UNCTAD Revisits Calls to Strengthen Regional Integration

9 July, 2009

By E.K.Bensah II



The UNCTAD 2009 report on Economic Development was launched in Accra in June. It is the latest in a series of yearly UNCTAD reports that provide additional angles on issues affecting Africa and the developing world.

Entitled “Strengthening Regional Economic Integration for Africa’s Development”, it is the second report in the space of two years that focuses exclusively on how developing countries can maximize the benefits of regional economic integration for their policy space.

UNCTAD 2007 Trade & Development vs 2009 Economic Report on Africa

The most recent was the UNCTAD Trade and Development Report, which was published in 2007. Entitled “Regional cooperation for development”, the 240-page report used the report to outline how regional integration could offer national space for developing countries. Apart from defining what “new regionalism” was, the report stressed that trade liberalization is not the end-all and be-all insofar as regionalism is concerned. The tendency has been for economic integration to be perceived as a purely economic enterprise. UNCTAD averred it was more to do with a reconfiguration of policy space, expressed through many important elements, such as the provision of public goods; a tool for regional trade and industrial integration; and strengthened policies on energy and industry to complement already-existing national strategies.

As for the 2009 UNCTAD report, it comprises five chapters dealing with the issues of challenges and opportunities in the context of the experience of regional integration for Africa; expanding intra-african trade for Africa’s growth; intra-African investment; emerging issues in regional trade integration in Africa; and policy recommendations on strengthening regional integration.

The report dedicates Chapter 1 to the “Experience with regional integration in Africa: challenges and opportunities”, offering more than just a theoretical justification for economic integration. The report provides a graphical illustration of the eight AU-mandated sub-regional blocs (ECOWAS/ECCAS/SADC/COMESA/AMU/IGAD/EAC), along with the existing monetary zones (UEMOA; CFA franc zone). The Libya-sponsored CENSAD, which Cape Verde joined recently, is the only one that is missing in the graph. This omission notwithstanding, the report explains that the African Union has classified the multiplicity of regional groupings in Africa into two groups—the regional economic communities (RECs) and other integration blocs.

We are reminded that many African countries have multiple memberships—an issue that was equally broached in the UNCTAD 2007 TDR, and considered to be one of the reasons for such low level of intra-African trade. Of the 53 countries, 27 are members of two regional groupings, with 18 belonging to three, with one country being a member of no less than four groupings. This kind of spaghetti-bowl groupings can only go to accentuate the necessity of regional integration by developing countries as part of their development strategies.

Given that this is the latest report by UNCTAD on the importance of regional integration, it is fair to say that although developing countries have made quite some progress, it continues to be found wanting—and napping—on concrete strategies to make regional economic integration work for them.

Infrastructure for intra-African trade

The most highlighted case is that of infrastructure. The report posits that there is a distinction when it comes to infrastructure—there is what it calls “hard” and “soft” infrastructure. Hard infrastructure is described as “physical infrastructure that is often missing or is of poor quality in many African countries.” These include road and air transport. The report avers that “the quality of the road network on the continent is so poor that many countries even within the same RTA remain effectively isolated from each other.”

Conversely, “soft infrastructure” includes “the policy and regulatory environment, the transparency and predictability of trade and business administration, and the quality of the business environment more generally.” Simply put, policies that impact on development, such as transport policies are some of the examples of “soft” infrastructural issues that affect transport costs. Not to speak of the high transport costs throughout the sub-regions and continent that inhibits the facilitation of intra-African trade.

Truth be told, it is difficult to speak about infrastructure without broaching the issue of intra-African trade. UNCTAD in this report views it as a critical element in facilitating regional economic integration. It admits that although intra-African trade is low in comparison to other regions, “Intra-African trade is important for many African countries taken individually.” This is buttressed by the point that “over three-quarters of intra-African trade take place within regional trading blocs, highlighting their importance.” The third critical point is that this kind of trade occurs around what the report considers “influential” countries. That is to say “trade poles” that could become development poles.

The report summarizes the section on intra-African trade by recommending AU and sub-regional policy-makers to pay greater attention to the landlocked countries on the continent that are “constrained by their own poor infrastructure as well as their neighbours’.” The report expresses hope, however, in multilateral processes, such as the EPA negotiations between countries of regional economic communities and the EU; AGOA processes and the WTO Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations that are bound to re-configure the future of intra-African trade.

Intra-African investment

UNCTAD identifies in its report the importance of financially integrating the economies of the AU. Citing examples for each region of Africa, it refers to ECOBANK as a trailblazer, describing it as a “prominent West African investor in Africa’s banking sector.” Created by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and established in Lome, Togo, in 1985, the company was not licensed to operate as a bank until 1988. Today, through manifold investments, it has followed what the report considers to be “a proactive policy of African expansion." It is represented in 25 countries, including China, and has over 500 branches. ECOBANK’s strategy for geographic expansion is consistent with what UNCTAD calls “a sound financial sector”, which it maintains to be a “pre-requisite for increasing the flows of investment within Africa.”

