional organisation's capacity to manage internal conflicts, the current difficulties in implementing it could reverse this potential gain, argues Michael Vatikiotis, Regional Director for Asia at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (the HD Centre). In one of two blog posts recently published on Peacetalks (the HD Centre's online discussion forum), Dr Vatikiotis explores the current Thai/Cambodia border crisis. He considers the challenges it poses for ASEAN and its efforts to increase its role as a guarantor of regional security. He also suggests other paths which could help de-escalate the conflict. Another challenge faced by ASEAN is linked to the inclusion of new member states. In a second blog post, Dr Vatikiotis reflects on the prospects and potential repercussions of East Timor becoming the newest member of an expanded ASEAN.  Despite misgivings among some member states centred on the country's economic and political stability, Dr Vatikiotis argues that incorporation of East Timor makes sense from a regional security perspective. These two blog posts are also available on the MacArthur Foundation Asia Security Initiative blog, which hosts discussions on current events and security challenges in the Asia Pacific region. The HD Centre is one of six contributing organisations. The HD Centre would like to thank the MacArthur Foundation for its support for research into Asian peace and security issues. ***ENDS***

For more information on the HD Centre's activities, please visit the HD Centre's website or write to pr@hdcentre.org. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 114 rue de Lausanne   |   Geneva 1202   |   Switzerland www.hdcentre.org  Disclaimer: The HD Centre is not responsible for the contents or reliability for web links in this document. They are provided for information only. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue is an independent mediation organisation dedicated to improving the global response to armed conflict. It mediates directly between belligerents and helps others to do the same. The HD Centre is active in approximately 15 conflicts around the world, some of which are necessarily confidential. Unsubscribe / change your profile | Subscribe to receive HD Centre mailings

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RESOURCE: Using Regional Institutions to Improve the Quality of Public Services

from: http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/Outsourcing%20to%20Regional%20Institutions

Authors

Edgardo Favaro

Lead Economist, Economic Policy and Debt Department, The World Bank

Resources

Download Using Regional Institutions to Improve the Quality of Public Services as a PDF

Abstract

The rationale underlying a government's decision to subcontract the delivery of some public services to a regional organization is to access higher quality (and possibly lower cost) services than could be produced domestically. In that respect, contracting out a public service is not radically different from importing private goods and services. But in many other respects contracting out public goods and services is very different than importing most other private goods: first, there is no market where a country can purchase security or justice provision; second, there is risk that an arm's length relationship between the service provider and the client government may result in supplier actions that may not represent the interest of client governments; third, switching from one to another service provider is orders of magnitude more complex than it is in the case of most private goods and services.

A deeper understanding of subcontracting of public services to regional institutions is especially relevant in the context of the development of fragile states. If outsourcing some public service provision is feasible, bridging the gap between current poor quality public services and the type of services necessary to encourage development of a market economy is also possible within relevant development horizons.

The strategy followed in this paper is to study the conditions that facilitate the outsourcing of some public service provision, the governance structure ruling the relationship between the source and the client government and the actual performance of these agreements through the experience of several regional institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa and in the Eastern Caribbean. The second section of the paper describes the characteristics of fragile states and provides indicators of the quality of institutions. The third section describes eight experiences of outsourcing in Sub-Saharan Africa and in the Eastern Caribbean. The fourth section analyzes historical, cultural, technical and economic reasons that have contributed to the development of this type of regional institution in some parts of the world and the rationale underlying the outsourcing of some functions but not others.

ENDs

Towards an Emerging Regional Governance?

Who would have thought it: no less than the US, through Hillary Clinton, urging the world to wait out a UN-backed no-fly-zone on Libya.
This contrasts sharply with when her husband was President in 1999, when Nato was allowed to run rough-shod over the UN Security Council
by dropping bombs on Kosovo, without the backing of the Security Council.

Perhaps even more interesting is listening to this same Hilary Clinton talk about partners, including the Arab League, the African Union; the European Union;Nato; and the Gulf Cooperation Council!

I would have loved to hear in that list the AU-mandated Arab Maghreb Union, but that is okay.

