Of Libya, CENSAD and...Which REC for South Sudan?

 

Whither the future of CEN-SAD?

The Community of Sahel-Saharan States was established in 1998 by the late Colonel Qaddafi. After the rationalization of the regional economic communities in 2006, it became an AU-REC – that is one of the eight RECs mandated and recognized by the African Union. It has twenty-eight members, and Ghana is a member. 

Despite many meetings that had taken place and a fully-functioning website on http://www.censad.org, the uprising that started in Libya in March threw a huge spanner in the works of the organisation, effectively throwing the regional grouping out of sync with the other RECs at its base in Tripoli. Regrettably, the conspicuous absence of the African Union itself on the future of CENSAD has not helped dispel the notion that the AU is nothing more than a “toothless” bulldog. 

The passing of Qaddafi will effectively take the wind out of the sails of CENSAD, probably throwing all the good work – including the Great Green Wall being built along the sub-region to protect the region from climate change; as well as the establishment of a free-trade area of ECOWAS-UEMOA-CENSAD/ECOWAS-CENSAD/ECCAS along the likes of the SADC-COMESA-EAC tripartite free trade area, which was mooted in 2008.

Going forward, I would expect to see the AU taking serious the need to engage the National Transitional Council in Libya on their commitments to the African Union. This would include discussions on Libya and where it stands on the establishment of the AU-mandated and Tripoli-hosted African Investment Bank, as well as the state of play of CEN-SAD, and how it can be factored into discussions of Africa’s ongoing discussions over Africa’s integration.

South Sudan – which REC to belong to?

South Sudan might have slipped off the radar of news—not because it is not important, but other hot issues might naturally have tipped it off. Still, what has not been making the rounds too much has been the regional economic community to which South Sudan should belong. Given the location of that country, one cannot take it for granted that they would necessarily want to go with their Northern counterpart—and to the RECs is no exception.

There is no mechanism that can predict that South Sudan will want to become member of the East Africa Community or the IGAD. And what of COMESA? This is an important debate that African media practitioners – aware of the utility and increasing assertiveness of the RECs – might be ruminating over on the continent.

Although there have been major developments around South Sudan and its membership of some of these RECs, the point I am making here is about the absence of a debate in much of the African media. Going forward, African media practitioners, including here in Ghana, should move beyond the stage of talking about other AU member states only when they’re, at best, embroiled in conflict and/or at worst, are headline news over at the BBC!

You might be happy to know that South Sudan was made a member of COMESA at the 15th Comesa Heads of State and Government summit on 14^th October in Malawi. Furthermore, on 17 October, South Sudan President General Salva Kiir confirmed that his country has started on the application process to become a member of the East African Community (EAC).

**this piece was culled from my Wednesday column for Ghana's "Business and Financial Times" newspaper, which is called "The Accidental ECOWAS and AU Citizen"--from: http://www.thebftonline.com/bft_subcat_linkdetails.cfm?prodcatID=6&tblNewsCatID=63&tblNewsID=9788 . More also on http://african-union-citizen.blogspot.com/2011/10/hot-issues-on-au-needing-popular.html

In 2009, in his capacity as a “Do More Talk Less Ambassador” of the 42^nd Generation—an NGO that promotes and discusses Pan-Africanism--Emmanuel gave a series of lectures on the role of ECOWAS and the AU in facilitating a Pan-African identity. Emmanuel owns "Critiquing Regionalism" (http://www.critiquing-regionalism.org). Established in 2004 as an initiative to respond to the dearth of knowledge on global regional integration initiatives worldwide, this non-profit blog features regional integration initiatives on MERCOSUR/EU/Africa/Asia and many others. You can reach him on ekbensah@ekbensah.net / Mobile: 0268.687.653.

Understanding African Integration—Actors and Dates

If one were to look at the landscape of integration efforts worldwide, it would be safe to say that African integration is perhaps the only kind that involves a troika that is fast and furiously emerging as the key drivers of integration at the intergovernmental level. These are the African Union Commission (AUC, est 2002); the African Development Bank (AfDB, est 1963); and the UN’s Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 1958).

As we now know here on this blog, the African Union Commission is a successor to the Adis Ababa-based Secretariat of the OAU, which was established in May 1963.

The AfDB is a regional development bank established in 1964 with the intention of promoting economic and social development in Africa. The Group comprises the African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Development Fund (ADF), and the Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF). AfDB provides loans and grants to African governments and private companies investing in the regional member countries (RMC) in Africa.**

As regards the UNECA, which is the African counterpart to the UN’s five regional commissions, it was established in 1958 and by the United Nations Economic and Social Council to encourage economic cooperation among its member states (the nations of the African continent)[2] following a recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly.

Many times I have tried to work out in my mind whether the Asian Development Bank(ADB) for example and UNESCAP have played a role as central as the Tunisia-based AfDB. While it is true that ADB has been involved in the regional integration process in the ASEAN region (http://www.aric.adb.org/ ), it has been more of a duo of the ADB and ASEAN working together, with a limited role by the regional commission of UNESCAP. It is even rather telling to note that a google search of “unescap asean” as compared to “uneca African union” yields searches of 75,600 and 86,900, respectively.

Still, far from suggesting that Asian integration has a long way to go, I think a little bit of the comparative approach helps provide perspective on the progress of an African integration that is rarely given much credit. If you recall my beef with Daniel Bach three weeks ago, it was to do with how he had managed to side-step the importance of the capacity-building and research (through its inimitable Assessing Regional Integration in Africa(ARIA) ) that UNECA has provided over fifty years towards African integration processes, in tandem with the AfDB.

But on the specific issue of African integration, other “processes” that are noteworthy are the following:

1. Conference of African Ministers of Integration(COMAI), institutionalized in 2006
2. The AU-mandated RECs (AMU/ ECOWAS / CENSAD / EAC / IGAD / ECCAS / SADC / COMESA)& subregional RECs(six of them)
3. National member states

Bearing in mind that the AUC/AfDB/UNECA have been frontline intergovernmental actors facilitating regional integration, with COMAI playing a secondary but important ancillary role to African integration, we can already see that in understanding African integration, the devil is truly in the detail of these processes.

This is because the picture is far from complete when you look at these actors in isolation. COMAI, for example, has been operating at the intergovernmental level in a context of REC-rationalization since 2006, when it was institutionalized. One can speculate whether without the rationalization of the Regional Economic Communities, the regularity of the meetings would have been established.

The eight AU-mandated RECs have been operating as legal personalities in their own right as well, creating action plans and attempting to implement REC-specific plans. As to whether they have cognizant of how their plans sit with the African Economic Community is less clear. In fact, we can speculate that it is virtually non-existent.

Now that we have a fair idea of who the actors are, allow me to remind you of the key 10 dates necessary to obtain an insight of African integration. These are:

1. 25 May, 1963. This is when the OAU was established.