In addition to ECOBANK, Nigerian banks have also been cited as key to the development of the financial sector in the ECOWAS region. UNCTAD indicates that the banking sector has “become a major player in African finance following a radical consolidation undertaken in 2005.” The centrality of these Nigerian banks in Africa’s financial system (with the biggest banks in Africa comprising 9 out of 20 that were Nigerian in 2008) can only go to complement the increasing financial integration of the economies—not just of West Africa but the continent, brought about by the fact that Nigeria’s banks go beyond the shores of the ECOWAS sub-region.

UNCTAD highlights a three-fold reason why both ECOBANK and Nigerian banks will affect intra-African investment. First, the merging and acquisition of these banks with domestic banks means that they inject capital in the economy. Secondly, new competition made possible by the coming of the new banks, triggers a reduction in the cost of banking. Finally, these banks have created financial networks across Africa, making payment mechanisms between countries easier.

In this respect, the proposal made by President of Cote d’ivoire Laurent Gbagbo along the sidelines of a June ECOWAS summit in Abuja for ECOWAS to establish a Regional Investment Fund that would purposefully be used for infrastructure is not just timely, but goes a long way to help cement the financial integration advocated in this report.

Migration and free movement

The May report by the African Union entitled “Status of Integration in Africa” disclosed that free movement had generally been achieved throughout the eight regional economic communities, but some were more advanced than others. ECOWAS perhaps has the oldest arrangement, which dates back to 1979, with a revised treaty in 2003. It has experienced many challenges throughout the three decades. Despite the presence of ECOWAS passports in only three of the fifteen ECOWAS countries, citizens of the sub-region are able to move freely throughout the region with only their ID cards or passports, and enjoy right of residence for 90 days.

Citizens of the East African Community enjoy a similar arrangement, where all the five members have a passport that is specific to the region, and which enables them single immigration entry/departure card under harmonized procedures of entry/work permits.

As for COMESA, it adopted a protocol on free movement of persons, labour, services, rights of establishment and right of residence in 2001. However, progress has been slow.

All these developments notwithstanding, UNCTAD continues to believe that migration and free movement remain important cornerstones of facilitating regional economic integration. It points to West Africa, where it relates the so-called “Ivorian miracle” of the 1980s, which it describes as attributable to “the inflow of Sahelian labour on cocoa and coffee plantations in the South of Cote D’Ivoire.”

The report points to already-existing initiatives, such as the 2006 African Common Position on Migration and Development, which highlighted, among others, the need “to ensure coordination in the development of common regional policies for the management of migration within the RECs.” In this report, UNCTAD avers that policy-makers have to build on the existing initiatives on facilitating labour mobility and migration management “already laid out in various RECs and other consultative forums in the region.” Those above are certainly ones that the report would like to see consolidated and help inform national development strategies so necessary for developing countries.

Commitment

In the final analysis, it is arguable that UNCTAD’s return to regional integration is not a coincidence. By re-visiting the issue of regional integration, it is reminding both policy-makers and interested constituents that its concern for strategic development policies that will help integrate developing countries into the global economy against the backdrop of a global economic recession is sound.

As it indicates in the report, there is nothing wrong with trade policy, but it should “be part of an overall long-term development strategy which defines a country’s development objectives and the way they should be reached.” Cooperation and collaboration are important elements insofar as regional economic integration is concerned, but it should be done on a holistic basis, which includes regional policies on energy; industry; migration; and infrastructure. Regional integration done without attention to these will only go so far, and end up hindering the progress that the regional economic communities have made.

As the report so aptly concludes: “regional integration is not an end in itself; it should be seen as a stepping stone towards Africa’s attractiveness to investment and export competitiveness.”


ENDs


This article can also be found on the twn-africa site on http://twnafrica.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=203:unctad-revisits-calls-to-strengthen-regional-integration-&catid=72:unctad-&Itemid=55

Regional Crises, Regional Solutions

Regional Crises, Regional Solutions
By E.K.Bensah

In 2008, West Africa had the distinction of being the only sub-region to have experienced two coups within months of each other.

On 6 August 2008, Mauritanian troops overthrew the country’s first elected leader that had been freely-elected, adding that they had formed a state council to rule the country. Four months later in December, the death of Guinea’s Lansana Conte would prompt young, military officers to storm the country’s radio and TV station announcing the seizure of power.

If it is arguable that these two incidences have reared the spectre of coup d’états in the ECOWAS region, especially noteworthy is how they have accentuated the efficacity of the mechanisms within the regional economic communities – including the African Union.

Precedents
The hurried announcing and swearing in of Kenya’s Kibaki by the Kenyan Electoral Commission (KEC) after the country’s presidential elections in December 2007 would trigger several weeks of chaos, where the so-called tribal hatred with a thousand-plus senseless killings would play out to the world’s media.

By March 2008, the crisis was all over—thanks to the AU-sponsored intervention of former UN secretary-General Kofi Annan. His several weeks in Kenya deep in discussion both with opposition party Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)’s Odinga, and then-incumbent Kibaki would prove to set the precedent of “power-sharing.”

