Reflections on Regional Integration: Creating Sub-Regional Imperatives for SADC & SAARC, While IGAD/ECOWAS Forge Ahead

I have been trying so hard to write about Madagascar without elaborating on the latest developments of the country having been suspended. Not that I am not happy that SADC has suspended the Indian Ocean country, or that the AU has equally done so, but that I was hoping that the issue of Madagascar ought to be a watershed for SADC to re-formulate where it needs to go in terms of its sub-regional imperative.

You might re-call that I have made a lot of noise about ECOWAS and Liberia and how it has developed a conflict prevention imperative, on account of the number of conflicts it was compelled to go through, as well as the transformation of what was essentially an economic organisation into something that would become a force for peace enforcement through ECOMOG.

I could not help but wonder whether the headaches that SADC had over Mugabe and power-sharing has perhaps forced SADC to look at a new imperative for it--governance! Think about the fact that Zimbabwe is in power-sharing mode now, and how Ravalomanana could have "power-shared" with Andry Rajoelina if SADC had intervened earlier.

I believe that as the regional economic communities move ahead, they needs must develop imperatives that lend them a degree of credibility; for surely regional integration cannot only be about bringing tariffs down within a collective group?

So when I heard yesterday of the Lahore bombings, I couldn't help but wonder how profoundly SAARC had failed in a possible regional imperative of tackling terrorism, and how it quickly needed to get its act together! If you have been reading some of my writings about SAARC, you'll know that I don't suffer it gladly--so to speak.

In my view, it remains one of the weakest regional unions that exist in the world. I cannot for the life of me understand how Afghanistan would seek to join it last two years, yet fail to use SAARC as a focal point to rationalise counter-terrorism activities in the region! Is it a political thing or what? If the 15-member ECOWAS could establish protocols on peace and security, what is stopping the seven-member SAARC?

Constrast SAARC's execrable performance on regional integration and the search for imperatives, and you are confronted with IGAD, which I wrote about a few months ago. IGAD, in all fairness, has gotten very serious about using the imperative of conflict prevention to its advantage. That it comprises SUDAN, SOMALIA, ERITREA as countries representing some of the inter-necine conflicts suggests that this was the only rational solution to pursue. SAARC must take cue. India, as the putative hegemon, should be less imbued by its own country's growth, and be more concerned about leading SAARC to be what it can be--an effective tool for the resolution of conflict in South East Asia!

Regional Crises, Regional Solutions

Regional Crises, Regional Solutions
By E.K.Bensah

In 2008, West Africa had the distinction of being the only sub-region to have experienced two coups within months of each other.

On 6 August 2008, Mauritanian troops overthrew the country’s first elected leader that had been freely-elected, adding that they had formed a state council to rule the country. Four months later in December, the death of Guinea’s Lansana Conte would prompt young, military officers to storm the country’s radio and TV station announcing the seizure of power.

If it is arguable that these two incidences have reared the spectre of coup d’états in the ECOWAS region, especially noteworthy is how they have accentuated the efficacity of the mechanisms within the regional economic communities – including the African Union.

Precedents
The hurried announcing and swearing in of Kenya’s Kibaki by the Kenyan Electoral Commission (KEC) after the country’s presidential elections in December 2007 would trigger several weeks of chaos, where the so-called tribal hatred with a thousand-plus senseless killings would play out to the world’s media.

By March 2008, the crisis was all over—thanks to the AU-sponsored intervention of former UN secretary-General Kofi Annan. His several weeks in Kenya deep in discussion both with opposition party Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)’s Odinga, and then-incumbent Kibaki would prove to set the precedent of “power-sharing.”

In Zimbabwe, when after presidential elections of March 2008, Mugabe increased intimidation of political opponent Morgan Tzvangarai in order for him to concede defeat against the face of a second round, rumours abounded that the country should go the “Kenyan way”, triggering what would now be called the craze of “power-sharing.” Several regional attempts by the fourteen-member SADC would prove futile, leaving observers and commentators to finger-point a suspected pusillanimity of veteran freedom-fighter Mugabe as the root cause for the non-condemnation of his antics.