2. December 1976 –In what is now the DRC, Ministers of the then-OAU decided to establish an African Common Market as a prelude to the African Economic Community

3. June 1991 – Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) is established

4. May 1994 – AEC starts operating as a continental framework for African integration

5. 9 September 1999 – Sirte Declaration (Libya) encourages the speeding up of continental unity

6. July 2001 – NEPAD is established in Lusaka

7. July 2002 – OAU is disbanded in Durban, South Africa to be replaced by the African Union(AU)

8. 2006:
a. March, OUGADOUGOU -- Institutionalization of Conference of African Ministers on Integration (COMAI)
b. July, The GAMBIA – AU Seventh Ordinary Session (Summit) decides to recognize 8 regional economic communities (RECS). Puts a moratorium on any other RECs [6-7-8]

9. July 2007 -- AU Grand Debate on Union Government, ACCRA

10. 2009 – first phase of Minimum Integration Programme commences under the ambit of the AU Strategic Action Plan (2009-2012)


**thanks, WIKIPEDIA!

EAC Common Market Commences 1 July

On July 1, 2007, EAC members Rwanda and Burundi joined the East African Community as the fourth and fifth members respectively of what is now seen as one of the more successful regional economic communities.

Three years later in 2010, July 1 will play host to the establishment of a common market for the EAC.

Is there something about 1 July? Someone else might ask "is there something about the EAC".

There sure is! It is increasingly being seen as a to-watch-out-for REC.

What will become known as the EAC Common Market has been touted by the Secretary-General as a "milestone the symbolizes strong political will and firm commitment by all EAC stakeholders in deepening and widening integration" (http://allafrica.com/stories/201006290221.html)

This date will, in fact mark the "commencement of the operationalisation of the EAC Common Market..." maintained Ambassador Juma Mwapachu. He continues that:

"What we have achieved so far is only the basic legal framework that outlines what needs to be done and implemented for the Common Market to be meaningful and to have impact in transforming the lives of the East African Community citizens,"

A piece featured in VOA News goes a bit further.

First, it talks about how Thursday 1 July will see the commencement of the EAC Common Market, following a protocol that was signed in November 2009. It maintains:

The protocol is part of a vision that would see the nations eventually form a federated state, complete with a single currency and unified foreign policy.

Secondly, it touches on the detractors who believe that KENYA, given it is the de facto hegemon of the region (though few might be quick to admit it) might be the country to most benefit from this EAC Common Market:

Critics of the union say that Kenya, the region's largest and most dynamic economy, is likely to reap the majority of the benefits. In smaller countries, such as Rwanda and Burundi, there are fears that Kenya's larger businesses will push aside the local economy.

According to Shaw, these fears distort the larger picture.

"Kenya is a hub, it is the hub and it will benefit a lot," says Shaw. "At the same time, do not underestimate the potential of benefits for other countries. Kenya has a lot of human resources and skills. That can only benefit the region as a whole

The reality of the situation, however, is that only time will tell how this EAC Common Market will fare. At the end of the day, as the article maintains, "it likely will take some time before the borders are opened"

That TURKEY's ambassador to Kenya has already announced that his country would establish an Export Processing Zone within the EAC to maximise the potential of the region is surely the greatest indication ever that the East African Community might be up the right path on attracting potential FDI.

Now it's time to tighten the regulation to ensure that the private sector complements a people-centred EAC!

More than MERCOSUR on My Mind: Goodbye to the OAS?

Is there something about Cancun?

First, WTO trade talks collapse there in 2003. Now, seven years later it is playing host to the birth of a new regional organization—the putative Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.

Truth be told, given the gargantuan size of the 32-member RIO group (comprising Latin American and Caribbean states) that has been around since 1986, it was only a matter of time before a formal name be ascribed to the grouping!

As an ardent regional integrationist, who is also a citizen of the Pan-African grouping (that comprises no less than 53 member states), this proposition looks like a delicious response to not just the US and Canada, but the paradigm of uniting under a regional umbrella.

More importantly, it looks to me like members of the Rio group have looked left and right, seen the EU, and the AU, probably heard of developments in East Asia of a Community , and thought "why not in Latin America?"

In my view, the reason why this Community would work is because AU countries, with their eight UNECA-mandated RECs are managing very well, thankyou! Xinhua thoughtfully provided a list of sub-regional organizations in that region—and it’s quite impressive. There are some nine around, with the oldest(Latin American Parliament) having been established in 1964 and the youngest as recently as….

If what I am reading is correct, then the RIO group is keen to have an economic community that would not just comprise 32 members of the Latin American and Caribbean states, but exclude the US and Canada (unlike the OAS). I am sure sometimes AU states have been keen to have an AU without some North African countries that make up the members of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)!

But on the specific issue of regionalism in this region, I foresee this Community to be more akin to that of an AU in the way it both accepts and accommodates the sub-regional groups, but contemporaneously dissimilar in the way it has been explicit about excluding Canada and the United States.

Honestly speaking, I do not foresee the AU excluding North Africa [especially because of the instrumental role played by Libya] anytime soon. Libyan leader al-Qaddafi’s pivotal role in the AU has perhaps put paid to the desire to jettison any element of the Arab contingent!?

ECOWAS-COMESA Relations Make Progress

When the visiting ambassador from the East African Community, Julius Onen, to the ECOWAS Commission on 24 July 2007 called ECOWAS the putative "mother of all communities", some might have believed this to be a rather bombastic statement, but when I had the priviledge of interviewing--on the sidelines of a mining workshop, hosted by TWN-Africa, AU Commission, ECOWAS, and the UNECA--Professor Ndongo of the West Africa Civil Society Forum(WACSOF)and him having disclosed to me that even without Dr.Chambas as Head of ECOWAS (as he now goes off to Brussels to head the ACP Secretariat), the ECOWAS machine would still run smoothly, I got the impression that despite the numerous challenges still dogging ECOWAS, it must be getting something right.

So when I read that no less than the Secretariat of COMESA was entertaining some ECOWAS chaps over at their Secretariat, I as more than chuffed about the potential collaboration that can come out of that.

In tones reminiscent of the collaboration I have referred to many a time on this blog, it was interesting to read that the two RECS are keen to strengthen their Regional Business Councils; "Women in Business, Agricultural Development and Food Security, Trading for Peace, Customs Issues, the Common External Tariff and Free Trade Areas..." among many other areas.

The article maintains:

At the end of the visit, an Aide Memoire was signed between the two sides sealing a commitment to collaborate in areas identified during the visit to enhancing private sector development and overall regional integration. The COMESA Director for Trade, Customs and Monetary Affairs, Mr.. Francis Mangeni, signed on behalf of the COMESA Secretariat, while Mr. Alfred Braimah signed on behalf of the ECOWAS Commission.

I guess seeing more of this is a sure way of facilitating a more progressive outlook on regional integration!

UNCTAD Revisits Calls to Strengthen Regional Integration

9 July, 2009

By E.K.Bensah II



The UNCTAD 2009 report on Economic Development was launched in Accra in June. It is the latest in a series of yearly UNCTAD reports that provide additional angles on issues affecting Africa and the developing world.

Entitled “Strengthening Regional Economic Integration for Africa’s Development”, it is the second report in the space of two years that focuses exclusively on how developing countries can maximize the benefits of regional economic integration for their policy space.