In Zimbabwe, when after presidential elections of March 2008, Mugabe increased intimidation of political opponent Morgan Tzvangarai in order for him to concede defeat against the face of a second round, rumours abounded that the country should go the “Kenyan way”, triggering what would now be called the craze of “power-sharing.” Several regional attempts by the fourteen-member SADC would prove futile, leaving observers and commentators to finger-point a suspected pusillanimity of veteran freedom-fighter Mugabe as the root cause for the non-condemnation of his antics.

Tale of Two Outcomes
Elsewhere on the continent, the coups of Mauritania and Guinea elicited interest, with attempts by regional organizations of the African Union(AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) respectively proving to yield altogether-different outcomes.

Days after news of the coup broke in Mauritania, the African Union was quick to condemn it, demanding a return to constitutional rule. It further added that it was sending an envoy to the nation’s capital Nouakchott immediately. Apart from the usual Western condemnations associated with the EU and the US, AU heavyweights Nigeria and South Africa were equally quick to voice their concern for the coup. Days after, the AU suspended Mauritania.

Shortly after the December coup in Guinea, the exhortations by coup-leader Army Captain Moussa Camara did little to assuage the fear of AU diplomats that they were going to revert to constitutional rule; neither did promises by the junta that none of them would run for public office. Camara had promised elections within two years—to which top AU diplomat Jean Ping would consider insufficient towards civilian rule.

Even Camara’s promise that he would reinstate Guinea’s previous constitutional limit of two , five-year presidential terms, repealing the seven-year, unlimited terms imposed by the late President Conte would wash little with AU officials, who promptly suspended the country mid-January. ECOWAS followed suit on 12 January, by suspending Guinea from the fifteen-member sub-regional group.

It must be said that these outcomes have not just shown how far mechanisms have come, but brought into sharp relief the ever-evolving and dynamic nature of the AU in the resolution of electoral conflicts. Furthermore, it has highlighted a symbolic departure from erstwhile ad-hoc solutions between 1963 and 2003 that amounted to nothing more than non-interference in the affairs of then-OAU countries.


In fact, it could be argued that the transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2003 has led to a kind of Zeitgeist where African countries, keen to march on with their democratic dispensation, have largely developed coup d’état-fatigue. That said, these latter-day coups have enabled regional economic communities (RECs) not just gain needed experience on how to better develop the paradigm of conflict prevention—both electoral and otherwise—, but also pointed the way on how to consolidate and strengthen the regional mechanisms at both the sub-regional and continental level.

REC’s Reaction
In the case of Mauritania, the mechanism found expression in a non-tolerance by the AU of the country’s coup as well as deadlines and proposition of steps to revert to constitutional rule; these steps have certainly helped the West African country get serious on holding elections—as exemplified by the January 23 announcement by Mauritanian State Council President General Mohamed Ould Abdela Aziz of elections on June 6 2009.

Six days later, the Council approved the formation of an independent national electoral commission. It is fair to say that had the AU adopted a lackadaisical approach to the follow-up of the coup, such measures—despite a 10-point communiqué issued by the AU’s Peace and Security Council (that gave a strong deadline that failure to move ahead on constitutional rule by 5 February would elicit significant sanctions, including “travel restrictions and freezing of assets”) – would not necessarily have come to pass so soon after the August 2008 unconstitutional ousting of President Abdallahi.

In Guinea, the regional mechanism through ECOWAS has been more elaborate. Like Mauritania, Guinea was ready to bluff and bluster: after having proposed a six-month deadline to conduct elections to return the country to civil rule, it suddenly reneged, setting a new deadline of December 2010. ECOWAS acted quickly to prevent any further tergiversation by Guinea; it insisted that the junta has just 2009 to return the country to civilian rule in the election process.

Calling for an early ratification and implementation of the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and the 2007 AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance at the December 2008 ECOWAS Ordinary Summit, the regional bloc went further to secure the suspension of Guinea from all meetings of ECOWAS Heads of State and ministerial levels, until civilian rule had taken root.

At the Abuja summit earlier in January, ECOWAS set the record straight on what it felt about the Guinean situation. Nigeria’s foreign minister for foreign affairs, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, chairing the meeting would say “there is no patriotic coup as distinct from unpatriotic coup. The ECOWAS protocols we are all parties to, leave no room for those distinctions…”

To this end, ECOWAS leaders agreed on a comprehensive set of measures for the restoration of Guinea back to the ECOWAS fold. These included the leaders resolving to push for the inclusion of Guinea on the agenda of the UN Peace Building Commission; the launching of a comprehensive security sector reform; the maintenance of a permanent and constructive dialogue with the CNDD party; the completion of voter registration exercise and the provision of voter identification cards to facilitate the holding of elections this year; as well as the authorization of ECOWAS President Ibn Chambas to submit regular reports on the situation in Guinea to the Chairman of the AU Commission as well as to the AU Peace and Security Council for information and appropriate action.