Tale of Two Outcomes
Elsewhere on the continent, the coups of Mauritania and Guinea elicited interest, with attempts by regional organizations of the African Union(AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) respectively proving to yield altogether-different outcomes.

Days after news of the coup broke in Mauritania, the African Union was quick to condemn it, demanding a return to constitutional rule. It further added that it was sending an envoy to the nation’s capital Nouakchott immediately. Apart from the usual Western condemnations associated with the EU and the US, AU heavyweights Nigeria and South Africa were equally quick to voice their concern for the coup. Days after, the AU suspended Mauritania.

Shortly after the December coup in Guinea, the exhortations by coup-leader Army Captain Moussa Camara did little to assuage the fear of AU diplomats that they were going to revert to constitutional rule; neither did promises by the junta that none of them would run for public office. Camara had promised elections within two years—to which top AU diplomat Jean Ping would consider insufficient towards civilian rule.

Even Camara’s promise that he would reinstate Guinea’s previous constitutional limit of two , five-year presidential terms, repealing the seven-year, unlimited terms imposed by the late President Conte would wash little with AU officials, who promptly suspended the country mid-January. ECOWAS followed suit on 12 January, by suspending Guinea from the fifteen-member sub-regional group.

It must be said that these outcomes have not just shown how far mechanisms have come, but brought into sharp relief the ever-evolving and dynamic nature of the AU in the resolution of electoral conflicts. Furthermore, it has highlighted a symbolic departure from erstwhile ad-hoc solutions between 1963 and 2003 that amounted to nothing more than non-interference in the affairs of then-OAU countries.


In fact, it could be argued that the transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2003 has led to a kind of Zeitgeist where African countries, keen to march on with their democratic dispensation, have largely developed coup d’état-fatigue. That said, these latter-day coups have enabled regional economic communities (RECs) not just gain needed experience on how to better develop the paradigm of conflict prevention—both electoral and otherwise—, but also pointed the way on how to consolidate and strengthen the regional mechanisms at both the sub-regional and continental level.

REC’s Reaction
In the case of Mauritania, the mechanism found expression in a non-tolerance by the AU of the country’s coup as well as deadlines and proposition of steps to revert to constitutional rule; these steps have certainly helped the West African country get serious on holding elections—as exemplified by the January 23 announcement by Mauritanian State Council President General Mohamed Ould Abdela Aziz of elections on June 6 2009.

Six days later, the Council approved the formation of an independent national electoral commission. It is fair to say that had the AU adopted a lackadaisical approach to the follow-up of the coup, such measures—despite a 10-point communiqué issued by the AU’s Peace and Security Council (that gave a strong deadline that failure to move ahead on constitutional rule by 5 February would elicit significant sanctions, including “travel restrictions and freezing of assets”) – would not necessarily have come to pass so soon after the August 2008 unconstitutional ousting of President Abdallahi.

In Guinea, the regional mechanism through ECOWAS has been more elaborate. Like Mauritania, Guinea was ready to bluff and bluster: after having proposed a six-month deadline to conduct elections to return the country to civil rule, it suddenly reneged, setting a new deadline of December 2010. ECOWAS acted quickly to prevent any further tergiversation by Guinea; it insisted that the junta has just 2009 to return the country to civilian rule in the election process.

Calling for an early ratification and implementation of the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and the 2007 AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance at the December 2008 ECOWAS Ordinary Summit, the regional bloc went further to secure the suspension of Guinea from all meetings of ECOWAS Heads of State and ministerial levels, until civilian rule had taken root.

At the Abuja summit earlier in January, ECOWAS set the record straight on what it felt about the Guinean situation. Nigeria’s foreign minister for foreign affairs, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, chairing the meeting would say “there is no patriotic coup as distinct from unpatriotic coup. The ECOWAS protocols we are all parties to, leave no room for those distinctions…”

To this end, ECOWAS leaders agreed on a comprehensive set of measures for the restoration of Guinea back to the ECOWAS fold. These included the leaders resolving to push for the inclusion of Guinea on the agenda of the UN Peace Building Commission; the launching of a comprehensive security sector reform; the maintenance of a permanent and constructive dialogue with the CNDD party; the completion of voter registration exercise and the provision of voter identification cards to facilitate the holding of elections this year; as well as the authorization of ECOWAS President Ibn Chambas to submit regular reports on the situation in Guinea to the Chairman of the AU Commission as well as to the AU Peace and Security Council for information and appropriate action.