UNCTAD 2007 Trade & Development vs 2009 Economic Report on Africa

The most recent was the UNCTAD Trade and Development Report, which was published in 2007. Entitled “Regional cooperation for development”, the 240-page report used the report to outline how regional integration could offer national space for developing countries. Apart from defining what “new regionalism” was, the report stressed that trade liberalization is not the end-all and be-all insofar as regionalism is concerned. The tendency has been for economic integration to be perceived as a purely economic enterprise. UNCTAD averred it was more to do with a reconfiguration of policy space, expressed through many important elements, such as the provision of public goods; a tool for regional trade and industrial integration; and strengthened policies on energy and industry to complement already-existing national strategies.

As for the 2009 UNCTAD report, it comprises five chapters dealing with the issues of challenges and opportunities in the context of the experience of regional integration for Africa; expanding intra-african trade for Africa’s growth; intra-African investment; emerging issues in regional trade integration in Africa; and policy recommendations on strengthening regional integration.

The report dedicates Chapter 1 to the “Experience with regional integration in Africa: challenges and opportunities”, offering more than just a theoretical justification for economic integration. The report provides a graphical illustration of the eight AU-mandated sub-regional blocs (ECOWAS/ECCAS/SADC/COMESA/AMU/IGAD/EAC), along with the existing monetary zones (UEMOA; CFA franc zone). The Libya-sponsored CENSAD, which Cape Verde joined recently, is the only one that is missing in the graph. This omission notwithstanding, the report explains that the African Union has classified the multiplicity of regional groupings in Africa into two groups—the regional economic communities (RECs) and other integration blocs.

We are reminded that many African countries have multiple memberships—an issue that was equally broached in the UNCTAD 2007 TDR, and considered to be one of the reasons for such low level of intra-African trade. Of the 53 countries, 27 are members of two regional groupings, with 18 belonging to three, with one country being a member of no less than four groupings. This kind of spaghetti-bowl groupings can only go to accentuate the necessity of regional integration by developing countries as part of their development strategies.

Given that this is the latest report by UNCTAD on the importance of regional integration, it is fair to say that although developing countries have made quite some progress, it continues to be found wanting—and napping—on concrete strategies to make regional economic integration work for them.

Infrastructure for intra-African trade

The most highlighted case is that of infrastructure. The report posits that there is a distinction when it comes to infrastructure—there is what it calls “hard” and “soft” infrastructure. Hard infrastructure is described as “physical infrastructure that is often missing or is of poor quality in many African countries.” These include road and air transport. The report avers that “the quality of the road network on the continent is so poor that many countries even within the same RTA remain effectively isolated from each other.”

Conversely, “soft infrastructure” includes “the policy and regulatory environment, the transparency and predictability of trade and business administration, and the quality of the business environment more generally.” Simply put, policies that impact on development, such as transport policies are some of the examples of “soft” infrastructural issues that affect transport costs. Not to speak of the high transport costs throughout the sub-regions and continent that inhibits the facilitation of intra-African trade.

Truth be told, it is difficult to speak about infrastructure without broaching the issue of intra-African trade. UNCTAD in this report views it as a critical element in facilitating regional economic integration. It admits that although intra-African trade is low in comparison to other regions, “Intra-African trade is important for many African countries taken individually.” This is buttressed by the point that “over three-quarters of intra-African trade take place within regional trading blocs, highlighting their importance.” The third critical point is that this kind of trade occurs around what the report considers “influential” countries. That is to say “trade poles” that could become development poles.

The report summarizes the section on intra-African trade by recommending AU and sub-regional policy-makers to pay greater attention to the landlocked countries on the continent that are “constrained by their own poor infrastructure as well as their neighbours’.” The report expresses hope, however, in multilateral processes, such as the EPA negotiations between countries of regional economic communities and the EU; AGOA processes and the WTO Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations that are bound to re-configure the future of intra-African trade.

Intra-African investment

UNCTAD identifies in its report the importance of financially integrating the economies of the AU. Citing examples for each region of Africa, it refers to ECOBANK as a trailblazer, describing it as a “prominent West African investor in Africa’s banking sector.” Created by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and established in Lome, Togo, in 1985, the company was not licensed to operate as a bank until 1988. Today, through manifold investments, it has followed what the report considers to be “a proactive policy of African expansion." It is represented in 25 countries, including China, and has over 500 branches. ECOBANK’s strategy for geographic expansion is consistent with what UNCTAD calls “a sound financial sector”, which it maintains to be a “pre-requisite for increasing the flows of investment within Africa.”

In addition to ECOBANK, Nigerian banks have also been cited as key to the development of the financial sector in the ECOWAS region. UNCTAD indicates that the banking sector has “become a major player in African finance following a radical consolidation undertaken in 2005.” The centrality of these Nigerian banks in Africa’s financial system (with the biggest banks in Africa comprising 9 out of 20 that were Nigerian in 2008) can only go to complement the increasing financial integration of the economies—not just of West Africa but the continent, brought about by the fact that Nigeria’s banks go beyond the shores of the ECOWAS sub-region.

UNCTAD highlights a three-fold reason why both ECOBANK and Nigerian banks will affect intra-African investment. First, the merging and acquisition of these banks with domestic banks means that they inject capital in the economy. Secondly, new competition made possible by the coming of the new banks, triggers a reduction in the cost of banking. Finally, these banks have created financial networks across Africa, making payment mechanisms between countries easier.

In this respect, the proposal made by President of Cote d’ivoire Laurent Gbagbo along the sidelines of a June ECOWAS summit in Abuja for ECOWAS to establish a Regional Investment Fund that would purposefully be used for infrastructure is not just timely, but goes a long way to help cement the financial integration advocated in this report.

Migration and free movement

The May report by the African Union entitled “Status of Integration in Africa” disclosed that free movement had generally been achieved throughout the eight regional economic communities, but some were more advanced than others. ECOWAS perhaps has the oldest arrangement, which dates back to 1979, with a revised treaty in 2003. It has experienced many challenges throughout the three decades. Despite the presence of ECOWAS passports in only three of the fifteen ECOWAS countries, citizens of the sub-region are able to move freely throughout the region with only their ID cards or passports, and enjoy right of residence for 90 days.

Citizens of the East African Community enjoy a similar arrangement, where all the five members have a passport that is specific to the region, and which enables them single immigration entry/departure card under harmonized procedures of entry/work permits.

As for COMESA, it adopted a protocol on free movement of persons, labour, services, rights of establishment and right of residence in 2001. However, progress has been slow.

All these developments notwithstanding, UNCTAD continues to believe that migration and free movement remain important cornerstones of facilitating regional economic integration. It points to West Africa, where it relates the so-called “Ivorian miracle” of the 1980s, which it describes as attributable to “the inflow of Sahelian labour on cocoa and coffee plantations in the South of Cote D’Ivoire.”

The report points to already-existing initiatives, such as the 2006 African Common Position on Migration and Development, which highlighted, among others, the need “to ensure coordination in the development of common regional policies for the management of migration within the RECs.” In this report, UNCTAD avers that policy-makers have to build on the existing initiatives on facilitating labour mobility and migration management “already laid out in various RECs and other consultative forums in the region.” Those above are certainly ones that the report would like to see consolidated and help inform national development strategies so necessary for developing countries.

Commitment

In the final analysis, it is arguable that UNCTAD’s return to regional integration is not a coincidence. By re-visiting the issue of regional integration, it is reminding both policy-makers and interested constituents that its concern for strategic development policies that will help integrate developing countries into the global economy against the backdrop of a global economic recession is sound.