SADC’s Stagger
It was an altogether different affair with SADC over Zimbabwe, for despite the announcement three months earlier for Tzvangarai and Mugabe to power-share, it would only be in late January this year for any agreement to finally be agreed at. This delay had been fuelled by the sharpened divisions and mistrust that prevailed. SADC’s prevarication can arguably be construed as a reflection of its relative inexperience as a mechanism for the resolution of a conflict that potentially had ramifications for the region.

In Kenya, it would yet again be the African Union—not the East African Community--that would help resolve the crisis. Lack of movement and the near-silence by the EAC (save for the Central bank governors of the East African Community (EAC) who called for a quick and effective resolution of the political crisis in Kenya, saying the impasse has negatively impacted on the region’s economy) reflects—as in the case of SADC—a possible inexperience on bringing pressure to bear for a regional solution.


Imperatives
Conversely, the six-member IGAD played a more significant role. With a delegation comprising Ethiopian, Ugandan, and Somalian foreign ministers, they met with former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan who was leading the mediation talks. Despite the fact that Odinga claimed that Kibaki was not the legitimate head of state, they pressed on with the talks to the extent of eventually backing the Annan-sponsored discussions.

This desire to play a proactive regional role was predicated on two reasons. First, Kenya happened to hold the rotating chairmanship of IGAD and had built up “goodwill” in the bloc for its regional peace efforts; and secondly, as Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin indicated just a few days before the a breakthrough in the talks, IGAD’s experience in Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia meant that its imperative for conflict resolution was very important in bringing to bear a solution that at least had the backing of the regional leaders.

The same imperative for conflict resolution could be attributed to the ECOWAS countries. The turbulence of ECOWAS countries Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire in the 1990s has lent the West African REC an ineluctable imperative to resolve the recent Guinean crisis that it has acted as what consultant for election assistance and organizational development Tim Bilfiger has called a dual role of mediator and election observer.

The future of regional mechanisms
Bilfiger believes that if ECOWAS is to move forward on election monitoring, it must reconcile these two roles. His proposition for an Election unit has already become reality: Ghana’s Daily Graphic newspaper of 31 January reports that a regional network of electoral commissions has been established in the West African sub-region to harmonise election standards among ECOWAS countries.

As the RECs continue to standardize and harmonise as part of their democratic dispensation, election-monitoring –as exemplified by the roles played by the Pan-African Parliament and ECOWAS in Ghana’s December elections – will become more relevant. If Guinea, Mauritania, and Zimbabwe are any indicator, we see that there remain significant regional mechanisms that are as robust as they are sound and credible. Strengthened election-monitoring will only serve to complement the already-existing ones. That the ECOWAS Network of Electoral Commission has finally been established can only go to offer one a glimmer of hope that the facilitation of a development of a healthy and democratic sub-region is possible.

ENDs

This article appeared in an edited form for Third World Networks' African Agenda, Edition 12.1 (January 2009)

CEMAC--Has Cameroon Failed to Lead the Central African region?

It's a bit of bitter pill to swallow from an academic, but I can see where the man is coming from. The man in question, Cameroonian-born Dr.Chris Fomunyoh, Senior Associate for Africa & Regional Director of NDI, a Washington-based non-profit organization, has, in an interview, castigated Cameroon for adopting what he considers a "lack of leadership in the sub-region", and cites it as being responsible for the poor economic and political transformation in the sub-region.


He believes that unlike Nigeria/South Africa/Kenya for ECOWAS/SADC/EAC respectively, Cameroon has failed to step up to the plate over CEMAC. In this regard, Cameroon’s failure to compete as a sub-regional leader explains why the region "is unable to experience the kind of economic and political transformation other parts of the continent have enjoyed."

Meanwhile, bishops in the CEMAC region have called for responsible resource extraction. AFP reports that:

The bishops from the Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa (CEMAC) -- comprising Gabon, Congo, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea -- called for an anti-corruption mechanism to be developed and a change in behaviour when it came to exploiting and managing resources.

Prospecting and exploiting natural resources in these countries must ensure that "environmental and social norms are respected, so human rights and the well being of populations are respected," the bishops said.

AFRICAN UNION--Quote of the Day: African Union & its Symbolic Dimension of African unity

Africa Union HQ in Ethiopia

SOURCE: African Regional Integration and the Role of the European Union
by Professor Dr. Ludger Kühnhardt, pp.6-7
download it here: http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=ISN&fileid=E190DB75-79B8-EA1F-1D4A-952750F4E8AA&lng=en

For the past few days, I've been reading round the theories that make regional integration what it is; as well as browsing through some papers written by students and whatnot about what makes African regional integration. I came across this source by Professor Kuhnhardt, and think the following is a quotation worth noting:

It may well be that eventually it will not be the African Union but the most advanced and deep sub-regional groupings – the building blocs of an African Economic Community – that may become African equivalents of the European Union. The African Union may continue to serve the prime objective of promoting African unity as a matter of identity and the external projection of African claims. But while the African Union may continue to represent the symbolic dimension of African unity, some of the building blocs of sub-regional groupings in Africa may evolve into the strong representatives of deep region-building.