SADC’s Stagger
It was an altogether different affair with SADC over Zimbabwe, for despite the announcement three months earlier for Tzvangarai and Mugabe to power-share, it would only be in late January this year for any agreement to finally be agreed at. This delay had been fuelled by the sharpened divisions and mistrust that prevailed. SADC’s prevarication can arguably be construed as a reflection of its relative inexperience as a mechanism for the resolution of a conflict that potentially had ramifications for the region.

In Kenya, it would yet again be the African Union—not the East African Community--that would help resolve the crisis. Lack of movement and the near-silence by the EAC (save for the Central bank governors of the East African Community (EAC) who called for a quick and effective resolution of the political crisis in Kenya, saying the impasse has negatively impacted on the region’s economy) reflects—as in the case of SADC—a possible inexperience on bringing pressure to bear for a regional solution.


Imperatives
Conversely, the six-member IGAD played a more significant role. With a delegation comprising Ethiopian, Ugandan, and Somalian foreign ministers, they met with former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan who was leading the mediation talks. Despite the fact that Odinga claimed that Kibaki was not the legitimate head of state, they pressed on with the talks to the extent of eventually backing the Annan-sponsored discussions.

This desire to play a proactive regional role was predicated on two reasons. First, Kenya happened to hold the rotating chairmanship of IGAD and had built up “goodwill” in the bloc for its regional peace efforts; and secondly, as Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin indicated just a few days before the a breakthrough in the talks, IGAD’s experience in Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia meant that its imperative for conflict resolution was very important in bringing to bear a solution that at least had the backing of the regional leaders.

The same imperative for conflict resolution could be attributed to the ECOWAS countries. The turbulence of ECOWAS countries Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire in the 1990s has lent the West African REC an ineluctable imperative to resolve the recent Guinean crisis that it has acted as what consultant for election assistance and organizational development Tim Bilfiger has called a dual role of mediator and election observer.

The future of regional mechanisms
Bilfiger believes that if ECOWAS is to move forward on election monitoring, it must reconcile these two roles. His proposition for an Election unit has already become reality: Ghana’s Daily Graphic newspaper of 31 January reports that a regional network of electoral commissions has been established in the West African sub-region to harmonise election standards among ECOWAS countries.

As the RECs continue to standardize and harmonise as part of their democratic dispensation, election-monitoring –as exemplified by the roles played by the Pan-African Parliament and ECOWAS in Ghana’s December elections – will become more relevant. If Guinea, Mauritania, and Zimbabwe are any indicator, we see that there remain significant regional mechanisms that are as robust as they are sound and credible. Strengthened election-monitoring will only serve to complement the already-existing ones. That the ECOWAS Network of Electoral Commission has finally been established can only go to offer one a glimmer of hope that the facilitation of a development of a healthy and democratic sub-region is possible.

ENDs

This article appeared in an edited form for Third World Networks' African Agenda, Edition 12.1 (January 2009)

IGAD--Getting Proactive on its Security Imperative?

It's no news now that Ethiopian troops have withdrawn from Somalia. What is news is the fact that the six-member Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)--comprising Kenya; Uganda; Ethiopia; Somalia; Suda; and Djibouti -- issued a statement after an emergency meeting on Tuesday 27 January condemning actions of what are described as "anti-peace groups" in Somalia.

Bottom line is that unbeknownst to many, IGAD is getting proactive on the facilitation of its regional integration process, which could look like one increasingly predicated on security.

Profoundly reminiscent of ECOWAS in the 1990s when the West African REC transformed its mandate to transcend a conflict resolution/preventive one by establishing ECOMOG, it has got one thinking whether this new-found imperative is not to be consolidated further.