As it indicates in the report, there is nothing wrong with trade policy, but it should “be part of an overall long-term development strategy which defines a country’s development objectives and the way they should be reached.” Cooperation and collaboration are important elements insofar as regional economic integration is concerned, but it should be done on a holistic basis, which includes regional policies on energy; industry; migration; and infrastructure. Regional integration done without attention to these will only go so far, and end up hindering the progress that the regional economic communities have made.

As the report so aptly concludes: “regional integration is not an end in itself; it should be seen as a stepping stone towards Africa’s attractiveness to investment and export competitiveness.”


ENDs


This article can also be found on the twn-africa site on http://twnafrica.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=203:unctad-revisits-calls-to-strengthen-regional-integration-&catid=72:unctad-&Itemid=55

An Ineffectual REC: Arab Maghreb Union

With Libyan leader al-Qaddafi focussing his interests in the African Union and CEN-SAD, you kind of wonder how much effort he would want to put into the Arab Maghreb Union.

Here's a five-member regional organisation that is twenty this year, yet has made scant effort to re-formulate its vision.

I took the liberty of reading the African Union's Status of Integration
, and was profoundly shocked by the fact that of the 8 major RECs on the African continent that had write-ups of them (ECOWAS/CENSAD/East African Community/IGAD/AMU/SADC/COMESA/ECCAS/AMU), AMU had nothing about it. The report suggests that it did not participate.

Elsewhere on the AU website, another report--the Minimum Integration Programme--indicates that in the matrices that have been set up to monitor progress of RECs, this-same REC had failed to deliver on them.

Surely, it's time to disband the Arab Maghreb Union from the AU's established RECs?

ASEAN/African Union--Still Some Way to Go for the ASEAN Community

I am both excited and disappointed by the latest developments in the ASEAN region. I am excited to hear that ASEAN wants to "accelerate" the formation of a single market; but profoundly disappointed it has to be like that of the European Union.

ASEAN is not--and should not be expected to be -- like the EU, which culture is different; furthermore, the history surrounding the establishment of ASEAN is dissimilar to the EU. Like many of the African RECs, there was no Economic Coal and Steel Community before the Treaty of Maastricht created the EU in 1992.

That the organisation agreed to move on consensus-building rather than sanctions--even with the new Charter--is a reflection already of its idiosynchratic nature.

What is not so different is the fact that there are regional leaders driving the group. In this case, it is Singapore; Thailand; Malaysia; and Indonesia. According to bloomberg, they account for almost 90 percent of all foreign investment into ASEAN.

With regard to the bloc's response to the global recession, Bloomberg reports:

Asean’s new charter, which came into force three months ago, has no mechanism to stop member countries from implementing protectionist policies. Earlier this month Indonesia ordered civil servants to use local products, and Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi said it was “normal” for countries to resort to protectionist measures in a slowdown, according to local media reports.

ASEAN has always talked about free trade, and I don't believe that will change soon. What might have to be changed is the degree of political will to move forward on integration. That they have decided on a new human rights body, which has hitherto no name, is a great idea. Still critical steps to make it an important body in the ASEAN construct ought to take prominence. The naysayers and cold observers might huff and puff at the ideas for the region's processes. However, I believe that it needs to start with its charter--and the strengthening thereof--as an important step towards the critical development of its own regional integration.

What's eating the African Union?
Meanwhile, elsewhere in the African Union, the Pan-African body is getting some migraine from Guinea;Mauritania; Madagascar; and Guinea-Bissau. Need I mention Sudan? Let's watch the space for a frenetic period for the continental body. Before we do, let me leave you with a commentary by one Tom Nuttal about lessons that the AU can learn from the EU:

Tom Nuttall writing in the "Independent" newspaper of Uganda advances five lessons that AU member states can take cognizance of while conceiving of a United States of Africa.

First of all, it doesn’t take a charismatic man to drive the idea of any Union of African states. He refers to the "founding father" of the EU—a gradualist—Jean Monnet who espoused the idea of a Europe based on federal lines. Secondly, countries ought to "focus on the bottom line". In other words, they ought to believe that they will benefit mutually from being associated with each other, that leaving becomes the last thing on their mind. The third lesson is in finding "a method of integrating states while allowing them space for legitimate disagreements—and ensuring that those disagreements do not hinder the fundamental project of union." The fourth point is predicated on finding an external force, like the US in the EU after the Second World War ended in 1945, who can preside over any attempt or project to unite. Finally, adversity and challenges are necessary to advance any unification project. 

ECOWAS/ARAB LEAGUE--Once Again, the New Year brings the Regional to the Fore: Palestine & Guinea: A Tale of Two Countries

[I wrote this post on 27th and 29th December, 2008. I post it for general consumption]

Once again, the spectre of a coup has regrettably loomed large in the ECOWAS country of Guinea, prompted by the demise of Lansana Conte. Thankfully, once again, the visceral desire to find a regional response has been omnipresent in the minds of African Union (AU) diplomats.

Speaking to the BBC on Christmas Eve from here in Accra, Ghana, ECOWAS Commission Chief Dr.Mohammed Ibn Chambas not only categorically condemned the coup, but went further to add that ECOWAS would be a "critical element" in the search for solutions for Guinea.

In contrast, the conspicuous absence of any regional organisation in any attempt of a resolution to the crisis in Gaza, where 300 people have been killed by airstrikes the last week of the year, in my view, points either to a lack of faith on the Arab League--or lack of any regional organisation in the first place!

Can we surmise that the strong influence of the US in the Middle East makes null and void any desire either by the Palestinians or Israelis to pursue a regional solution. Talk of any solution in the crisis always seems to reside on the UN or a US-based solution, prompting personal speculation that the Middle East (playing host to the Gulf Cooperation Council and Arab League) does not seem to have any sense of the regional. The lack of consultations of these regional bodies can only unwittingly render them toothless.

Back to Guinea, one cannot help but wonder how distinctive the comparison is. In that country, the 15-member ECOWAS stepped in straight away not just to condemn the coup but initiate moves to resolve the crisis by forming a delegation that would be Conakry-bound and appeal to the coup-makers to remember that the Guinean constitution remains alive.

On 29th December, news came in that the 53-member AU has suspended Guinea -- until it gets its constitutional house in order.

SADC--Mbeki's other Headache: Getting SADC to Get More Proactive on Peacekeeping Force

As if Mbeki doesn't have enough on his plate with issues on Zimbabwe, BusinessDay reports that in the upcoming weekend, SADC ministers will meet to plan for the activation of a SADC regional peacekeeping force, which has already been mooted since August 2007. The objective of the meeting, really, is to brainstorm on how it can begin to deploy on peacekeeping missions.

The meeting in Durban--to be chaired by Angola--will take recommendations for a SADC summit next month when President Mbeki is "expected to take over the chairmanship" of tyhe 14-member SADC from Jose Eduardo Dos Santos.

Discussions are in the offing also on a regional early warning centre that is scheduled for the end of the year.

More importantly however is the significance of this regional standby force.