The good professor goes on to add that so far it is ECOWAS and SADC that are "the most successful examples of deepened integration among sub-regional groupings on the African continent." He adds that the "re-born" East African Community could follow close behind, making the latter three the "advanced and comprehensive regional groupings in today's Africa."

Finally, he adds, "they may eventually mature into the African equivalents of the European Union -- supranational entities hold together and advanced by a common body of legislature and a multi-level system of governance."

Perhaps his biggest prediction ever is this:

In turn, the African Union may develop into a hybrid of the Council of Europe,
the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations – a collective security organ defined by the quest for a common identity and its global recognition.

SADC--Mbeki's other Headache: Getting SADC to Get More Proactive on Peacekeeping Force

As if Mbeki doesn't have enough on his plate with issues on Zimbabwe, BusinessDay reports that in the upcoming weekend, SADC ministers will meet to plan for the activation of a SADC regional peacekeeping force, which has already been mooted since August 2007. The objective of the meeting, really, is to brainstorm on how it can begin to deploy on peacekeeping missions.

The meeting in Durban--to be chaired by Angola--will take recommendations for a SADC summit next month when President Mbeki is "expected to take over the chairmanship" of tyhe 14-member SADC from Jose Eduardo Dos Santos.

Discussions are in the offing also on a regional early warning centre that is scheduled for the end of the year.

More importantly however is the significance of this regional standby force.

By 2010, the African Union plans to have completed an African Stanby Force, with regional standby forces for the regional economic communities (RECS). This falls into line with the AU's protocol on peace and security, "

...which required all regional economic communities to have units that fed into the standby army. So far, the Economic Community of West African States is the other regional bloc that has made the most progress.

It's easy to check that. Only in June this year, a training in Bamako for ECOWAS Standby Force -- codenamed "Jigui 2008" took place, with a Malian logistic sub-command; a Nigerian East Sub Command and a Senegalese West sub command, as well as ECOWAS Staff from the Commission in Abuja.

East Africa established its regional peacekeeping force also in August 2007, with IGAD hoping that it might ease the pressure, what with demands for Darfur.

Bank of the South is Here, But Can Africa Bank on the Latin American Way of Regional Integration?

The new multilateral institution is considered as an alternative to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and seeks to satisfy development credits demand.

Seriously, it's more than an alternative; it's also yet another expression of Venezuela and its associate MERCOSUR members of their dissatisfaction with the prevalent neoliberal system.

I've written about this Bank of the South before and I explained that the Latin Americans had something that Africans certainly didn't. Beyond blood running through their veins, it's about a radicalism and conviction so unprecedented and emanating that any of their opponents feel it viscerally that these are people not to be toyed with.

If not, how is it that despite the articulations of Venezuela against the mighty US, Venezuela has -- along with Brazil; Argentina; Bolivia; Ecuador and Paraguay -- establish this Bank of the South [I notice no Uruguay!!]. Yet, Africans have allowed themselves to be fragmented on the so-called Economic Partnership Agreements?

The fallout of the signing of a so-called EPA-lite by the East African Community and SADC (without South Africa and Namibia) just leaves one speechless--not to mention a little bit less for wear the arduous efforts of civil society -- both in the North and the South.

That said, it's important to press on to stop the discussions between the bullying EU and the other regions.

In my view, the Bank of the South initiative, a formidable alternative indeed to the Breton Woods institutions of the World Bank and IMF in the sense that "each member country would have a single vote, irrespective of size and financial contribution" (from:http://www.nationnews.com/290175804330225.php) brings into sharp relief the necessity for greater collaboration between MERCOSUR in general/Latin America specifically and other AU regionalisms to learn lessons on how they were able to resist the Free Trade Area of the Pacific in 2005, yet AU/ACP countries allowed fragmentation by the EU.

While this issue of the Bank of the South, in my view, is one of the most progressive developments in global regional integration to date--bar the ASEAN charter-- Africans ought to contemporaneously reflect on whether there is that much of a difference between the EU and the US, for them to have allowed the EU--former colonisers at that--to hoodwink many of them into an interim agreement that will most likely destroy attempts at regional integration.

From Rwanda & Burundi With Love...

...to the East African Community!

Well, we knew it was in the works...to the extent that Rwanda would leave the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) at an Eccas inter-ministerial meeting in Brazzaville, Congo two weeks ago.

In leaving, this is what the Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Minister would say:

"The regional economic communities are in the process of creating free trade zones, a common market, monetary unions and eventually political federations which are evolving at different speeds, and puts us in a very difficult situation of being tugged in separate directions"

Rwnada expressed the desire to hold onto joining the SADC region just yet, and has, as we see here, proceeded in its joining of EAC.

To be fair, it makes sense for Rwanda to toe this line, for in joining the performing EAC, the once-genocide-torn country will not only be increasing the regional population to 115 million people, but be joining a regional bloc that is making strides.