Though I am impressed with Nato Secretary-General Rasmussen's claim that Nato will not act without the backing of the UN Security Council as well, I still have little regard for Nato, an alliance I believe has lost its raison d'etre. Still, hearing that list has given me hope that however and whatever people might feel about the utility--or lack thereof--of these groupings, they DO still exist and they are unlikely to break away anytime soon.

I just hope this Libyan crisis is a wake-up call for them to crank up what may just be the framework for the emergence of some kind of regional governance, where regional organisations are recognised as partners in the resolution of conflict -- everywhere!

Too Many Afro-Pessimists in the Hood

**The AU lacks the mechanism to be proactive and has failed. Its existence is not warranted.

**The AU is nothing but a forum for idling by questionable characters who meet and compare notes on their mismanagement of affairs. The AU itself is a problem that Africans have to solve first.

**Once again, the AU has led Africans to come across as people incapable of solving their own problems. How will we ever be respected if we continue to portray ourselves as "the white man's burden"?

from: http://www.citifmonline.com/index.php?id=1.290993.1.310328

I have just read a fascinating piece by one Dr.Michael J.K. Bokor on Ghana's citifmonline website that reeks of Afro-pessimism. I thought it was important to highlight three quotes that have resonance with a lot of what many African are talking about, namely: the failure of the AU to act in Libya.

While I agree to a large extent that the AU was slow in responding to the crisis in Libya, I never expected it to react so quickly. After all, Libya has been a rather formidable purveyor of African unity in many more ways than we can imagine. While that may have been self-serving for Libya in many respects, the bottom line is that Libya alone has paid the dues of smaller countries unable or unwilling to pay AU dues; plus the country contributes no less than 15% of the AU budget.

Perhaps if AU member states got their act together and paid more of their dues, rather than leaving it for South Africa; Libya; Nigeria; Algeria; and Egypt, we would all have a more functioning AU!

I don't know about you, but last time I looked no organisation can exist without finances--and Libya has offered a lot of that in the service of African Unity. Even if in theory, let's give the devil his due!

On issues of peace and security, it is acknowledged worldwide that outside Europe, the AU outshines Asia and Latin America in conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution initiatives.

As a West African learning every day about my sub-region of ECOWAS, I know that ECOWAS, out of all the regional economic communities, has a significant comparative advantage over the seven other ones on peace and security, having had sound experiences in Liberia and other hot-spots in the sub-region.

Simply put: enough of this Afro-Pessimism by the learned doctor. The AU needs to get its house in order, but it won't do that when the Afro-Pessimists who see nothing good from the AU decide to castigate it, without offering sufficient solutions on how to make it better.


ekbensah@critiquing-regionalism.org

The Blogging Passion's Still Burning...But Like That, He was Gone!

I thought I'd eschew any vestige of melodrama by being as incisive about my point as possible.

But knowing me, it was always going to be difficult!

It is not so much that I have goofed or erred -- just that I've become more of a human being, both pretending to be, and actually being busier than I ever expected.

Undoubtedly, this has affected my blogging. I cannot tell you the number of entries I have started only for them to be lost somewhere in my written diary/journal.

Somewhere.

Like the fire burning in this picture, the passion of blogging remains -- as does my passion of all things Ghanaian and all pictures Ghanaian.

I also love my area of expertise: comparative global regional integration, which is simply how the emerging regions in the world -- the European Union, African Union, ECOWAS, ASEAN -- compare with each other in their respective sectors. Closer to home, there's been a lot of talk about ECOWAS, because of the still-unresolved Ivorian Crisis, which has seen Laurent Gbagbo still in power.

My take is that the African Union meddled too much, leaving egg on the face of the West African bloc of ECOWAS.

I am glad, though, to have seen the ARAB LEAGUE get proactive about Libya; and the AU's powerful Peace and Security Council finally issue a communique about Libya (considering Libya's sponsoring of the Pan-African body to the tune of 15% of the AU's budget!)

I guess life's like that: we're all shades of gray, and a LOT of work-in-progress.

Suffice-to-say, I have more bombastic claims when I get back to regular blogging in April.

I shall be away from blogging proper for a good one month. I'm already getting withdrawal symptoms...

Just like the smoke in the picture, I've been lingering for a while, while the passion burns.