By 2010, the African Union plans to have completed an African Stanby Force, with regional standby forces for the regional economic communities (RECS). This falls into line with the AU's protocol on peace and security, "

...which required all regional economic communities to have units that fed into the standby army. So far, the Economic Community of West African States is the other regional bloc that has made the most progress.

It's easy to check that. Only in June this year, a training in Bamako for ECOWAS Standby Force -- codenamed "Jigui 2008" took place, with a Malian logistic sub-command; a Nigerian East Sub Command and a Senegalese West sub command, as well as ECOWAS Staff from the Commission in Abuja.

East Africa established its regional peacekeeping force also in August 2007, with IGAD hoping that it might ease the pressure, what with demands for Darfur.

Reflections on Regional Integration: Kenichi Ohmae Makes his Stance on Region States

Irishman Eamonn Moran is a nice guy whom I found on facebook last year. He also believes in the power of the State. Back in 2002, when he and I were working as colleagues at a Brussels-based NGO, we had many discussions about neo-liberalism and the role of the State on countering it. His thesis on that genre was a good read. I guess I waxed so lyrical about regional integration that he decided to shut me up by giving me this book, which I have captured in the inset picture. The book in question is Kenichi Ohmae's The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies, which I have only recently begun to read after a good six years!!

In any event, I think it's about time that book featured highly on this blog. The contribution that it offers is as controversial as it is interesting. His stance is clear: he believes the State is being rolled back, and in classic neo-lioberalist theory, he feels that it is a good thing. I am inclined to disagree, but I think it never hurts reading the other side.

So what I've resolved to do is that over the next couple of posts, sprinkle summaries of the chapter of the book, among regular reporting of what's happening in the other regional groupings. To that end, I can offer a perspective that engages in the thinking around the discipline of regional integration.

New trends
The last article hints at a new thinking on regional integration, and I realise the more I read, the more questions arise. These include:

---

1. Is it possible to conceive of a Committee of Regions à l'Africaine that will cater for the needs of all those regions in Africa?
2. Will twinning African regions help facilitate a more efficient regional integration?
3. Are micro-regions the way to go?
4. How do I reconcile some of the new trends around regional integration with the need to develop the Un Regional commissions?
5. What about my three-tier proposal on regional integration where:

First, there needs to be identification of imperatives of each region. Simply put, what is unique about a particular region that that region can capitalise on to bring to bear in the conception of an AU government? So, we can say, for example, that ECOWAS's sub-regional imperative is that of conflict prevention/resolution /management, given its experience with Liberia/Sierra Leone/and the instrumentality of ECOMOG. SADC's might be a different one; the EAC's might be on, say, regional infrastructure. For example, § A paper from UNU-CRIS cites that: “the AU has been the first regional organization to establish a clear relationship with the UN as it is consciously aspiring to closely coordinate, if not integrate, its mission planning and execution of peace and security action with the prevailing structures/plans of the UN”.



Secondly, there needs to be comparative approaches. By this I mean what best practices are there from each of these regional communities that can best be put to good use in any conception of an AU government? This means that ECOWAS's peacekeeping/peace enforcement wing ECOMOG could be analysed for use in a regional organisation like SAARC that has experienced problems over Kashmir/India and Pakistan. What is it that ECOMOG has been able to do in enforcing peace that SAARC can learn from?


Thirdly, there needs to be collaboration, as exemplified by the donation of $1m by the Arab League to the African Union's peacekeeping forces.

I have further arguments that can be elaborated on in later entries, but for now, these three points remain the crux of my personal vision of an AU government. Even then, ramifications of these elements remain, and can be very much expounded upon.

---

Back to Ohmae's point in his introduction, he talks about how the end of history was a false idea, and that the "voiceless" and "invisible"..."have entered with a vengeance, and they have demands--economic demands--to make." The question though is to whom should the demands be made? He believes that people turn to the UN, which is nothing more than "a collection of nation states", but also other regional groupings like OPEC/G7/ASEAN/APEC/NAFTA/EU. For him, all these are nothing more than groupings of nation states.

He wonders whether these actors are truly players in the global economy, by coming up with 4 "i"s:

1. Investment
2. Industry
3. Information Technology
4. Individual Consumers

Along with these 4 I's is the global economy that works very well, thankyou, with them. It probably means, in his view, that "the middleman role of the nation states [is] obsolete". Instead "geographical units", such as Hong Kong, Kansai region, or Catalonia wield more significant power.

Though he believes in the "region states", his port of entry is that nation states--as understood in the traditional Westphalian system" are obsolete, and that they have become "unnatural."

The next couple of chapters promise to be exciting!

Till next time!

Will the Real "Regional Integrationist" Stand Up?

Rare is the "regional integrationist that will not concede defeat against what I consider the Eurocentric paradigm of the EU being the de facto trend-setter of global regional integration. Even more rare is the one that will openly advocate "the possibility of a UN reform in which regional organisations would be given seats in the Security Council along with states."

What is not strange is who is doing the advocating -- none other than Luk Van Langenhove of the United Nations University Comparative Regional Integration Studies [UNU-CRIS]. It is a delicious irony that the Belgian be based at a research institution on regional integration that is also home to one of the most advanced regions in the West--Flanders.

This ostensible little detail about the regions is important, in my view, because as I read the article linked on the UNU-CRIS website, I could not help but mull over the use of the word regions, especially in the context of EU integration.

Langenhove makes an interesting an important point that:

The EU is the world's most advanced form of supranational regionalism. It has managed to develop a model that incorporates political elements in a deep economic integration, and challenges existing assumptions about governance.

.

This level of sophistication seems to have a lot to do with the EU's Committee of Regions that has played an important role in cementing this so-called "deep economic integration." One website describes the CoR as:

The Committee of Regions is a new advisory body established by the
Maastricht Treaty, to take into account the views of regional and local
government in European decision making. The advisory Committee of Regions is
a compromise between the aspirations of powerful regions in federally
organised member states (such as Germany, Spain and Belgium), which have
long asked for direct influence on EU decision making, and the views of much
more centralised member states (such as the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands)
whose regional governments have only derived powers from a strong central
government.

A very superficial response to the EU's Committee of Regions was to think how one could be replicated elsewhere, say, in the African Union countries, where a number of countries--say many along the West african sub-region--fall under the ambit of regions. In my own country of Ghana, there are no less than ten regions, with regional ministers and district chief executives of those regions. This all for a country of roughly 22 million!

So, I can most definitely conceive of an AU that has a system like the EU's CoR, where regions are twinned and affiliated in a manner that they act as separate entities within the states they are part of.

But the operative word, today, is "states".

Van Langenhove prefaces his article with some history about states and the Westphalian order. As regards the latter, he maintains:

The Westphalian order that emerged in Europe and now spans the world proved to have a stabilising effect, making it difficult to change borders to create bigger units, especially now that war has largely been abandoned as a means of expanding territory. But some existing states are under pressure to split up as a result of nationalism and calls for cultural autonomy.

The alarm bells that the author gives about the stability of the Westphalian system--and how that is is danger is more relevant, because it means that the system is imperfect and can be modified. But does that mean that regions are the answer to resolving those potential dangers?