The article maintains that some of the institutions both Burundi and Rwanda will benefit from joining are:

the East African Court of Justice;

the East African Legislative Assembly

the Secretariat

Defence Pact

, including...

the Inter-University Council for East Africa and sustainable development of the Lake Victoria basin

There are many other advantages besides this, such as on foreign policy and visa applications:

In respect to foreign policy, the five member states will be able to take a common stand at international fora and assist each other in countries where they do not have diplomatic missions. This entails that any of the five member states can appoint one mission to represent their interests abroad.

Nationals from the five countries will also be able to have visa applications processed in any of the missions representing the region.

With regard to the East African political federation, the consultative process which has been going on in the three partner states, is expected to extend to Rwanda and Burundi. A federal president and parliament is expected in 2013

There are, quite naturally, fears about Rwanda and Burundi joining the EAC, and it has mostly to do with loss of sovereignty.

Either way, the EAC is no longer a three-member bloc, but a fully-fledged five-member one. At least, from 1 July, when the AU Summit will also be in process, here, in Accra.

Reflections on Regional Integration(II/III): COMESA Moves Forward...Pan-African Integration?

As Africa sits a day or two away from the 34th celebration of efforts at African unity, it becomes very timely that positive and constructive decisions would have taken place in Kenya at the 12th COMESA Summit.

The two-day meeting has yielded some very positive outcomes, which include:

the approval of a Common External Tariff(CET), which paves the way for the transformation of a FTA into a unified Customs Union in 2008

the exhortation by Kenyan premier Kibaki for COMESA to "reach out to regional economic blocs such as the EAC and SADC to consolidate integration"

the realisation that there need to be common understanding and positions in regional trade negotiations critical to a successful engagement with the regional blocs

Haven't we been here before? What of the African Economic Community? Is that not supposed to facilitate outreach towards the other regional blocs in Africa.

My understanding had always been that that would be the framework. Anything else is this side of reinventing the wheel, when it's clearly fixed on a timeline, and already in motion.

COMESA will be 13 years this December, and as is reputed to be the biggest African regional grouping in the sense that it groups

20 countries with about 400 million people and a combined gross domestic product in excess of 180 billion U.S. dollars.

Its members are Angola, Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Libya, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.



That's basically encompassing quite some countries from IGAD; COMESA; SADC and EAC countries. Already an over-lapping is inevitable, as has been discussed several times at international fora, and so I would have found it very interesting to have seen some talk of harmonising the over-lapping.

Failing that, the outreach that Kibaki talks about is all well and good, but how would that be operationalised, in the sense that how would it work practically without interfering with existing mechanisms? Would it come in the form of SADC-COMESA/SADC-EAC/IGAD-EAC/IGAD-SADC/etc percolations, expressed through a bilateral arrangement predicated on economics and trade, or something else? Maybe cultural? Maybe political.

It is clear that on regional integration in Africa, much needs to be done. There is talk that the next AU summit to be held here in Accra, Ghana, will discuss the putative United States of Africa. It promises to be an event worth monitoring, and RegionsWatch shall definitely be there to give you some insights.

Over and beyond that, though, it is very interestings--albeit predictable--that Kenya should be talking about a regional integration strategy predicated on conflict prevention and conflict resolution. That's an idea that's been chewed and spat out several times in West Africa, and I do hope Kenya will consider some liasing with ECOWAS on this.

This is because, as many know about the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, these conflicts in the sub-region compelled the region to beef up its knowledge and experience on conflict, to the extent of establishing centres on the training of conflict prevention, such as the Ghana-based Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre.

All that said, I maintained Kenya's decision is "predictable", because, as it explained some posts ago, the facilitation of regional security is an important pillar in the strategy for Kenya's perspective on regional integration. Important, because it sees, for example, the accession of Rwanda and Burundi into the East African Community as a way of ensuring that possible inter-necine conflicts originating from those two countries are seriously clamped down on. If the regional security imperative is in place, it will prevent any possible spillovers into the region, of which Kenya is part of.

Examples of Kenya having been the honest broker is what Vice President Moody Awori listed:

Kenya which successful[ly] mediated Somalia and Sudan peace processes two years ago will continue to spearhead regional conflict resolution efforts to bring peace and stability in the region to promote trade and investment

He further noted:

"Kenya's commitment to proactive engagement in seeking security and stability in the region is informed by the essence for an environment that can facilitate our people to engage in both international and trans-border trade which is a prerequisite to our quest for economic development,"

He couldn't have said it better. To boot, he compounds all this heavy talk by arguing what COMESA should begin to do as far as conflict prevention and management is concerned:

COMESA should streamline its program of conflict prevention in its trade regimes with the aim of avoiding trade and investment related conflicts

Who needs the EU when Africans themselves can make spurious ties to their regional integration?

How a program of conflict prevention and management can be streamlined with trade and investment is beyond me.

Any takers?

Have a good AU day!

Reflections on Regional Integration(I)

It's Africa Union Day this Friday 25th May. As such, it is celebrated as a holiday in all AU countries.

In preparation for that celebration I deemed it incumbent on my part to do some reflection on how far regional integration has gone on the continent, by way of what the media is writing about it.