The only difference between me and the picture is that my passion won't ever ebb away -- just gone on hiatus.

Till then!

See you first week of April...

Both ECOWAS & AU must reduce Scare-Mongering on "war" in Cote d'ivoire!

Fears about a war notwithstanding, I feel it is important people understand that without a qualification of what "military intervention" would mean for Cot d'Ivoire, we are all making assumptions about a "hot war", which might not be the case at all. In March 2008, the AU, deploying a surgical objective of removing a dictator in the island of Comoros, went in (without South African or Nigerian troops) with some AU troops in what has been termed a "successful operation." While that island is small--and cannot be compared to Ivory Coast--it reflects the fact that the AU has a precedent in "military intervention". Research from Swedish Foreign Ministry about the Comoros intervention maintains there were no deaths, but some 11 civilians wounded.

Point is: there has been much talk about ECOWAS intervention, through ECOMOG, in Liberia in 1989. The arguments are sound about the need to avoid a direct comparison of the situations. What we must be asking though is why ECOWAS and the AU have not come out to clarify what military intervention would mean, given that ECOWAS has a Standby Force of roughly 6,500 troops which could be deployed--at least in theory. That Ghana has stated publicly about being unable to deploy troops does not foreclose the use of intervention by other ECOWAS member states.

The rhetoric of force in Cote d'ivoire has ironically come a couple of months after the AU declared 2010 to be the Year of Peace and Security. But what the AU failed to also do is provide sufficient information to the wider public about what this means about Africa having a "Peace and Security Architecture", under which regional standby forces, including the ECOWAS Standby Force, can be deployed.

I find it curious that neither the AU or ECOWAS has not sought to correct perceptions that there might be the prospect of an ECOMOG force--as in Liberia. ECOMOG no longer exists. I would have hoped the two leading African protagonists be more vocal about these misperceptions. That is not happening begs more debate that can probably be discussed when tensions around Cote d'Ivoire simmer down.

In the meantime, both ECOWAS and AU must come clean about a "hot war", which many West African citizens fear is likely to happen!



*picture from news24.com

On Why Military Intervention in Ivory Coast by Ecowas Standby Force is Feasible et al...

Am heartened by the fact that there's a lot of interesting discussion around Ivory Coast, but I want to make a few points:

1. Nigeria -- those associating military intervention with a whim of Nigeria are woefully wrong. Goodluck is only toeing the ECOWAS line. The ECOWAS Framework for Conflict Prevention (available from ECOWAS, 2008) states that military intervention is the last resort "in the broader framework of peace and security architecture: )--p.15. Jonathan just happens to be chairing ECOWAS at the time of the crisis. It could have been any of the other 14 members proposing it as a last resort.

2. ECOWAS ability to intervene -- ECOWAS set a precedent of military intervention back in 1989 when it went into Liberia. The force was called ECOMOG, and 70% of it was indeed Nigerian. They went in with the mandate of peace enforcement. There were problems, but it was not an illegal intervention. Chapter VII of the Security Council enjoins regional organisations to utilise regional organisations "in the maintenance of international peace and security for which the Security Council is primarily responsible" (http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/regional_arrangements.shtml)

3. ECOMOG vs Ecowas Standby Force -- ECOWAS has had missions in Liberia (ECOMOG); Cote d'Ivoire(2002); Sierra Leone; Guinea-Bissau. These had different monikers and were not all known as ECOMOG. In 2010, the African Standby Force (ASF) was born, under which the ECOWAS Standby Force(ESF) is a regional node, a kind of rapid reaction force. Each African region has one (there are five in total). This is what would likely intervene to depose Gbagbo. They trained in October 2010, and have the experience to avoid maximum bloodshed.

4. Human rights abuses -- there are many being perpetrated by pro-Gbagbo supporters, including attacks of UN forces whose sole mandate is to protect Golf Hotel and Outtara. What's the justification in attacking UN forces? ECOWAS has a Community Court, which will have full competence to accept cases of abuses of human rights when all this is over.

This is far from an exhaustive list of points, but for observers of international relations, this escalating crisis is one to keep one's eye on for the actors (a more activist UN; a secondary regional economic community in UEMOA setting a precedent by freezing funds of a member state; the lackadaisical performance of the AU--as exemplified by the choice of Raila Odinga as an AU Envoy, etc)

A more detailed analysis will be delivered in due course!