The author does not go this way in saying the region is a panacea. Rather, he argues that:

I myself believe that an announcement of the "death of the state" is – to paraphrase Mark Twain – gravely exaggerated. In the foreseeable future, states will remain important centres of governance. But in an attempt to face the challenges of globalisation, states can – on a voluntary basis – turn to world and local regions to complement and even strengthen their power. As such, the world of states would gradually become a world of states and of regions.

Regions as Complementary Roles
So, in fact, regions are complements to the nation state--and not substitutes. World and local regions helping to complement and strengthen the power are important in going this way. Note what Van Langenhove says about the EU:

European integration has been accompanied by "de-federalisation": the emergence of sub-national regional governance. The EU is not just a collection of 27 member states; it is also an association of hundreds of local regions. Regions can be found at all territorial levels. One could organise nice academic debates about what a region actually is, but a more pragmatic approach is just to accept the plurality of the concept and focus on what regions are not. They are not sovereign states!

In my own country of Ghana, the Ashanti region--the second biggest region after the Northern region--is renowned for having called for independence from Ghana many years ago. Belgium's own recent troubles that lasted more than six months when the relatively stronger Flanders region wanted to do what looked like a split from Bruxelles-capitale politicking is a testament of the potential divisiveness of ensuring strong regions within states.

States won't disappear
Thing, though, is that states are not going to go away any time soon--neither will regions. Extrapolate this to the international level, and it seems likely that most regional organisations that we know will not go away any time soon either! Rather, I foresee that they will do the natural thing of evolving and transforming into bigger entities, such as ECOWAS Secretariat into an ECOWAS Commission, and the former OAU into the African Union in 2003--very much modelled on a hybrid between the United Nations and the European Union.

That ASEAN now has a charter, where the EU does not is not necessarily an indication of the sophistication of that ten-member grouping, but rather one of the decision to evolve into a more supra-national entity with what is considered legal personality.

These are certainly big ideas coming from a big article, and a lot more could be said. In the interests of time, I will broach this article at another time, for the ideas have tremendous resonance in the regional integration paradigm. That the EU is to play a greater role in the development of regional integration worldwide is a palatable idea.

It is a shame, therefore, to see it using the Economic Partnership Agreements as a stick to disrupt the regional integration initiatives of the AU countries.

Still, Van Langenhove's point here is not to be sneezed at, and I sincerely believe that it is providing the grounds for a critical and progressive look at regional organisation as well:

The multiple world of regions could be a way to replace the illusion of a single national identity with the more realist view that people hold plural regional identities. As such, the world of regions might not only be a more complex world but also one with more chances of peace and freedom. Europe can help to make this challenging vision real.

ASEAN/SAARC Integration Gospel, according to The Economist

You have got to give it to the Economist. Once it propounds theories on regional integration, people are bound to listen. It hasn't been in this business of writing and influencing for almost two centuries for nothing. But that has got to change.

On issues of regional integration, people are getting smart, and being more discerning. Old attitudes that seek to see the EU as the precursor of regional integration everywhere, or those that seek to perpetuate the idea that it is because of countries against each other that cause the fragmentation of regional block are not quite fading into insignificance, but fading...somewhere!

Whilst there is some truth to these ideas, it's always important to look beneath the surface.

The Economist sadly, in its latest article looking at ASEAN, fails to do so. In my view, any generalist on regional integration could have come up with the view.

It starts off by saying all that we know: "The European Union has plenty of critics".

By gum, surely a secondary school leaver could have come up with that!

Then it goes on:

"For Asian leaders who seek greater regional integration across the continent, however, the EU surely provides at least a distant goal, if not a model. But time spent in Brussels talking to officials at the European Commission about the EU’s relations with Asia highlights the gap between the EU and its nearest Asian equivalents"

Let me not begin to presume that I am cognisant of the discussions that transpired between EU officials, but I can say authoritatively that this post goes to fly in the face of the Economist magazine's claim. In that article, EU officials from the 28th session of the Inter-Parliamentary ASEAN Assembly were claiming that ASEAN's model was a commendable one. They went on:

"We have good relations and strong economic links. The EU is a large investor and we create a lot of trade in Asean and vice-versa."

2. "Apart from having a common economic interest, our regional cooperation is the most advanced and successful in the world,"

3. "Until last year AIPA was still called the Parliamentary Organisation. It stresses parliamentary influence in Asean just like the European parliament"

Clearly, saying that there is work to be done does not discount the commendable nature of the organisation that is ASEAN, but in my view, the Economist should not go away making readers feel that ASEAN is clamoring to be like the EU--otherwise the ASEAN Charter would not have been passed!

Still, it is interesting to note that the article talks about war having been fought among the current 27-member-strong EU several decades ago, so why does it feel that if there are issues between India and Pakistan in SAARC over Kashmir, the two countries cannot sort it out? It writes:

In comparison, the two big Asian integrative ventures—the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC)—are puny striplings.

ASEAN has at least achieved the first aim. Formed in 1967, just after a period of “confrontation”, just short of war, between Indonesia and Malaysia, it has made armed conflict between its members (now ten of them) seem very unlikely.

SAARC is not even there yet. It is riven by bloody internal conflicts in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, and a dormant but unresolved dispute over Kashmir between India and Pakistan that has sparked three wars in the past. A regional conflagration, sadly, cannot be ruled out.

In Brussels, SAARC hardly gets a mention. This is not just because its contribution to regional integration is so inchoate. It is also because, within South Asia, India physically, politically and economically dwarfs its neighbours.

This reference to India/Pakistan is a development that needs must be talked about in discussions over any SAARC integration, but I would have assumed the esteemed magazine to have elaborated a bit more than the sentiment that things can turn into a "regional conflagration."

It is fair to say that integration in SAARC is slow and, well, very slow, but it is important to put things into perspective. SAARC and the EU are far from comparable. EU and ASEAN, yes, but SAARC and EU, no!

I like the fact that the Economist has woven a news story of the EU wanting an FTA with India and ASEAN around this piece, but it has done some selective interpretation of the story, in my view, to underscore how formidably efficient the EU is--and, frankly, that's not on.

Sure, the EU had problems with Burma, but let's face it, ASEAN has not kicked that country out. The ASEAN Charter is a reality and Burma does not look to be going anywhere!

It is true that the Charter might have issues on voting; and the beefing up of the Secretariat, inter alia (note that ECOWAS without a charter transformed into a Commission so as to become more "efficient"), but it is not as if ASEAN will do it today is it?

Even the much-maligned African Union has moved away from the doctrine of non-interference, albeit slowly. ASEAN will go that way some day.

In my view, it's all about shades of gray.

It is important to talk about SAARC and how it can be helped, but the EU, I suspect, knows that it because it has preferential relations with the India (a rather dominant figure within SAARC), the organisation can probably go fish.

I suspect further that any greater proactiveness by India within SAARC might go to ruffle the EU's growing feathers.

SAARC's Existential Angst (1)

At a time when the SAARC region is in the news thanks to one of its key members, Pakistan, it beggars belief that there has been little effort by the regional organisation, that will be celebrating its 22nd anniversary in December, on the issue of regional security .

And I should know.