These latest developments look like it just might do that--with the help of the African Union.

Already--as VOA news maintained--top AU diplomat Jean Ping "spoke confidently of adding Ugandan and Nigerian battalions to the AU's 3,500-strong peacekeeping mission in Somalia." This is important as the Islamist extremists are allegedly trying to re-take control of Somalia.

We all know how nature abhors a vacuum. Developments so far prove that with the proactiveness of AU and IGAD, the regional solution will be comprehensively explored.

[map from Voice of America website]

SADC--Mbeki's other Headache: Getting SADC to Get More Proactive on Peacekeeping Force

As if Mbeki doesn't have enough on his plate with issues on Zimbabwe, BusinessDay reports that in the upcoming weekend, SADC ministers will meet to plan for the activation of a SADC regional peacekeeping force, which has already been mooted since August 2007. The objective of the meeting, really, is to brainstorm on how it can begin to deploy on peacekeeping missions.

The meeting in Durban--to be chaired by Angola--will take recommendations for a SADC summit next month when President Mbeki is "expected to take over the chairmanship" of tyhe 14-member SADC from Jose Eduardo Dos Santos.

Discussions are in the offing also on a regional early warning centre that is scheduled for the end of the year.

More importantly however is the significance of this regional standby force.

By 2010, the African Union plans to have completed an African Stanby Force, with regional standby forces for the regional economic communities (RECS). This falls into line with the AU's protocol on peace and security, "

...which required all regional economic communities to have units that fed into the standby army. So far, the Economic Community of West African States is the other regional bloc that has made the most progress.

It's easy to check that. Only in June this year, a training in Bamako for ECOWAS Standby Force -- codenamed "Jigui 2008" took place, with a Malian logistic sub-command; a Nigerian East Sub Command and a Senegalese West sub command, as well as ECOWAS Staff from the Commission in Abuja.

East Africa established its regional peacekeeping force also in August 2007, with IGAD hoping that it might ease the pressure, what with demands for Darfur.

Reflections on Regional Integration(II/III): COMESA Moves Forward...Pan-African Integration?

As Africa sits a day or two away from the 34th celebration of efforts at African unity, it becomes very timely that positive and constructive decisions would have taken place in Kenya at the 12th COMESA Summit.

The two-day meeting has yielded some very positive outcomes, which include:

the approval of a Common External Tariff(CET), which paves the way for the transformation of a FTA into a unified Customs Union in 2008

the exhortation by Kenyan premier Kibaki for COMESA to "reach out to regional economic blocs such as the EAC and SADC to consolidate integration"

the realisation that there need to be common understanding and positions in regional trade negotiations critical to a successful engagement with the regional blocs

Haven't we been here before? What of the African Economic Community? Is that not supposed to facilitate outreach towards the other regional blocs in Africa.

My understanding had always been that that would be the framework. Anything else is this side of reinventing the wheel, when it's clearly fixed on a timeline, and already in motion.

COMESA will be 13 years this December, and as is reputed to be the biggest African regional grouping in the sense that it groups

20 countries with about 400 million people and a combined gross domestic product in excess of 180 billion U.S. dollars.

Its members are Angola, Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Libya, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.



That's basically encompassing quite some countries from IGAD; COMESA; SADC and EAC countries. Already an over-lapping is inevitable, as has been discussed several times at international fora, and so I would have found it very interesting to have seen some talk of harmonising the over-lapping.

Failing that, the outreach that Kibaki talks about is all well and good, but how would that be operationalised, in the sense that how would it work practically without interfering with existing mechanisms? Would it come in the form of SADC-COMESA/SADC-EAC/IGAD-EAC/IGAD-SADC/etc percolations, expressed through a bilateral arrangement predicated on economics and trade, or something else? Maybe cultural? Maybe political.

It is clear that on regional integration in Africa, much needs to be done. There is talk that the next AU summit to be held here in Accra, Ghana, will discuss the putative United States of Africa. It promises to be an event worth monitoring, and RegionsWatch shall definitely be there to give you some insights.