*Monday Analysis*: Ivory Coast crisis Should be Wake-up Call for SADC and ECOWAS

The centrality of former South African Thabo Mbeki to the resolution of the crisis of Cote d'Ivoire resonates with my oft-repeated theme of relying on putative imperatives (http://ekbensahinghana.blogspot.com/2007/06/au-grand-debate-is-on-my-interview-on.html) assigned expressly or otherwise onto the regional economic communities(RECs) of the African Economic Community(AEC).

I specifically use "imperative", because in 2009, both Zimbabwe and Madagascar--as SADC countries--were confronted with the problem of having "two" [disputed] presidents, but were eventually able to resolve the permafrost with power-sharing. Imperfections notwithstanding, it is clear in my view that SADC should use the Ivory Coast crisis as an opportunity to build experience on governance issues.

Although Mbeki's appointment as African Union envoy has less to do with my thesis and a great deal to do with his prior involvement in Ivory Coast, I believe strongly that history is on SADC's side in the fashioning of an imperative, which will put it at par with a REC like ECOWAS on peace and security.

Let me leave you with how I put the case of "imperatives" in an interview by Ghana's Radio Gold in June 2007, when I was asked about the possibility of a Union government of Africa:

First, there needs to be identification of imperatives of each region. Simply put, what is unique ab7out[sic] a particular region that that region can capitalise on to bring to bear in the conception of an AU government? So, we can say, for example, that ECOWAS's sub-regional imperative is that of conflict prevention/resolution /management, given its experience with Liberia/Sierra Leone/and the instrumentality of ECOMOG. SADC's might be a different one; the EAC's might be on, say, regional infrastructure. For example, § A paper from UNU-CRIS cites that: "the AU has been the first regional organization to establish a clear relationship with the UN as it is consciously aspiring to closely coordinate, if not integrate, its mission planning and execution of peace and security action with the prevailing structures/plans of the UN".

from: http://ekbensahinghana.blogspot.com/2007/06/au-grand-debate-is-on-my-interview-on.html


labels: http://regionswatch.blogspot.com/search/label/monday%20analysis, imperatives, ivory coast, SADC, ECOWAS, Mbeki, madagascar, zimbabwe, african economic community

Comparative Regional Integration Network: The EU in Comparative Context

from: http://www1.aston.ac.uk/lss/research/centres-institutes/aston-centre-europe/projects-grants/comparative-regional-integration-network-the-eu-in-comparative-context/

Network Coordinators:

Prof. Alex Warleigh-Lack, Brunel University, Alex.Warleigh-Lack@brunel.ac.uk
Dr. Jens-Uwe Wunderlich, Aston University, j.u.wunderlich@aston.ac.uk

Network Rationale

The revival of regional integration across the globe since the late 1980s has been remarkable, but it is rare to find sustained comparative work which puts the EU in a context with other global regions, rather than federal states. Partly, this is because scholars of non-European regions have often self-defined as IR/IPE experts at a moment when EU studies has gone through a comparative politics turn, considering the EU and EU studies as something  ‘other’ than their dependent variable. However, it is also because many EU scholars have interpreted the field’s comparative politics turn as a move away from IR. Thus, scholars interested in comparative regionalism including the EU often find themselves on the margins of both communities, lacking iterated access to funding and networking opportunities.

This network aims to help fill this gap by bringing together an interdisciplinary, international group of scholars to debate three core themes, building on the small if growing body of work which has begun this process. We maintain that scholarship on other global regions help us understand what is unique to the EU, and what is a general attribute of contemporary global regions. We also maintain that EU studies and the EU itself can be seen as a laboratory whose experiments with a highly institutionalised form of regional integration generates useful evidence and concepts for scholars of regions like ASEAN or MERCOSUR. The network will expand by gradually involving other researchers, in order to foster collaborative research endeavours.