The first article I came across, entitled African integration can't skip its five powerhouses is an interesting article that spends less time talking about how and why there are five powerhouses, which actually boils down to four: South Africa; Democratic Republic of Congo; Sudan; Nigeria.

This, in theory, is not a bad idea, but the writer does little justice to the explanation as to why these are the ocuntries except to generally say they have:

big populations

(massive) economic resources

status as political and economic hub(s)

massive unexploited resources

sizeable skilled knowledge population

All in all, if it's not big, it's big and bad; or big and badly managed--except when it's South Africa, which he describes as:

South Africa is Africa`s powerhouse in terms of industrial development and technologically skilled population.

With its population standing at over 40 million and its relatively pronounced international posture, South Africa is a force to reckon with in the continent and can, therefore, help the continent look for viable integration solutions.

What?

Since when has South Africa been instrumental in the resolution of erstwhile conflicts in, say, the ECOWAS sub-region? Have we forgotten that it was Ghana's premier Kwame Nkrumah that was even, as his detractors maintain, helping fight apartheid, whilst along with Nasser, and others spearheaded what was then the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which has evolved to become the African Union?

Either way, my major point is the aggrandizement of South Africa as a country that has the ideas and tools for how African integration can be done is not just spurious and pie-in-the-sky, but ridiculous. It is a rare "regional integrationist" that should advance such a notion, without having an agenda of sucking up to the powerhouse of the SADC region.

The elaboration of Nigeria, for example, is so poor and shoddy it's not funny. Little time is spent on explaining why it is the political and economic hub of West Africa. Were the author to be pressed, I am sure he would first cite the size of the population (140 million), and conveniently forget that Nigeria has a precedent in being the only ECOWAS country to have launched a satellite!

And much more besides. But in the interests of time, let me just press on.

I have talked about the IGAD country Sudan before, and concede very much it has a challenge of reconciling its oil-rich status with economic development. I would have expected this article to have transcended the issue of Darfur a bit and explained what some of the constraints on the country are.

DRC is a good point, but, yet again, little explanation. It is only South Africa that glows.

In his discussion of the regional powerhouses (the "regional" are mine), he mentions SADC; ECOWAS; COMESA. I would have expected a bit more about the Africa Economic Community, which the UN's regional commission of Africa, UNECA, elaborates on here:

First of all, the Africa Economic Community: "article 6 of the Treaty lays down a timetable for the process of integration, or the creation of Africa Economic Community (AEC) to be carried out over a period of 34 years (1994-2027), in 6 different stages of different duration".

Africa is making some progress in its attempts to integrate. However, the results are mixed. Notable progress has been made in the areas of trade, communications, macroeconomic policies, and transportation. The West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) have all made significant progress in trade liberalization and facilitation. In the area of free movement of people, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has made remarkable strides. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC) have progressed in the area of infrastructure. For peace and security, ECOWAS and SADC have made commendable.
from:http://www.uneca.org/integration/numero1/opinion.asp

If we backtrack just a bit, we see that the regional blocs mentioned under the ambit of the AEC are: ECOWAS; SADC; UEMOA; COMESA; EAC. I would agree with the UNECA that these are the five regional powerhouses. Though, I find UEMOA less reliable in terms of grand regional integration projects, it is true that as far as economic regional integration goes, by way of the CFA, it is way up there.

Suffice-to-say, our learned reporter needs to do some more research!

The Fight is On: SADC Competes With ECOWAS in Banking

Last week, Metro TV, in its Newsnight programme, reported --much to my chagrin--that the government had offloaded (finally) its shares in ADB in preparation for the takeover by the South African bank Standard Bank.

I've been seeing Standard Bank's ads in magazines like Business In Africa, Africa Today, and been forced to accept that it, too, like ECOBANK, wnts to be a Pan-African bank.

Predictably, I'm being biased towards Ecobank being a veritable regional bank--precissely for its history of ECOWAS' stake, and its reach in almost ECOWAS countries, including CEMAC countries. Honestly, Stanbic, a Pan-African bank? I don't think so! Where's the SADC support to underscore this? Where is the SADC region's understanding of the rest of Africa?

In my view, I see an interesting trend here--one of Stanbic, like South African big capital, choosing to lord it over Africa, and feeling, why not, West Africa's a good place. Once we get Ghana, we've got a springboard for the rest of West Africa.

Not so fast, Stanbic!

The South Africans appear not to understand not just West Africa, but its market. One thing that goes to compound this perception is an article in Friday's edition of the private Ghanaian paper The Observer, with the headline:

Stanbic Offers $80m for ADB

The sub-heading speaks volumes: Workers Charge and Say "Kai!" ADB's Western Union
Inflows for 2006 Alone Was $400m



This, in fact, was reduced from $120m.

The cheek of Stanbic! To think it could buy Ghana's only agricultural development bank for $80m, when Western Union's for ADB alone was clocking a good five times aaht amount speaks more about the South African chutzpah, or hubris, of feeling it can lord it over West Africa in general, and Ghana in particular.

Back to the news report from Metro news, I noticed that the following night, the station reported that the government insists it had not sold its shares in ADB, and was actually looking at an unsolicited proposal from Stanbic made last year.