Over and beyond that, though, it is very interestings--albeit predictable--that Kenya should be talking about a regional integration strategy predicated on conflict prevention and conflict resolution. That's an idea that's been chewed and spat out several times in West Africa, and I do hope Kenya will consider some liasing with ECOWAS on this.

This is because, as many know about the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, these conflicts in the sub-region compelled the region to beef up its knowledge and experience on conflict, to the extent of establishing centres on the training of conflict prevention, such as the Ghana-based Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre.

All that said, I maintained Kenya's decision is "predictable", because, as it explained some posts ago, the facilitation of regional security is an important pillar in the strategy for Kenya's perspective on regional integration. Important, because it sees, for example, the accession of Rwanda and Burundi into the East African Community as a way of ensuring that possible inter-necine conflicts originating from those two countries are seriously clamped down on. If the regional security imperative is in place, it will prevent any possible spillovers into the region, of which Kenya is part of.

Examples of Kenya having been the honest broker is what Vice President Moody Awori listed:

Kenya which successful[ly] mediated Somalia and Sudan peace processes two years ago will continue to spearhead regional conflict resolution efforts to bring peace and stability in the region to promote trade and investment

He further noted:

"Kenya's commitment to proactive engagement in seeking security and stability in the region is informed by the essence for an environment that can facilitate our people to engage in both international and trans-border trade which is a prerequisite to our quest for economic development,"

He couldn't have said it better. To boot, he compounds all this heavy talk by arguing what COMESA should begin to do as far as conflict prevention and management is concerned:

COMESA should streamline its program of conflict prevention in its trade regimes with the aim of avoiding trade and investment related conflicts

Who needs the EU when Africans themselves can make spurious ties to their regional integration?

How a program of conflict prevention and management can be streamlined with trade and investment is beyond me.

Any takers?

Have a good AU day!

Monday Analysis : Of Subregional Imperatives and Regional Integration: CARICOM, IGAD, ECOWAS

J'aimerais commencer en disant "merci" a winbald, le blogger senegalais, qui frequente cette-site-ci. Meme s'il y a longtemps que j'ai visite ton site, c'est tres acceuillant--en fait, ca chauffe le coeur--qu'un blogger ouest-africain suit le site.

All that said, the primary objective of this blog has, thus far, been to raise awareness on the subject of regional integration to the casual visitor(aficionados are not excluded!).

You could say , like the WTO, regional integration is all the rage these days. I would say more specifically, free trade areas (FTAs), what with Japan signing an FTA with ASEAN, or India signing one with non-SAARC countries.

The advocacy website Bilaterals does a great job of providing an-almost daily overview of FTAs signed worldwide.

This blog, however, choses to look at the initiatives; the developments; and the trends in regional integration.

It is not a coincidence that last week, I covered IGAD and CARICOM--perhaps little-known to most Westerners, and even to those in my own backyard of ECOWAS.

Affinity in Conflict?
I find IGAD particulary interesting because from the little research I conducted on it, it looks very comparable to ECOWAS--for one prime reason: its propensity for conflict.

IGAD countries may be small, but most (c.f. Ethiopia/Eritrea/Somalia) are embroiled in some quasi-internecine conflict or other. Look at Sudan--also an IGAD member--with conflict brewing right there in Darfur.

Parallels with West Africa in that regard are uncanny. Remember the Charles Taylor days of Liberia , in 1990; Sierra Leone--before the British intervention; Togo, with its never-ending rule of Eyadema, till his demise in 2005?

Sub-regional imperatives
Armed conflict is far from new in West Africa. Thankfully, ECOWAS, by what I would call its sub-regional imperative of conflict resolution and conflict management has made serious and significant strides in this area. I can foresee IGAD going the route of maximising its experience on conflict for the benefit of the region and the continent as a whole.