I come from a region where regional security has been put on a pedestal on account of the internecine conflicts that engulfed the region in the 1990s. Despite the hegemon of Nigeria, the oil-rich country rarely ever became an obstruction in the development of peace in the ECOWAS region. Nigeria was instrumental in providing significant financial capital towards ECOMOG--the peacekeeping wing of ECOWAS. In 2007, ECOWAS has transformed from a Secretariat to a Commission with commissioners leading on the major issues pertinent to the region. Bottom line? ECOWAS, for all its problems and challenges, has moved on. That is not to say that things cannot be done better, and mindsets changed. For what it's worth we see developments.

Very little changed can be said for SAARC.

Not to deny SAARC having golf tournaments, but I find it ludicrous that a regional organisation with the size that SAARC has (seven members, excluding Afghanistan which joined recently) cannot get its regional organisation going!

Contrast this with the East African Community, which collapsed in 1977, but re-invigorated itself in 1993. Today, Rwanda and Burundi are members, making the organisation 5-member strong. Yet it's going strong. ECOWAS has 15--and look at the regional structures it has: a Parliament; a Community Court; and a strong regional security initiative.

SAARC is nowhere near.

I was encouraged, however, last week to read that Pakistan is going to host SAARC Police Chiefs meeting in February. I thought that here was encouraging news that SAARC was finally getting serious. I had the visceral feeling that the meeting was too closely associated with teh War on Terror, especially as Pakistan's role in that war was cited.

I wondered whether it would make headline news next year when Pakistan hosts the Third Meeting on Home Ministers, because it is a putative ally of the Bush administration, or would it be consigned to the proverbial dustbin of "irrelevant" news?

On the positive note, it was good to see that the SAARC Home Ministers are interested in establishing an electronic network of police authorities of SAARC countries.



It's certainly something that here, in the ECOWAS region, given the spate of gun-related crimes, we could do with! When the West Africa Police Chiefs Committee met a few weeks ago, I do not re-call hearing anything concrete like this SAARC proposal.

However, what was said by Ghana’s Minister of Interior Nana Obiri Boahen, was this:

I am also honoured to be part of this historic occasion when the Police Gendarmerie from our sister Francophone countries are joining their counterparts to discuss issues of mutual and common interest.

I am told that the ECOWAS Commission is expanding its Political Peacekeeping and Security Department to include a police unit that will take care of police issues within the ECOWAS community.

This laudable idea has been on the commission’s agenda for quite some time now and I am particularly happy that the idea is being implemented.

from:http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/speeches/WapccoIntMinister20071003.asp

In my view, such lacuna go to underscore complementarities that I have talked about before being factored in any critical and progressive discussion on regional integration.

African Union Peacekeepers Were Only Doing Their Job, but ASEAN must act in Myanmar

Recent events in Burma and Sudan have conspired to remind me about the need to have regional responses to these regional crises. Regional, because Myanmar is a member of ASEAN, and Sudan, a member of not just IGAD, but the more formidable African Union.

When I heard the news of the 10 AU peacekeepers having been killed over the weekend, I found myself almost on the verge of tears.

What happened to "never again" in Rwanda? More importantly, I couldn't help but remember, in uncanny parallels, how 10 Belgian peacekeepers were killed in Rwanda, prompting a hasty retreat. Whether Belgium was justified or not in the withdrawal, let's just say that in 1994, at the height of the genocide, no-one could have blamed them.

In my view, a quick reminder of the quasi-parallels are worth reminding ourselves about:

In January 1994, three months before the killings, Major General Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian commander of the U.N. peacekeepers in Rwanda, informed the Belgian government that the Hutus were preparing for a large-scale slaughter of Tutsis. Despite repeated warnings, the Belgians refused to provide or request further assistance.

In February, Belgian Foreign Minister Claes sent the Belgian Senate a telex that reported the possibility of genocide. No additional precautions were authorized.

The massacres ultimately were provoked April 6, 1994, by the death of Rwandan President Habyarimana, a Hutu, blown up in his jet as it approached Kigali airport on his way back from Arusha, Tanzania. Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira, also a Hutu, was killed on the same plane. The two presidents had just agreed to let Tutsi refugees in Burundi return to Rwanda.

Reacting to Habyarimana’s death, Hutu leaders proceeded with their plan to exterminate Rwanda’s Tutsi minority.

General Dallaire, the UNAMIR commander, saw the developing danger. He asked Uwilingiyimana, Rwanda’s Hutu prime minister, to speak on Rwandan radio to help calm the nation. He sent 10 Belgian soldiers in U.N. blue berets to pick up Uwilingiyimana at her house.

The Belgians took gunfire at the house, and when Uwilingiyimana tried to slip out the back, the militant Hutus caught her and killed her on the spot.

Then the 10 Belgians, with U.N. advice, agreed to disarm, and the Hutus took them in trucks to Camp Kigali, a military compound. Here, a mob of Hutu soldiers attacked the Belgians.

The Hutus beat several of the Belgians to death with iron bars. A few peacekeepers ran to a cinder block hut and tried to fight off the attackers. Hours later, the last of the 10 was killed with a grenade.

Shocked by the death of the 10 Belgians, Foreign Minister Claes asked U.N. secretary-general Boutros-Ghali for permission to withdraw all Belgian troops from the peacekeeping force. Claes also told Boutros-Ghali that the U.N. should suspend its entire operation in Rwanda.

In a letter to the U.N. Security Council, Boutros-Ghali said a Belgian withdrawal would cripple the UNAMIR mission
from: http://frankwarner.typepad.com/free_frank_warner/2004/04/belgiums_war_cr.html

In the same vein, a Nigerian withdrawal would cripple the AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan) that is about to become part of a UN-AU hybrid 26 000-strong force. This, despite the fact that Nigerian AU peacekeepers were also killed--and Nigeria has been emphatic about this, too:

"The Federal government of Nigeria condemns this attack and is concerned that this incident may undermine the credibility of the international mission," presidential spokesman Olusegun Adeniyi said in a statement.

But he ruled out any withdrawal from the peacekeeping mission.

"Nigeria will still continue to participate because we are committed to our commitment in Darfur under the UN/AU hybrid force," Adeniyi added.
from:http://www.africasia.com/services/news/newsitem.php?area=africa&item=071002210557.3t71v59e.php

Meanwhile, it was interesting that in all the responses of conflict management offered by listeners to BBC World Service news last Friday in News Hour, it had to take Mark Malloch-Brown, former UN Deputy Secretary-general now-turned junior foreign minister in the Gordon Brown administration in the UK, to talk about an ASEAN response to the crisis in Myanmar/Burma.

In a manner which I personally felt was slightly self-serving on Australia's part, it was interesting to read that Australia did not wholly condem an ASEAN response; in fact, it praised ASEAN:

perhaps most significantly, the ASEAN leaders meeting in New York last week released an uncharacteristically strong statement condemning the violence, calling for the release of all political detainees, including Suu Kyi, and imploring all parties to find a political solution.
from:http://www.theage.com.au/news/opinion/regional-pressure-can-change-burma/2007/10/02/1191091111557.html?page=2

Perhaps I spoke too soon?:

It is ASEAN's new robust position that offers an opportunity for Australia.

Having successfully assumed a leadership role at APEC and enjoying strong relationships with a number of ASEAN countries — including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and ASEAN's chair, Singapore — Australia is well positioned to work with them in co-ordinating a regional response, including multiparty talks.