Themes

The themes to be debated over the lifetime of the network have been selected because they speak to core issues in regional organizations and their role in the global political economy, but are also all under-explored in a comparative context:

• ‘Awkward’ States in Regional Integration: What drives some states to join regional organizations while frequently appearing ill at ease with their choice? How are these states managed by their partners?
• Balancing Economic and Political Integration: Beyond the EU, it is common for political integration (of various kinds) to precede economic integration; why and how do different regions strike different balances between the economic and the political? And how sustainable are these different balances in the age of global capital?
• Interregionalism: How does the EU manage its relations with other regions? And do other regions, such as ASEAN or Mercosur, develop more fruitful interregional relations than the EU?
• Opposition to Regional Integration: What are the motives behind resistance? How do these differ between different types of actors, between different national context and between different regional contexts? Do particular forms of regional integration generate more resistance?

Conferences

Section on Comparative Regionalism – Europe and its External Others at 6th ECPR General Conference (25th - 27th Aug. 2011) http://ecprnet.eu/conferences/general_conference/reykjavik/section_details.asp?sectionID=50

Making the African Union-European Union Relationship a Progressive One

If it is true that everything changes but the sea, then it must hold
that as the Treaty of Lisbon goes into full swing (with the
operationalisation of the EEAS in December), new configurations will
be created. In other words, a "revised" EU that might probably be more
insular and parochial--even as it seeks to project itself on the world
stage as a global player.

I came across two pieces of literature recently that sought to confirm
the delusions of grandeur that the EU has. I will, however, focus on
one of them this entry.

The piece in question is "EU Cooperation with the African Union:
problems and potential." Written by Cristina Barrios, it operates from
the premise that if the Joint Africa Union European Union (JAES)
summit to be held in Tripoli in November is to be relevant, then both
sides should revise their positions.

In her view, the EU must "simplify its partnership with Africa and
cease to use ACP grouping as the main basis for Africa-EU relations."
And for the AU, it must do more to "prevent and condemn military
coups".

This might appear simplistic, but I believe it makes sense.

Let's look at the fact that the ACP-EU framework has been around since
1975. Now, in 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon means new powers for the EU.
It makes sense that these powers will be inimicable and probably
incompatible with the old system predicated mostly on trade and aid. I
believe it makes sense to ditch the ACP-EU framework, and pick the
relationship up through the prism of the regional economic communities
(RECs).

The RECs are perhaps an area that the EU has focused little on--save
in the context of the Economic Partnership Agreements. And even with
the EPAs, let's be frank, the EU has sought to pressure the regions
not only into signing but by creating what is in essence an illegality
of the "Eastern and Southern Africa" region--one that does not have
legal personality in the eyes of the AU-mandated RECs of 8 regions.
There is no ESA region, but the AU has done little to talk about it.

Perhaps, therein lies some of the AU's problems: expecting that the EU
should come and bail it out in a number of areas.

Barrios is more explicit when she writes how while the EU was keen to
show support through the Africa Peace and Security Architecture(APSA),
"the AU insisted on food security and health issues, and asked about
financial transfers." She writes that "this showed its limits as a
strategic institution."

That's quite a key word--"strategic", and the AU has often been found
wanting on being just that.

Forget the fact that the AU has been a place where leaders like Robert
Mugabe can hide behind the cloak of African solidarity, or where
Gaddafi can exhibit more of his eccentricities, and let's look at how
it has a comparative advantage with the RECs over the EU, but has not
been capitalising on it. Even the author writes that:"in general, EU
policy-makers have limited knowledge about sub-regional
opportunities." They have demonstrated this lack of expertise by
asking ECOWAS to merge with UEMOA, while seemingly oblivious to the
immense experience that both ECOWAS and SADC have on peace and
security interventions.

So, could the future be to predicate the relationship of the AU and EU
on security and democracy imperatives?

The author actually did not use the word "imperatives", but in my
view, it seems the most appropriate, given that she's talking about
"security cooperation" and "fighting autocratic trends."

In sum, "security cooperation" is basically about the EU supporting AU
peace and security structures like "Exercise Amani", including support
for the operationalisation of the African Standby Force, which
incidentally has just ended off the East Coast of Africa as "Exercise
Carana"(http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/New-African-Standby-Force-Faces-First-Test-105518428.html).
It is also about strengthening the African Peace and Security
Architecture (APSA) through the JAES framework, which Barrios
maintains "is a key EU priority."