CARICOM, conversely, is conflict-free. Arguably, its sub-regional imperative would be different . That said, it is very telling that in the designation, or creation, of the so-called "Single Domestic Space", as outlined below,it chose to create IMPACS--a regional-space-and-security-regulating agency. This seems to be something which appears non-existent in ECOWAS, despite de jure visa-free travel not only having been established, but being, as it were, comprehensively applicable throughout the ECOWAS countries. Like I said last week, a regional organisation that considers the security of its citizens of utmost importance is certainly a serious one!

Hegemon
Finally, last week, I touched on Kenya being the peacebroker for the Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute. Kenya can far from anything be called a hegemon, on account of its size, as compared to Sudan, but in the East African Community, it certainly seems to be quite a leader, among its friends of Uganda, Tanzania, and now Rwanda and Burundi--set to join the community soon.

Kenya looks set to be proactive in these two regional blocs, and I suspect one should begin to keep its eye out for it in the near future.

Kenya, the EAC Peacemaker

If we were being superficial about the analysis of regional integration, we'd probably say that Nigeria is to ECOWAS, as Sudan is to IGAD.

In fact, that superficial analysis has some elements of truth in it, in the sense that just as Nigeria is the most populous countries in Africa, Sudan , as wikipedia says of it that it is:

the largest African country by area. [2] The country is situated at a crossroads between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. It is bordered by Egypt to the north, the Red Sea to the northeast, Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east, Kenya and Uganda to the southeast, Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic to the southwest, Chad to the west, and Libya to the northwest. It is the tenth largest country in the world.

So, basically, they're both big.

Even in regional integration, size matters, because the bigger you are, the more clout--ostensibly--you have. Nigeria has oil, and some challenges; Sudan has...Darfur.

You would have thought if Nigeria is a de facto hegemon (by its sheer size), Sudan would correspondingly be considered one, too.

It's therefore puzzling--at first--to read, as I read here in Africa News that the comparatively smaller country of Kenya, which is a key country in the East African Community, is going to be the peacemaker, mediating in the Eritrea-Somalia-Ethiopia crisis.

Simple point is that: Kenya is currently chairing the 26th session of an IGAD inter-ministerial, so perhaps it doesn't have a choice, as it suggested here:

Kenyan Foreign Minister Raphael Tuju, whose country chairs IGAD, afterward said the bloc had "no appetite" to mediate Eritrea and Ethiopia's feud despite the problems it has caused in the region and within IGAD.

"The problem between Ethiopia and Eritrea is like a problem between brothers. Our hands are pretty full at the moment so it is not one of the things we have an appetite to get into."

Quite whether the problem between Ethiopia and Eritrea can be simplistically analogous to a problem between brothers is a moot point. Either way, for now, Kenya is the peacemaker.

At the heart of the Ethiopian-Eritrea dispute is a finger-pointing from Somalia and the United States that Eritrea...:

...was supporting insurgents in Somalia to fight its neighbour Ethiopia. Eritrea and Ethiopia fought a two-year border war whose effects are still lingering (from:http://www.africa-interactive.net/index.php?PageID=4181)

The article maintains:

Eritrea is said to be demanding the urgent withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia, but IGAD's six other member States are calling for quick deployment of the African troops before the Ethiopian pullout.

"We have discussed this issue previously and Ethiopia has been willing to withdraw from Somalia but we all agree that it has to be a tactful pullout otherwise it would plunge the region into a security vacuum," Tuju explained

As nature abhors a vacuum, it might be rather critical to start consolidating existing peace efforts to have that intractable dispute between regional neighbours sorted.

West Africa is very familiar with this type of situation, with ECOWAS having resolved potentially-explosive situations in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 20th century.

Today, we have the regional hegemon of ECOWAS that is Nigeria voting in polls. Despite elements and pockets of violence here and there, AFP, through africasia news has said

An observer team from the west African bloc ECOWAS said Saturday's state elections were "relatively free and peaceful," the News Agency of Nigeria reported Monday

I am personally confident about moves by Kenya on the dispute. I can foresee that the experience that the six-member IGAD is obtaining is heading it towards a conflict resolution and conflict management imperative, such as that was experienced in ECOWAS--and that cannot, surely, be a bad thing, as far as human resource goes for building well-experienced Africans' capacity for the bigger project of African unity.