However it turns out in Burma, what with China, Japan and India playing key roles in the resolution of the crisis, what is crystal-clear to me is that the world ought to be moving slowly and surely towards a time when crises -- as exemplified by that of the ambush of the AU peacekeepers (ending in a meeting of the AU's Peace and Security Council), and that of Burma -- prompt a visceral direction towards a regional response.

About this, there must be no question.

Three-Day Accra Meeting on ECOWAS Free Movement--Still Valid?

As newly-elected Sierra Leonian president Koroma returns from meeting both ECOWAS and Mano River Union officials, ECOWAS ministers are meeting today, Tuesday, here in Accra.

The objective of their meeting is to discuss ECOWAS's free movement protocol.

Top on the agenda will be:

ways of overcoming problems militating against the implementation of the protocol

dealing effectively in countering the ignorance of citizens about their rights under the 1979 protocol

effectively dealing with the harmonisation of the ECOWAS passport, adopted by Headds of State of Government in 2000, "including the incorporation of biometric features such as digital photographs and thumb prints which not only enhance security but also reduce the possibility of fraud and forgery" (from:http://www.afriquenligne.fr/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=9246&pop=1&page=0&Itemid=115

While we can balk at CARICOM earlier this year for having failed to "secure" a free movement protocol by way of its Cricket World Cup, we can at least hope they might also be monitoring events worldwide to see how best to bring into fruition a visa-free area -- as exempplified by the ECOWAS-zone in 2007 -- where West African citizens can veritably make any of the fifteen countries their residence for a good 90 days, before regularising.

Right now, though, the ECOWAS passport, in my view, ought to be harmonised in ALL countries.

For it to be applicable in only SIX member states some 28 years after the free protocol was adopted is a woeful expression of where ECOWAS has gone. These six countries currently using the passport are: Benin, Guinea, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal ; the others using an ECOWAS travel certificate are: Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, The Gambia, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria and Sierra Leone

"Fixed deadlines" and "operationalisation" come to mind in a fast and furious way!

Here's hoping that the leaders meeting in the three-day meet here in Accra will be (im)pressed upon by us--common and concerned citizens--to come up with a date that is more definitive than one comparable to what is looking like a pie-in-the-sky date of 2009 for the ECO--ECOWAS' regional currency.

In checking ECOWAS's news website here, the last meeting you see is that of 19 September!

Without a google search, how on earth would anyone have known about this meeting? ECOWAS, PULL your socks up.

You are now a Commission--and things gotta get a-changing...

Now, chance would be a fine thing!

Here be Some Revelations: The European Union's View on Regional Integration (in ASEAN)

All's well that ends well--even in ASEAN, which has a very different kind of regional cooperation to that of the EU. You know you're doing something right, I suppose, when the EU tells you that your regional cooperation is the best and most successful in the world. Check these soundbites out by EU Parliamentarian, Hartmut Nassauer, invited to the 28th session of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly:

1. "We have good relations and strong economic links. The EU is a large investor and we create a lot of trade in Asean and vice-versa."

2. "Apart from having a common economic interest, our regional cooperation is the most advanced and successful in the world,"

3. "Until last year AIPA was still called the Parliamentary Organisation. It stresses parliamentary influence in Asean just like the European parliament"

A very superficial analysis would reveal, from these quotes at least, that the EU is no less than pleased with how ASEAN does business. It is evidently looking forward to ASEAN becoming a bigger bloc--as evidenced by this statement here:

Nassauer said the EU would support Asean the best it could in its efforts to speed up integration of the Asean community particularly on the single common market

I guess there can be nothing wrong with parties seeking to maximise cooperation, while contemporraneously lending credence to the maxim that there are "no permanent friends, only permanent allies", as so wittily enunciated by Palmerston with regard to British foreign policy in the nineteenth century.

So, you've got no bother, really, wondering why the EU would be making such proclamations at this time.

Either way, I'm bored. Bored because these pronouncements are nothing mere than reflections of a less-than-altruistic motive by the EU to woo the ASEAN region like never before. And here's the bombshell: the EU betrays itself by giving us mere mortals a sneak preview into how it conceives of regional integration. Read carefully:

the basic element for the EU approach of regional cooperation was

how to strike a balance between the super powers like China, India and the United States

.

"The only chance for the weaker and smaller states is for them to act together. For a balanced development, South-east Asian states had decided to act as a regional cooperation,"

he added.

If that be the case, why the hell will the European Union not leave Africa alone to manage its own regional integration? Why does it seek to force one for us--as evidenced by the aggressive pursuit of the Economic Partnership Agreement, slated for December this year?

Does it mean, therefore, that it's one rule for ASEAN, and another altogether for African Union's regional organisations?

ECOWAS -- The "Mother of all Regional Economic Communities in Africa"? (So Says EAC)

At least, this was what the visiting ambassador from the East African Community, Julius Onen, to the ECOWAS Commission on 24 July said. He is reputed to have said this when he was "exposed" to the ECOWAS Operational system.

This was no ordinary visit. It was one from no less than the five-member East African Community, which recently accepted Rwanda and Burundi in its fold. What is most significant about this visit is that it goes to underscore the very essence of the regional integration I had been adavocatinig ever since I started this blog, and way back in 2004, when I set up RegionsWatch.

It was conceived of, inter alia, as a way of sharing information about different kinds of regionalisms. To see that even without my instrumentality, this is happening(!) is a very positive sign. Maybe. it's possible that the long enough you preach your word out there on the internet, the more likely someone, somewhere is going to see and pass the word on;-) Someone might be patting their back for promoting this exchange, I'm sure!

Either way, it is all-so-exciting to see such important developments, and when these are expressed through information sharing and best practices, it becomes all the more interesting...and uncanny!

Best practices on regional integration are not new; the UN's Economic Commission for Africa created the Assessing Regional Integration in Africa(ARIA) as a way of doing just that.

In my estimation, however, it had served more to use ARIA as a way of monitoring and evaluating regional integration than using it to look at best practices in regional integration.

Either way, I'm grinning like a chesire-cat at the idea that suddenly, as if by magic, it is being discussed in no less than a place like ECOWAS that has moved progressively on communicating what it does to the ECOWAS citizens--and beyond--albeit in a painfully slow manner.

A quick look at the Communications department of the ECOWAS Commission reveals some interesting ideas about where ECOWAS would like to see itself. As to the operationalisation of these ideas, one lives in hope. It is good to see that some of the following have been slated:

Activities



· The West African Bulletin

· ECOWAS in Brief

· Publication on ECOMOG

· Brochure on the new ECOWAS Commission

Coming back specifically to the context of the press release from the newly-designed ECOWAS Commission website, it is important to disclose one very important piece of information about the future of EAC-ECOWAS relations, as well as the EAC itself:

Ambassador Onen disclosed the EAC’s plans to transform into a commission and
intensify its collaboration with African States and RECs as evidenced by the
bi-annual tripartite meetings with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

I've blogged a number of times about the EAC, and quite a few times about ECOWAS.

The last comparison I made between EAC and ECOWAS yielded in this post. It was all about communication.

I'm glad to be blogging about something more concrete now. Let's keep fingers crossed for more of these positive developments!!