Similarly, the author is advocating a kind of securitization of
policies as the the basis upon which relationships should continue. In
other words, "the EU-AU partnership should articulate a more
comprehensive security approach", and secondly "the EU needs to be
attentive to the politics in the AU's Peace and Security Council
(PSC)..." I have to emphasize that the politics she talks about is
shrouded in mystery as she does not highlight what particular politics
she is talking about--save the fact that it is understaffed (old
story) at the military level, and "there is no multi-annual budget to
guarantee resources."

On "fighting autocratic trends", we are faced with a crystal-clear
understanding of where she's coming from, and she is more explicit in
this respect when she writes about how the EU "needs to bring
democracy to the forefront of its African agenda, countering AU
timidity and the persistent control of autocratic elites." In short,
the EU is being entreated to co-opt the AU on democratic ideals to
kind of rein it in, and ensure that it becomes more efficient.

In the final analysis, what Barrios is in essence saying is that both
the AU and the EU must be serious about their goals and ideals. The AU
has to be more consistent on countries like Madagascar and Zimbabwe,
and the EU has to be more creative in its future relations with this
52-member bloc. So far, it looks like the regional economic
communities (RECs) will remain a very critical leg upon which a future
could be crafted. It would really now be up to the RECs and the AU to
stress this point the best it can to ensure that a critical and
progressive approach to regional integration is maintained.





labels: african union, european union, AU, EU, comparative approach,
EEAS, Lisbon Treaty

The Unbearable Lightness of Blogging -- Back the week of 18 October!

As a blogger, there's definitely one thing you cannot escape -- your
private life. When you're blogging, the assumption is that a lot of
much of your life is put up for public scrutiny.

We all now know that this is rarely the case. The smarter blogger is
the one who is consistent with the themes he writes about. I have
fallen short on consistency at times, but the passion is clearly there
to continue blogging.

Some important and personal issues need to be attended to as I take a
break from full-throttle blogging.

It's only a hiatus...and one that will certainly recharge the batteries!

So here's to when I come back the week of 18 October!

Like British actor Daniel Hoffman-Gill, who I both follow on twitter
and his blog (http://danielhg.blogspot.com), I will also be available
on twitter.

I would be happy to receive and follow your tweets as well. I'm on
http://www.twitter.com/ekbensah.

Rest assured that I shall be doing quite some reading on:

1. the European External Actions Service (EEAS)
2. regional economic integration dynamics in Africa / ASEAN region
3. ECOWAS
4. theories underpinning regional economic integration

Till then!

-

Can the European Union (&EEAS) Overcome EU27's Nationalism?

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I do not foresee any understanding of regionalism as we now know it without an understanding of what the Treaty of Lisbon has come to do with the so-called European External Action Service(EEAS). That the EU has already set up a website speaks less about how organised the EU is, and probably more about how much in a hurry the EU is keen to project its power on the global stage.

When the EU became EU27 a few years ago, Fortress Europe seemed to have been entrenched. Outsiders probably began to see an insular Europe ready to protect its own interests by any means necessary. Now that the Treaty of Lisbon is well and truly in operation for almost a year now, one can speculate that there will be a deeper consolidation of Fortress Europe in many more ways than one could imagine.

My deepest fear is that Europe has resources and, if we are not careful, much of the world will be taken off guard about what the EEAS will do. I do not foresee the EEAS ever supplanting the UN, but probably in many ways, its power-parity with respect to the UN secretary-general will be frightfully closer than one might care to imagine.

These trends notwithstanding, it's curious that nationalism is on the rise in the EU--at least this is according to professor of international affairs at Georgetown University Charles Kupchan.

In an article he wrote in August, he posits the idea that "The European Union is dying." He writes:

not a dramatic or sudden death, but one so slow and steady that we may look across the Atlantic one day soon and realize that the project of European integration that we've taken for granted over the past half-century is no more.

 He attributes the decline to an economic issue, saying that because it has affected the economies of many European economies, there have inevitably been cutbacks, forcing some European economies to "claw...back the sovereignty they once willingly sacrificed in pursuit of a collective ideal."