It was confirmed in the state-owned Daily Graphic on Thursday, as the picture above illustrates.

I certainly hope that Bank of Ghana, and Ghanaians open their eyes to the looming threat of big capital--be it outside Africa, or on the continent itself, represented by a wolf in sheep's clothing--South Africa, always ready to please the West and its elite, yet less amenable to the interests of Black Africa.

Does NEPAD ring a bell, anyone?

The Mosquitoe Bites the (Regional Integration) Dust...Almost

There I was feeling that HIV/AIDS was one of the biggest killers in Sub-Saharan Africa, until I came across this article in Xinhua about how Malaria kills more than war among military forces of SADC:

The article reveals how:

Malaria remains one of the biggest challenges for military forces in the Southern African region, accounting for more deaths than wars, Zimbabwe Defense Forces Commander General Constantine Chiwenga has said.

Far from being stuck in a moment of trepidation, I think it makes sense. We get so consumed by the big picture that we forget, sometimes, to attack the little problems. It's, perhaps, like a crime thriller: it's only upon hindsight that you realise the veritable killer was closer than you thought.



But seriously speaking, the article maintains that so serious is the issue that:

[a] first seminar of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) military malaria managers [will take place] in Harare on Tuesday. The seminar, which is running for three weeks, is being held under the auspices of the SADC Military Health Services.

SADC Military Health Services That sounds rather profound. So I did some investigation to ascertain how far SADC had gone in instituting a regional institution specifically dealing with health. I noticed SADC had met last month--under the aegis of SADC Health Minister's Forum, and had decided to recognise tradional medecine in the region.

That article maintains how the SADC Health Forum will:

...also look major problems of SADC health issues such as HIV and AIDS,Tuberculosis and Malaria.

Googling further, I came across references to health protocols, without there being anything concrete on a SADC institution dedicated to health.


Predictably, I atavistically made the comparison with West Africa, which I do know has a West African Health Organisation.

Even before all of that, my parents tell me that back in the good old days of Nkrumah, during the fifties and sixties, the goverment organised regular spraying of the country, so as to kill mosquitoe eggs.

I can tell you that in 2007, it is not just that this has not happened, but it has not happened for several years either!

A few weeks ago, the Accra regional minister I.C.Quaye quipped that mosquitoes did not need visas to enter the country of Ghana.

One of the Ghanaian Saturday papers commented on this:

The statement attributed to the Honourable I.C Quaye in Parliament recently, that mosquitoes do not need visa from him to enter Accra may be amusing, but it is very true.

This is because the mosquito has become a very efficient transmitter of disease, especially malaria and the parasite it transmits has become so adaptive that it makes the control of malaria a very daunting business. As such it can move freely and cause havoc with impunity.

A reference to the spraying was made by Ms Aba Wilmot, the Chief Entomologist of the Ghana Health Service, who maintained:

even though spraying is good, she would like the environmental control bit emphasised to deal with the source of the mosquito. Her belief is that Accra, for example, should be divided into zones and the environment tackled from one zone to the other in a rotational basis.

She went on to call for:

indoor spraying instead of the outdoor one since the outdoor spraying is expensive.

But any large scale operation will require the setting up of a good monitoring system to ensure its success. But this effort must be taken on by the whole of ECOWAS through the West African Health Organisation (WAHO). WAHO is the technical wing of ECOWAS that advises the health ministers of the West African States as well as their heads of states on matters concerning health.

I checked the WAHO website, which does a woeful job of conveying how ECOWAS is dealing with malaria. One sorry sub-site refers to it thus:

The FY2003-2007 Strategic Plan of the West African Health Organisation (WAHO) is the product of an ongoing strategic planning process that has been underway since February 2001. Contributors to this process include WAHO’s Directorate General, the Ministers of Health from Member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), international donors and consultants, health specialists, and experts in health policy and institutional development. Nine priorities have been identified:
1. HIV/AIDS/STI/TB
2. MALARIA
3. PREVENTION OF BLINDNESS
4. CHILD SURVIVAL
5. NUTRITION
6. DRUGS AND VACCINES
7. TRAINING
8. CONTROL OF EPIDEMICS
9 INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPONENT

The document may very well be available for download, but let's get real: a document for download and plenty of plans do not a concrete plan make. Come on, WAHO! It is interesting to note, even, that the website, in its attempt to be current, has failed woefully.

This is because under "WAHO today news", you read that news from January was posted on what looks like April 2, 2007!!

I think SADC has the right idea in this seminar, and if ECOWAS has been doing something similar for its citizens and/or for those working for ECOWAS institutions, it has done a bad job. We're in 2007! For how long go African regional organisations have to take their citizens for granted on key issues like these!

Access to vital information like these doesn't need a person being paid thousands of dollars, but committed public servants, or even volunteers.

WAHO has some way to go. It has the advantage over SADC that it's been in existence since 2000. SADC has yet to establish an institution dealing specifically with health in that sub-region. WAHO, and ECOWAS by extension, must not fail its citizens!