He cites Germany; Britain; Belgium; and France is being the major culprits walking down the path of a renewed nationalism.

On Germany, he writes:

Germany's pursuit of its national interest is crowding out its enthusiasm for the E.U. In one of the few signs of life in the European project, member states last fall embraced the Lisbon Treaty, endowing the union with a presidential post, a foreign policy czar and a diplomatic service. But then Berlin helped select as the E.U.'s president and foreign policy chief Herman van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton, respectively, low-profile individuals who would not threaten the authority of national leaders. Even Germany's courts are putting the brakes on the E.U., last year issuing a ruling that strengthened the national Parliament's sway over European legislation.

On Britain, he continues : "May elections brought to power a coalition dominated by the Conservative Party, which is well known for its Europhobia."

On Belgium: " in July, the E.U.'s rotating presidency fell to Belgium--a country whose Dutch-speaking Flemish citizens and French-speaking Walloons are so divided that, long after elections in June, a workable governing coalition has yet to emerge. It speaks volumes that the country now guiding the European project suffers exactly the kind of nationalist antagonism that the E.U. was created to eliminate"

As for France: " In France, for example, anti-Europe campaigns have focused ire on the E.U.'s "Anglo-Saxon" assault on social welfare and on the "Polish plumber" who takes local jobs because of the open European labor market."

In the final analysis, Kupchan offers a solution: "The E.U.'s rapid enlargement to the east and south has further sapped it of life. Absent the cozy feel the smaller union had before the Berlin Wall came down, its original members have turned inward. The newer members from Central Europe, who have enjoyed full sovereignty only since communism's collapse, are not keen to give it away."

One might get away from this feeling that it has little to do with regional dynamics--far from it!

The impression being given with the growing EEAS is that the EU will come to represent a significant force on the world stage. No-one expects that everything would be easy-sailing, what with 27 members and all, but the jury is clearly out on the implications of the EEAS for regional dynamics and interaction. What will, for example, be the role of the EEAS with regard to the African Union / MERCOSUR / ASEAN / CARICOM/ the ACP?

Most importantly, how does one reconcile the growth of the EEAS with the nationalism Kupchan is talking about? If it is true that Europe needs "new generation of leaders who can breathe life into a project that is perilously close to expiring", then what does that say  about the sustainability of this most ambitious of projects that might well unwittingly alienate European citizens in a way they have not yet been?

And, finally, what will it mean for the UN that has taken the mantle to lead the world away from the scourge of war? Will the EU and its EEAS be as magnanimous on the world stage?

More Thoughts on Regional Integration...TEAMWORKS UNDP/UNECA!

Many thanks for your patronage thus far. I am profoundly honoured to increasingly be the hub of "African integration" initiatives. Although I owe Google for that, still, for those who have come to this blog, many of you have come again. And again!

I believe life to be a work-in-progress, so it is an ineluctable fact that this blog is, too. This simply means that comments and suggestions would be appreciated on how to make this blog more efficacious. I don't see it to just be about prosaic, academic thought on regional integration.

In my view, it ought to be punchy and hard-hitting. I am confident you will get away from reading most of the entries and realise that the entries are very irreverent. I am continually trying to improve and expand the content, so comments much appreciated!

I am perhaps vindicated by having been invited by no less than an official of the UN Economic Commission on Africa to the the UNDP/UNECA intranet, which link can be found on http://ecateamworks.beta.undp.org/pg/profile/emmanuelk.bensahjr.

Those who made that possible, you know who you are! I will move along with this "e-accolade" by consolidating and improving the qualitative nature of the posts I write.

In the meantime, note to self:

1. what's the difference between regional cooperation and South-South cooperation (the answer might not be as obvious!)

2. Will Fortress Europe collapse due to a growing nationalism within the 27 member countries?


These are some of the issues that have preoccupied me over the past week. They shall be transformed into entries very soon!

Understanding the role of UN Regional Commissions

It may not be the most obvious thing to think about when we talk about regional integration, but from where I have been sitting, it clearly looks like the UN’s five regional commissions have been playing critical roles in the facilitation of regional integration. Although it is fair to say that what they do has been presented on this blog through the prism of African integration dynamics, I must add that there is a reason for this.

First of all, I am more familiar with the terrain of regional integration dynamics in Africa. Equally, I am familiar with the noteworthy publication by the UNECA--the Assessing Regional Integration in Africa which was launched in July 2004. I’ve tried,perhaps unfairly, to look for a report by the other UN regional commissions that compare—and have yet to find any.

This does not mean that they do not play equally-important roles. Just that in a region like Europe, where the EU is rather advanced, I continue to question how relevant the UN Economic Commission for Europe is, and the extent to which it has facilitated regional integration in Europe. The same could be said with the Asia-Pacific, and other regions.

I must confess, though, that were I to pursue this line, I might be missing the boat.

This is because the UN regional commissions have been playing key roles in their respective regions. Just because Africa has a peculiarity about it that makes the ARIA report relevant does not foreclose the other important dynamics facilitating regional integration that are taking place.

Truth be told, UN Regional Commission and the work they do is frankly not sexy like that of the UN Security Council.

Let me just say that I spent the better part of two weeks endeavoring to download the last UN Regional Commissions newsletter (published July 2010), and which, frankly, takes forever to download!

It’s a 16-page newsletter that offers summaries of the “activities” of each of the five regions. (http://www.un.org/regionalcommissions /)

I noticed reading through that the UN Economic Commission for Europe(UNECE) seems to be more focused on signing partnerships—be it with private sector or international organizations. UNESCAP, conversely, was looking at an “Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific”—a publication that would most likely offer a panorama, if you will, of the economic landscape of the region.

As for ECLAC (Latin America and Caribbean), critically-important among its activities was the launch of a report entitled "Time for Equality. Closing Gaps, Opening Trails." True to form, this region has been looking at state-centred policies that facilitate integration. There are also discussions on the MDGs and climate change, including a report on the regional perspective on climate change that has been prepared by ECLAC and the Inter-American Development Bank.

UNECA touches more on publications, including an AU-ECA Economic Report on Africa that is calling for job creation to be prioritized in African countries. Equally significant is a piece on an African response to climate change, and the UNECA signing a partnership agreement with Microsoft.

UNESCWA is also concerned about MDGS, climate change, as well as a guide on public finance reform; the facilitation of clean energy, and women empowerment.

Overall, however, most of us following regional integration—as practised by the UN regional commissions—might be found wanting. There are quite a number of things it does which we might be totally oblivious to.

For example, did you know that unlike the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank was established by UNESCAP, and is the biggest of the UN's five regional commissions in terms of population served and area covered?

But back to the newsletter.

The principal role of the UN regional commissions, as per the July 2010 newsletter, is to facilitate South-South cooperation—technical, political and economic collaboration between developing countries. The newsletter writes:

“South-South cooperation is at the core of the mandate of the Regional Commissions to promote regional cooperation and collaboration, through providing Member States with capacity-building, data collection, and the sharing of experience, as a means of strengthening ties between countries and enhancing their respective capabilities”

The piece adds that the regional commissions "have further expanded their role in increasing countries’ resilience to confront the impact of multiple crises."—as exemplified, I guess, by the ECLAC report advocating state-centred policies to facilitate integration.

Truth be told, during the past two weeks I have been burrowing through material on the UN Regional Commissions, I have come to realize that they have a central and critical role to play not just in development but in regional integration. Given that they publish a lot of material which might not be as sexy as issuing press releases left, right, and centre, they are likely to be relegated in the background more easily than the more-“activist” UN agencies like the UN Office on Drugs and Crime or UNICEF In Africa, for example, the UNECA seems to be more prominent because of its association to the African Development Bank and the very explicit roles it has played in regional integration.

I remain unconvinced that comparatively speaking, the other regional commissions have been as vocal. But I am still reading and learning. When I get more, you are bound to find out about it here. But let me just remind you that UNESCAP is a UN agency that is not to be sneezed at. The history books report that since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, it has adopted a less dirigiste outlook—as exemplified by the information on its website that it “advocates for greater private sector involvement in infrastructure development.” But let’s just remember that it is thus far the only regional commission that has been instrumental in establishing a development bank.

It must be doing something very right--and so must the other four regional commissions.